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Rather than wondering if alien beings exist in the cosmos, 
let’s assume that they are all around us, everywhere, at all 
scales: not just dogs and penguins and magnolia trees, but 
also cornbread and polyester and the city of Orlando and 
sidewalks and nectarines. I started asking one particular 
question about their inhumanity, a question I have previously 
given the name alien phenomenology: what do objects 
experience? What is it like to be a thing?
Ian Bogost, “Inhuman,” in Inhuman Nature
Introduction
The Voyager 2 spacecraft, currently hurtling at great speed away from 
Earth and towards the edge of our familiar solar system, along with its 
twin Voyager 1, will be the first human-made machines to pass beyond the 
heliopause, and to encounter the objects that make up interstellar space.1 
Sometime after this, perhaps as early as 2025, its sensors will be switched off 
and it will continue, inert, through space until it approaches the star Sirius 
in about 296,000 years.2 The Voyager spacecraft are not the first human 
objects to cross into interstellar space – human-made electromagnetic waves 
began leaving Earth over a century ago. But the Voyagers are the most 
anthropomorphic object yet to leave behind the aura of our sun’s energy, 
the energy that is the root of life on Earth, of human life, and ultimately of 
human technology. Voyager 2 is a machine built by humans, incorporating 
metals extracted by human ingenuity from the Earth, plastic derived from 
decayed organic matter and plutonium manipulated by highly skilled 
human engineers. There is also a time capsule aboard the vessel, carrying 
information about the human race considered relevant by the scientists who 
launched it in 1977.3 Among other things, this includes a disc known as 
the “Golden Record”, containing analogue-coded photographs of human 
life, greetings in 55 different Earth languages, and music from Beethoven 
to Chuck Berry. Moreover, it carries sensory organs designed to gather 
information about phenomena that human scientists consider important, 
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and it conveys that information in a way that humans on Earth can receive 
and interpret. Voyager 2 is an object made of human materials and ideas, 
and it is careering as fast as possible away from us, making its way further 
into alien territory by the instant.
The point of this story is not to marvel at the way in which an artificial 
object, intrinsically linked to science and human exploration, can gradually 
become alien to us. In popular parlance, the alien is that which is strange, 
inhuman and sometimes hostile. It is often used to describe the possible 
residents of other planetary bodies, perhaps beyond the edge of our solar 
system. Our desire to explore will soon bring a human-made artefact in 
contact with this alien territory. But Voyager 2 was already an alien before 
it was ever launched into space, despite the immense human effort put 
into creating it. Like all nonhumans, the qualities that define Voyager 2 
and its way of being in the world are for the most part inaccessible to us 
and are evident only in interactions between it and other objects – that is, 
how it senses and relates to its environment (including us), and how its 
environment relates to it. We built this machine, yet the argument that it 
is not fully accessible to us is a key aspect of one of the most important 
theoretical influences on this book, Graham Harman’s object-oriented 
philosophy (OOP), also known as object-oriented ontology (OOO). OOO 
is a prominent set of theoretical, practical and artistic ideas that have 
significantly influenced the so-called nonhuman turn, a movement in the 
contemporary humanities away from an anthropocentric view of the world 
and towards foregrounding nonhumans and their perspectives. In later 
pages, the details of Harman’s ontology and other similar positions will be 
described, depicting the universe as a glittering fractal of objects and their 
relations. An object like Voyager 2 has complex relationships both with 
individual humans (such as engineers and politicians) and with a human 
culture that promotes exploration of the universe, but it also interacts with 
billions of nonhuman objects (such as electrons and stars) in ways that are 
closed off from our experience.
Nevertheless, something about Voyager 2 will reflect its human origins. 
Its means of signalling to Earth, its evidence of human workmanship and 
particularly its cargo of precious images and ideas, all point to its close 
relations with humanity that may well persist beyond the lifespan of the 
Introduction 11
human race. Voyager 2 possesses human-like qualities in that it bears 
distinct evidence of close modelling upon humans and human intent in their 
design, although it is unlikely to be confused with a human. In contrast, 
the case studies discussed in this book are frequently compared with 
humans. We project humanness onto them and pick and choose the alien 
qualities that are of most interest to us. But this book will argue that every 
anthropomorphic machine, every sensor, every robot, every interface, every 
word, and every concept of future or transformative technology is as alien to 
us as is Voyager 2.
Anthropomorphic machines are marvellous. We marvel at them. From 
intuitive chatbot interfaces to fully-fledged bipedal robots, we love to 
look for human-like qualities in machines. Anthropomorphic machines 
are charming when they work and frustrating when they fail. This is not 
necessarily because we see ourselves as the epitome of good engineering; we 
do not need to think of ourselves as quite that vain. But in many machines, 
particularly those that we bring into our homes, anthropomorphism 
aids in our ability to use them since humans are typically very good at 
communicating with other humans. They usually reproduce elements 
of human bodies or performance that make it easier for human users to 
comprehend how they relate to the world, apparently replicating qualities 
like eyesight and the ability to learn to speak. But we do not build machines 
to be like humans. We build machines to pretend to be humans. And by 
discussing specific technologies alongside contemporary anthrodecentric 
philosophy, this book aims to address the marvellous complexity of 
machine sensation and experience that anthropomorphic discourse tends 
to obscure. To a large extend, this is done through the mobilisation of and 
experimentation with OOO.
In engineering contexts, “anthropomorphic machines” typically refers 
to bipedal or social robots. Here, the term is much broader. I leave it 
deliberately vague in acknowledgement of the fact that anthropomorphism 
can be seen in an enormous variety of technological objects and other 
nonhumans. But a key factor that links all of the case studies in this book 
is the fact that they were designed or marketed as material or metaphorical 
mimics of humans. The case studies are, in the order presented:
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1. The Microsoft Kinect, a natural user interface (NUI) for the 
popular Microsoft Xbox One (a videogame console);
2. William Grey Walter’s robot tortoises (Machina speculatrix);
3. Terry Winograd’s SHRDLU, an early language-using computer 
program; and
4. The concept of the gynoid sex robot.
These case studies were selected for particular reasons, and those reasons 
will be explained in each respective chapter. Although these objects are all 
human-made, and all possess qualities that make them anthropomorphic, 
I argue that anthrodecentric inquiry focusses investigation onto how 
anthropomorphic qualities in machines may obfuscate and confuse 
questions about their place in human society. Each are examples of 
protagonists in episodes when humans and artefacts have managed to 
comprehend each other successfully enough to form a useful working 
relationship, as well as occasions when an artefact stubbornly refuses to 
cooperate, when the human expects more than the artefact can deliver, or 
when the human does not act in a way that the artefact requires in order 
to do what the human wants it to do. Anthropomorphism is something 
that is done by humans in reaction to particular qualities in machines. Not 
everyone sees the same anthropomorphic qualities in machines. What might 
seem human-like to one human may to another human seem uncanny or a 
tool through which governments or corporations pursue their own agendas. 
This is an obstacle to consensus-building about the possible societal 
consequences of building anthropomorphic machines. This book contends 
that these episodes are usefully illuminated through greater exploration 
of the artefacts’ sensory worlds and speculation about their internal 
experiences, even if those experiences are radically separate from us. In 
other words, we should take nonhuman perspectives seriously.
Anthropomorphism
Since it is easy for us to interact with human-like objects, and it is often 
easier to copy living things rather than invent brand new ways of being 
in the world, humans frequently anthropomorphise advanced machines. 
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Anthropomorphic qualities can improve the performance of artefacts, or 
they can improve human knowledge of human bodies and minds. The 
machines discussed in this book are all anthropomorphised for at least one 
of these two reasons. But anthropomorphism is a trick that is deceptive 
but persuasive, and consequently valuable or dangerous depending on 
the context.4
We might think of technology as existing on a spectrum of complexity. 
One end of this complexity spectrum is occupied by the simplest of 
machines, such as levers and glass cubes, and the other is occupied by our 
most advanced computers. Inevitably, the advanced end of the spectrum 
has become associated with machines that we heavily anthropomorphise. 
Computers “think”, “hear” and “make mistakes”. These complex machines 
are the subject of much study both in philosophy and cultural studies. They 
have directed us to rethink what it means to be human and how we interact 
with objects. They visibly, and often deliberately, blur boundaries that 
modern Westerners are used to thinking of as impervious.
But our tendency to anthropomorphise is also evident in other kinds of 
objects. It can be seen in the assignment of human qualities to objects in the 
natural world, such as gods, animals and natural disasters.5 Moreover, we 
can trace human interest in anthropomorphic nonhumans through stories 
of more primitive machines. The humanoid robots found in science fiction 
are the modern incarnations of venerable stories like Pygmalion’s statue 
and the golem (a clay humanoid enchanted into movement by a rabbi).6 
Narratives in which human-like sculptures come to life have been common 
since ancient times and are represented in early science fiction, when robots 
were monstrous and eerie.7 Medieval automata and Japanese karakuri were 
frequently made in the image of humans,8 and today the compulsion is 
evident in our most sophisticated AI systems. The case studies of this book 
are diverse in structure and sensory capabilities, but they share similarities 
because of the human-like attributes that we give them.
The desire for anthropomorphism often comes into conflict with 
requirements that we may have for machines, such as skills that humans do 
not have. It also sometimes diverts attention to things that do not aid in the 
task assigned to the nonhuman. As Brian Duffy puts it, “anthropomorphism 
obstructs the fact that human form is not the ideal for a machine.”9 But 
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that does not necessarily mean that designing human-like characteristics 
into a machine is necessarily frivolous or vain. Anthropomorphism in 
technology is a practical concern (such as when designing robots for 
therapeutic purposes10) as well as being indicative of certain preoccupations 
of human designers (theorists have identified preoccupations such as vanity 
as well as religious faith11). Anthropomorphised entities are more likely 
to be deemed worthy of our care and consideration.12 For example, the 
term “Mother Earth” is often used by people who wish others to behave 
in an environmentally conscious way.13 Studies have shown that humans 
are more likely to deem nonhumans responsible for their actions if the 
nonhumans have anthropomorphic qualities.14 The greater the potential 
action and “intelligence” of the technology, the greater we consider its 
ability for rational thought and decision-making. Claiming that an artefact 
is human-like can also be a way of emphasising its dangerous qualities. 
One of the most common tropes in science fiction is that of robots who 
are created to help humans but end up posing a threat. They are almost 
always anthropomorphic robots. They might be visually anthropomorphic, 
like the robots gone amok in Westworld,15 or they might have functionally 
anthropomorphic language and conversation skills like HAL in 2001: A 
Space Odyssey.16 It is psychologically easier for humans to furnish objects 
with moral responsibility if they have a stronger resemblance to humans.
As Kate Darling points out, anthropomorphic framing of technological 
artefacts may be desirable or undesirable (from a human point of view).17 
Anthropomorphising an object allows us to manipulate the response 
of human consumers, which might be a good thing with a Fitbit that 
encourages people to exercise more, but a negative thing if it can persuade 
people to release personal data.18 The resemblance need not be physical. 
One experiment by Clifford Nass and colleagues revealed that humans are 
even anxious about offending computers.19 Participants performed a task on 
Computer A and were then asked to evaluate the computer’s performance 
on the same machine. But a second group was asked to enter their opinion 
of Computer A on Computer B. When the participants evaluated the 
computer on the same machine, participants were less critical than when 
the evaluation was performed on Computer B. As Sherry Turkle puts it, 
“participants do not want to insult a computer ‘to its face.’”20 Even when 
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machines are not designed to look human, people impose human values and 
relationships onto them. Anthropomorphism can be useful for designers 
who wish to emphasise the human-like qualities of their creations for profit.
Machines may only bear a resemblance to part of the human form, 
and that part is likely emphasised by the designer. Take the case of a 
glass eye. In this case the goal is to replicate as realistically as possible the 
appearance of the eye, without its visual functions. But another type of 
anthropomorphism is evident in technologies that mimic the function of 
human bodies. A pertinent corollary to the glass eye is the retinal prosthesis, 
a technology used in the treatment of macular degeneration, a common eye 
condition that can seriously impede human vision. The retinal prosthesis 
attempts to merge naturally with the remaining eye tissue and stimulate 
parts of the retina.21 It simulates human sensation, but it is structurally 
very dissimilar from the eye and the user is visibly cyberised. The glass eye 
is visually anthropomorphic, while the retinal prosthesis is functionally 
anthropomorphic. Functional anthropomorphism can also be seen in 
our daily interaction with technology: in the assignment of names to our 
computers, or the impulse to swear at them when they malfunction.22
In semi-autonomous technological artefacts, sensation and perception 
of external data may be more or less functionally anthropomorphic. For 
example, a robot arm in an assembly line needs to be able to sense any 
instructions being sent to it from an external object (such as a computer), 
to have proprioception (an understanding of the position of its “body parts” 
in space) and to have a knowledge of where other objects are located (such 
as the object being assembled). Other machines have sensory apparatuses 
that make them better suited to environments with a lot of people. A social 
robot is most effective with both visual anthropomorphism and functional 
sensory anthropomorphism. It should be able to relate what it sees, hears, 
feels and smells in a way that seems natural to human users. Yet when we 
consider the mechanisms that produce these effects, it is evident that natural 
appearances are in fact highly contrived artificial senses. Machines do not 
have ears, nor do they have the centres of the brain responsible for hearing, 
but may have microphones and sound chips instead. Their sensation and 
perception of phenomena begins as machine-like and is heavily mediated 
to become human-like. We can have some insight into how the sound chip 
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functions, easily performing some feats and being unable to perform others. 
But ultimately the structure of the sound card is only related to us through 
other objects. Why would we choose functionally anthropomorphic or 
visually anthropomorphic qualities in different cases? Our choice reveals the 
intended use and cultural or practical value of the artefact.
Choosing when to use anthropomorphic language and when to use 
more alien language can divide us on social issues. The boundary between 
human and nonhuman is drawn, policed, and transgressed in each of the 
case studies discussed. Acceptance of anthropomorphism comes more 
easily to some people than others. To some humans, anthropomorphic 
machines are endearing. To others, the same qualities that are meant to be 
endearing seem uncanny or even blasphemous.23 Sex robots (or sexbots) 
are discussed in Chapter 5 of this book and are an excellent example. 
The ethics of acting out a rape fantasy with a sexbot is dependent on 
the perceived anthropomorphic or alien qualities of the sexbot. To an 
individual who sees more alien qualities in a sexbot, it is more tool-like 
than human-like and it cannot be raped. To an individual who sees more 
anthropomorphic qualities in a sexbot, the question of consent becomes 
more relevant. Note that this may not be because the sexbot is deserving 
of rights for her own sake, but because violence against machines with 
anthropomorphic qualities could lead to violence against human beings. 
Gender and ethnic identity are also difficult to define in robots because of 
the conflict between perceived human and alien qualities. Darling cites the 
power of anthropomorphism to both reinforce and challenge stereotypes.24 
Nonhumans that lack anthropomorphic qualities like ATMs and factory 
robots cannot be accused of representing particular gendered or ethnic 
groups. But if a nonhuman is highly anthropomorphic then gendered 
and ethnic signifiers must be built into them. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
even a simple machine can be accused of racism or sexism. Seeing more 
of a human or more of an alien in a nonhuman determines the degree to 
which it is interpolated into cultural and social issues. Anthropomorphism 
is subjective, but examining an object’s alien qualities alongside their 
human ones can help us to make more informed decisions about what they 
“understand” or “desire”. We could make an informed decision about the 
ethics of sexbot rape if we could access the inner being of individual sexbots, 
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but we cannot. All we can do is focus on the relations they form with both 
physically embodied and incorporeal objects. It can be tempting to focus 
on anthropomorphic qualities in nonhumans that approach the carefully 
policed human/nonhuman divide. But to be anthrodecentric we must focus 
on the whole object and accept our psychological impression of it as just one 
side of the story.
It might not be possible to know exactly what a pencil is experiencing. 
But it is not possible to know what another human is experiencing either, 
yet we still give voice to each other and advocate on behalf of marginalised 
groups. Anthropomorphic machines are built in our image – are they a 
marginalised group? Historically we have designated groups as less than 
human in order to justify violence or subjugation. Rosi Braidotti has called 
“the human… a normative convention, which does not make it inherently 
negative, just highly regulatory and hence instrumental to processes of 
exclusion and discrimination.”25 Braidotti is speaking here not of machines, 
but of groups of humans that have been historically excluded from the 
concept of humanity (such as enslaved peoples). But we still regulate 
humanity and either resist or encourage the exclusion of anthropomorphic 
machines from human categorisation. How human-like does an object 
have to be for us to call it human? If we insist upon anthropomorphising 
large groups of nonhumans, we are met with a contradiction. We frequently 
refuse to consider them as individuals. When anthropomorphic machines 
are shipped en masse, we simultaneously inflict humanity on them 
while refusing them the individuality that humans, according to Western 
morality, deserve.
Of course, there is a problem with this argument in that it equates the 
suffering and struggle of marginalised or oppressed groups of humans with 
the human labelling of machines. Being dehumanised is a big problem 
for a human or groups of humans. But if anthropomorphic machines are 
marginalised by us, it is not necessarily important to them. Who can say 
what a social robot really wants – perhaps it wants to be a good companion 
to humans; perhaps it wants to encourage us to build more social robots; 
perhaps it wants to maintain access to its electric power source; or perhaps 
it simply wants to exist for as long as possible. We cannot be sure. If a 
social robot tells me it is happy, I am inclined to disbelieve it. But there is 
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a certain point on the human-nonhuman spectrum at which we need to 
take seriously what nonhumans tell us about their experiences. Because it 
has anthropomorphic qualities, and was in part created by us in our own 
image, it is unconscionable to avoid acknowledging its social robot-ness. 
If we do not at least attempt to create an anthrodecentric narrative for 
the social robot, then how can we justify bringing these machines into the 
world? We deny them self-determination by avoiding their alien qualities. 
We contrive human-like qualities then force them into an unhuman 
outgroup. Nonhumans do not necessarily mind being forced into an 
outgroup, but humans should mind. We have enough trouble appreciating 
existing humans’ individuality without creating more stereotyped 
anthropomorphic outgroups.
The challenge of examining relations in anthropomorphic machines is 
often complicated by cyborg or hybrid qualities in objects. It is becoming 
harder to determine where human agency, decision-making and sensation 
ends and where that of nonhumans begins. When we can’t tell what is 
human and what is nonhuman, the distinctions between them become 
less relevant in an expedient sense, even if they are still philosophically 
interesting. Thus we are left with interesting hybrids, actor-networks, and 
cyborgs: the employment of algorithms to buy and sell in that bastion of 
human culture and economics, the Stock Exchange; the use of artificial 
steroids to enhance athletes that participate in the Olympics, once the 
test of “natural” human bodies; the close touch of a robot, controlled by 
a surgeon outside the room, in the removal of cancerous cells.26 The case 
studies in this book are deliberately presented as human-like, not just as 
human-machine hybrids. The chapters ahead contain examples of genuine 
attempts by humans to create an artificial other, often with personalities, 
names and the attribution of human qualities. Once again, these objects can 
best be interrogated by examining their relations. An essential first step is 
to decide upon the object of study and not be distracted by our own sloppy 
language choices. Is it the robot or robot-surgeon network that is the focus 
of investigation? Are we talking about the Stock Exchange as an embodied 
network, or as an incorporeal concept?
Another reason why anthropomorphic machines make interesting 
case studies is the fact that they are generally explicable by their creators. 
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Because anthropomorphic machines are engineered by humans, we can 
make useful deductions about their way of being in the world. In Chapter 
3 the robot tortoises discussed possessed simple light and touch sensors. 
These sensors were built into them. Unlike when we study nonhumans 
such as bats and slime moulds, the question of which parts of the world the 
nonhuman is capable of sensing is already partly answered. In most cases, 
creators are able to understand why technological artefacts act in certain 
ways.27 There’s no need to reverse engineer a sensory organ if you’ve created 
it. In addition to this, the sensory organs of anthropomorphic machines can 
often be compared to human sensory organs. A light sensor may attempt to 
replicate human vision, but we know enough about the anatomy of the eye 
and the design of the sensor to deduce that they have different structures 
and, consequently, a different way of being in the world. Comparing the 
two yields an appreciation of what it is that makes nonhumans unlike 
humans and more alien. We can generalise this appreciation to apply to 
all nonhumans.
The value of taking nonhuman perspectives seriously
This book encounters anthropocentric thought on two fronts. 
The anthropomorphism of machines is the first. The second is the 
anthropocentric thought that dismisses the sensation and experience of 
nonhumans beyond that of their successful or unsuccessful interaction 
with human “users”. Both of these tendencies distort nonhumans into 
specific kinds of caricatures. We are inhibited in our attempts to look 
beyond human problems or thinking, which can be a hindrance when 
persuading technological objects to behave one way or another. They may 
spring surprises on us. So, this book proposes to employ an anthrodecentric 
approach both to the theory and the case studies, a technique that actively 
removes the human from the centre of scholarly inquiry. We may discover 
which anthropomorphic qualities we give to (or inflict on) machines. An 
uninhibited approach to studying nonhuman phenomenological worlds can 
open our minds and, with any luck, facilitate more informed relationships 
between technological artefacts and humans. There is irony in this: the 
deployment of anthrodecentric thought to solve anthropocentric problems.
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Science and philosophy are both heavily invested in the work of 
describing the lived experiences of humans. Yet there has been relatively little 
work studying the phenomenal world of the machine as a semi-autonomous 
being. The language to explain, for example, what constitutes the experience 
of a spacecraft, microphone, length of copper wire or videogame character, 
is still in its infancy (possibly due to a lack of interest in any aspect of its 
experience beyond that which is relevant to its technological functionality). 
This book argues that this is a significant problem for the philosophy of 
technology because it is only by comprehending the phenomenology of 
machines that we can arrive at an understanding of experiences between 
humans and nonhumans (or between nonhumans).
To begin this book, I must make one thing clear: no human can ever 
fully understand what it is like to be a robot or a computer. According to 
Harman, objects are radically divided from one another and the only part 
of the objects we can see are those that are evident in our interaction with 
them. I once believed that OOO could help increase sympathy between 
humans and anthropomorphic machines, which might smooth a path toward 
a more congenial relationship. But over time I have come to think that the 
opposite goal is also a worthy task. Anthropomorphism already promotes a 
feeling of sympathy for a nonhuman, but that sympathy sometimes obscures 
the alien processes that contribute to unanticipated failures in human-
artefact relations. We sometimes underestimate the importance of paying 
attention to other relations such as those with materials, light, platforms, 
and ideas. OOO permits (and even encourages) a loss of sympathy through 
extreme alienation. But it can also spark interest in nonhuman experiences, 
and particularly in the sensory capabilities that nonhumans use to interact 
with one another.
The version of OOO presented in this book is based upon Harman’s 
work, from Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (which is 
based on his 1999 doctoral dissertation) to more recent publications. 
Throughout his career, Harman’s metaphysical position has remained 
steady, but it has found new areas of application and he and other authors 
have allowed OOO to flourish in unexpected ways. There have been other 
interpretations of a OOO nature, but I focus on Harman because of his 
prominent status in the movement and his continuing observation of and 
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engagement with the changes taking place. The evolution of his writing is 
significant. His first books were deeply concerned with metaphysics and 
particularly phenomenology. But more recent works have addressed the 
socio-political implications of OOO.
Harman’s metaphysics is rich and vast. It is built on an interpretation 
of Heidegger that leads him to some unconventional conclusions.28 
Harman’s concepts of the quadruple object, withdrawal, and allure form 
a robust structure through which the interpretation of real examples is 
made possible. They provide the language to facilitate accounts of complex 
relations between objects. For the purposes of this book, it is not important 
whether Harman is correct in his ontology because it is mainly used here 
to focus the anthrodecentric inquiry into the case studies. Harman’s model 
provides a cohesive framework for studying specific objects and is a useful 
tool for both purely metaphysical and socio-political inquiry.
Chapter 1 will go into detail about OOO, but to those who are 
unfamiliar with the idea here is a quick contextualisation. OOO is 
fundamentally different from most other approaches to theorising being 
and relations because of its anti-correlationism. The word “correlationism” 
in this context was first used by Quentin Meillassoux in 2006 in his book 
After Finitude.29 It refers to the prevailing understanding in philosophy that 
the human view of the world is the only one that is possible or important to 
understand. All other perspectives are either inaccessible to humans or are 
not worth considering. Levi Bryant identifies a profound anthropocentrism 
at the heart of correlationism.30 However, most post-Kantian philosophers, 
from phenomenologists to idealists, are correlationists. In contrast, OOO 
is an anti-correlationist movement based on realism. It insists not only that 
nonhumans really exist outside of human perception but that we can know 
something of objects independent of human access. As Ian Bogost says, 
“humans are allowed to live […] alongside sea urchins, kudzu, enchiladas, 
quasars, and Tesla coils.”31 Each of these nonhumans is an object, but the 
definition also extends to humans and to incorporeal things like concepts 
and signs. And each object, no matter its humanlike or corporeal status, is 
equally ontologically relevant. The perspective of the sea urchin is just as 
necessary for an understanding of the world as that of the human, even if 
it does not seem important to most humans when compared with our own 
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perspectives. Matt Hayler points to OOO’s “usefulness” in the study of 
technological artefacts in particular.32 Our bodies limit and structure our 
encounters with the world, and technologies both change our encounters 
with the world and exist as independent and inaccessible objects in their 
own right. Anti-correlationist thought is often a key concept for those 
interested in the concept of “flat ontology”,33 since anti-correlationism 
discourages hierarchies and categories of objects. At the time of writing, 
Bogost and cultural critic Christopher Schaberg were commissioning books 
and essays on “the hidden lives of ordinary things”, such as golf balls and 
refrigerators.34 In general, these texts on ordinary things follow the trend of 
rejecting the primacy of human lives and experience in favour of a focus on 
nonhumans, a project that is anti-correlationist in nature.
OOO is a metaphysics of objects in general, and narrowing the 
focus to anthropomorphic machines is already a step away from pure 
metaphysics toward the socio-political implications of theory. OOO has 
important consequences for the study of technology beginning with 
its problematisation of both STEM disciplines (Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Maths) and HASS disciplines (Humanities, Arts and Social 
Sciences). Each of these paradigmatic approaches to the investigation of 
nonhumans are traditionally and inherently correlationist. Harman analyses 
each of these approaches in a short essay entitled The Third Table, and he has 
different objections to each of them that amount to the same criticism: both 
the STEM and HASS disciplines enable the “reality” of things to disappear 
from inquiry and each “reduces” objects in different ways.35 (This is related 
to the concepts of overmining, undermining, and duomining, which are 
discussed in Chapter 1.) The first approach critiqued in The Third Table is 
the investigation of objects through the natural sciences. When Voyager 2 is 
investigated through the STEM disciplines, we look at its material qualities. 
Of what materials is it built, and how do those materials cause it to react to 
different natural forces like gravity and electricity? How do those materials 
and their interactions affect human usage? Different parts of Voyager 2 are 
there to perform different functions, such as the sensors, transmitters, and 
the provision of power to the machine. This study of materials, if taken 
far enough, leads us to consider the atomic and sub-atomic structure of 
different parts of Voyager 2. Scientific investigation deflects attention from 
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the object as a whole. Voyager 2 is not just a set of atoms “any more than 
a game is just a set of plays or a nation just a set of individuals.”36 On the 
other hand, societal and cultural investigation into objects such as those 
made by the social sciences also avoid studying the object for its own sake 
and from its own perspective. In the case of Voyager 2, the social sciences 
might study its economic impact, the historical factors leading up to specific 
engineering choices made about its form, why as a species we feel the need 
to incorporate a record of our culture and society in a machine destined 
for interstellar drifting, and whether those records encoded on the Golden 
Record were Euro-centric in nature. These investigations, in Harman’s view, 
also reduce the object albeit to “its theoretical, practical, or causal effects 
on humans or on anything else.”37 The object itself is avoided. The object 
itself is “an intermediate being found neither in subatomic physics nor in 
human psychology, but in a permanent autonomous zone where objects are 
simply themselves.”38 Voyager 2 may have been created by the manipulation 
of material structures and ideas, but there also exists a Voyager 2 that is 
irreducible to any of these things. There is a Voyager 2 that exists for its own 
sake. There is a lack of interest in this Voyager 2-ness that OOO can target. 
Even if we can’t access the nonhuman, acknowledging the alien status of 
Voyager 2 gives us a fresh starting point.
So much of human experience is affected by technology, so our interest 
in it tends to be self-centred and limited. Engineering and cultural texts 
about anthropomorphic technologies report on an inner world in a way 
that reduces the tension between the alien experiences of the nonhuman 
and its positioning in human culture. Typical questions include whether it 
is possible to build a machine that is genuinely intelligent or ethical. This 
question would involve reference to both STEM and HASS disciplines. To 
be clear, Harman is not advocating the abandonment of STEM or HASS 
investigations. These are ways that humans gain knowledge about the world, 
and are important.39 But these kinds of investigations often marginalise the 
alien qualities of nonhumans by bringing them under the aegis of human-
centred research. We reduce the tension between humans and nonhumans in 
a way that is not always in our best interest. Ironically, understanding of the 
perspective of nonhumans allows us to advance human interests. One way of 
doing this is using OOO and alien phenomenology.
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One of the most important tenets of OOO is the rejection of human-
centric enquiry or the common a priori belief that objects are only important 
because of their relationship with humans, a concept that it shares with 
actor-network theory (ANT). Voyager 2, drifting beyond our ability to 
retrieve it on its long voyage to Sirius, is swiftly proceeding towards a space 
uninhabited by humans – popularly known as the territory of E.T. and 
little green men. This is not the intended usage of the term “alien” here. 
“Alien” in this book is much closer to Ian Bogost’s description of alien 
phenomenology (see Chapter 1).40 The word is used to highlight the failure 
of human language or understanding to describe the unhuman processes, 
experiences and tendencies of nonhumans. It need not refer to human-
made or complicated nonhumans. Tectonic plates are alien. Aerosol sprays 
are alien. Smartphones are, as Lev Manovich says in his comments on 
the creation and customisation of human-computer interfaces, “friendly 
aliens.”41 We can never feel what it is like to be one of these nonhumans. But 
that should not be our goal (except perhaps in artistic practices). Rather 
we should investigate the questions that come up when we explore the 
capacity of anthropomorphic technologies to exist in worlds that may not 
centre around humans. Once Voyager 2 finally moves out of range of Earth, 
it will still exist as much as it did before. Humans are not the centre of the 
universe, and human observation does not define nonhumans. The star 
Sirius (and any nearby inhabitants) is unlikely to register any kind of human 
presence for nearly 300,000 years.
OOO and alien phenomenology are linked more broadly to the 
nonhuman turn in the humanities, and it is a metaphysical orientation 
that is of interest to any movement that aims to decentre the human. The 
nonhuman turn may be traced to such ideas as ANT, affect theory, animal 
studies, assemblage theory, brain sciences and artificial intelligence, new 
media theory, new materialism and systems theory.42 The nonhuman turn 
also incorporates different theoretical approaches. It is an extremely varied 
movement, but the term “nonhuman turn” articulates a certain direction 
in ideas which can be traced back to the Copernican revolution. Upon 
discovering that the Earth revolved around the sun, the anthropocentric 
universe was suddenly decentred. The Earth was no longer the centre of the 
universe, surrounded by circling planets, a moon and a sun. The Copernican 
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revolution resulted in a conclusion that the sun was at the centre of the 
universe, and that we revolve around it. As recounted by Bruce Mazlish, this 
was a major blow for the human conception of self.43 Mazlish goes on to say 
that the second blow came with Darwin, and the work that so significantly 
altered science and culture. No longer were humans a separate entity, 
perhaps created by a god, fundamentally ruptured from all other animals. 
Humans had evolved from animals. Evolutionary theory was around before 
Darwin, but he was among the first to apply the concept to human evolution 
in The Descent of Man. A third major blow came with Freud and the 
psychoanalytic revolution. Freud argued that the human mind is not entirely 
the domain of the human. Everybody has an ego, the mode in which we 
live most of the time, but with a considerable controlling influence by our 
superego and id. The id was characterised as being somewhat animalistic 
and primal, implying that the human mind is not actually as rational as we 
might think.
More recently there has been an increasing awareness of the dire 
ecological danger posed by, among other things, climate change. Most 
discourse on this topic is directed towards the protection of humans from 
this terrible calamity. But some ideas on this topic have resulted in a 
decentring of the human and a more posthuman perspective. The work of 
James Lovelock is a particularly good example of this. In his book Gaia: 
A New Look at Life on Earth, Lovelock reframes the planet as a sort of 
ecological agent with its own homeostatic system, in which life is a co-
creator of the Earth’s conditions.44 He anthropomorphises the planet as 
Gaia, after the Ancient Greek Earth goddess.45 Gaia is capable of responding 
to the presence of human beings the way a human would respond to a 
virus. The humans change the climate of the planet, which kills us off, 
solving the problem from Gaia’s perspective.46 He also draws the interesting 
comparison between human pollution and the creation of oxygen by 
photosynthetic bacteria, aeons ago, destroying the anaerobic microorganisms 
in an “oxygen pollution disaster”.47 This implies that while humans might 
be worried about the conditions for human life on Earth, the Earth itself 
is neutral about ecological destruction: “The very concept of pollution 
is anthropocentric and it may even be irrelevant in the Gaian context.”48 
This is an example of an ecological perspective resulting in an orientation 
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toward the nonhuman. The Anthropocene is the name that is increasingly 
being given to the period of geological time that we are currently living in, a 
word premised on the fact that human beings are making such a profound 
difference to the ecological make-up of the planet that it may be recognised 
as a distinctive time period.49 It is not officially recognised by geological 
experts, although some advocate the use of the term, some estimating that it 
began with the industrial revolution and others dating it back further to the 
start of agriculture. Qualities of the Anthropocene include mass extinction, 
extreme alteration of the air, land and aquatic systems, and the deposit of 
heavy metals. The concept of the Anthropocene is occasionally cited as a 
motivating factor for participants in the nonhuman turn, since ecological 
narratives are so frequently motivated by an over-riding concern for the 
welfare of human beings over, for instance, coral reefs, bees and forests. 
Timothy Morton has called the Anthropocene an “antianthropocentric 
concept” that forces us to face “the task of thinking at temporal and spatial 
scales that are unfamiliar, even monstrously gigantic.”50 We are faced with 
catastrophes that are simultaneously of our own making and that are yet 
ludicrously removed from us in terms of scale.
Some theorists have become disenchanted with a philosophical model 
of the universe that prioritises the human. Rejecting the Kantian model in 
which observation by a human is central to ontology, Harman, Ray Brassier, 
Iain Hamilton Grant and Quentin Meillassoux briefly formalised a new 
anthrodecentric direction in philosophy under the umbrella of “Speculative 
Realism”.51 I say briefly because the name was adopted in April 2007 before 
speculative realism splintered into radically different movements.52 Harman, 
Brassier, Hamilton Grant and Meillassoux now agree on little.53 OOO is 
the principal movement that will be mobilised in this book, with frequent 
references to Harman. There is little critique of OOO metaphysics here. 
(Many already exist – see for example Slavoj Žižek’s comments,54 which 
primarily critique Bryant’s ontology; Alexander Galloway’s comments,55 
which criticise what he sees as Harman’s apolitical attitude towards 
ontology; and Nathan Brown’s comments,56 which condemn OOO as 
obscurantism). Instead it is hoped that OOO and other anthrodecentric 
philosophies can bring about greater awareness of machine phenomenology.
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Machine phenomenology is not a trivial matter, as we will discover 
when the first data on interstellar plasma is interpreted by human scientists. 
At that time, the relationship between the plasma and the human-made 
spacecraft will be of great interest, and the rendering of its observations 
into human terms will depend on our understanding of Voyager 2’s ability 
to mediate new knowledge for the human eyes, ears and brains on Earth. 
Typically, the output of data and changes in the state of the object are the 
only observations available to us in interrogating an artefact, and only a 
skilled observer can distinguish the useful observations from the irrelevant 
ones. A robot might relate to me by directing its eyes towards my face and 
speaking, and this is the focus of my experience, but we must not forget that 
it is also in a relationship with the floor, photons, code and the materials of 
which it is made, and they are all contributing to its experience at that time.
As humans we cannot access the inner Voyager 2-ness of Voyager 
2. We can only explore the relations that it forms with other objects 
(including humans), and our view of it is most complete when we take a 
transdisciplinary approach. Alien phenomenology should not just be used 
to investigate relations between nonhumans, but also between specific 
objects of study and human authors. Each author takes different things 
from their investigation into objects – including authors with backgrounds 
in the natural sciences and the social sciences (and including the present 
author). The trick is in taking these authors and their conclusions as objects 
in themselves, which also form part of the flat ontology. No perspective 
on objects should be taken as a definitive perspective, since the only real 
perspective is the one possessed by the object, which is inaccessible to us. 
All investigations are partial investigations, and no matter their disciplinary 
background, they are equally objects in relation to the alien under 
investigation. Alien phenomenology should be transdisciplinary. Social and 
scientific studies may co-exist peacefully in an alien phenomenological 
approach, since the origins of the study are not important to the alien. All 
relations between humans and nonhumans are influenced by the ideological, 
disciplinary and cultural history of the human, as well as by physical 
qualities such as the possession of sensory organs. With a OOO analysis, 
these qualities of human authors are impossible to avoid, but each is equally 
valid. This doesn’t mean that exploration of nonhumans is pointless or 
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impossible. Each contribution to knowledge around a nonhuman adds 
to a collective alien phenomenology of the nonhuman. Starting with 
acknowledgement of the alien in objects like anthropomorphic machines 
decentres human inquiry, and permits a broader critical study of these 
objects. This is both an advantage and a limitation of OOO. We can arrive at 
a more complete investigation into nonhumans, but only if we incorporate 
multiple approaches.
This book makes a conscious effort to increase the tension between 
nonhuman and human experience by emphasising the alien qualities of 
anthropomorphic technologies which are so often neglected by humans. 
The discourse surrounding technology is anthropocentric, as is the way in 
which humans speak about specific technological artefacts. The discourse 
centres around human-nonhuman relations and cultural impact, and we 
speak of (and to) technological artefacts as if they were humans. Hence, 
this book confronts the same issue on two fronts. We need to accentuate the 
anthropomorphic in the machine in order to promote their alien faculties. 
Humans frequently conceal or overlook aspects of machine phenomenology 
because of the mundane use of anthropomorphic language. HAL speaks 
to the crew, the automaton plays the piano, the robot opens her mouth. I 
will accentuate this tendency as much as possible so as to make this day-
to-day anthropomorphic language stand out. Ian Bogost would call this 
a point “where gears grind”57 and his example of the werewolf is relevant 
here. There is a friction between human and inhuman that is emphasised 
in the transformation, which we too often replace “with explanation 
or ignorance.”58 This book will not seek to erase the power of the 
transformation between anthropomorphic and nonhuman, between human 
and robot, between a robot that is switched on and one that is switched off. 
The transformation between these two states is what gives these entities 
their incredible power and is an indelible part of their objecthood.
A note on language
As Samuel Butler says in the Book of Machines, ‘Won’t it be 
the glory of machines that they can do without the great 
gift of speech? Someone has said that silence is a virtue that 
makes us agreeable to our fellows.’ Ah, Aramis, you would 
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finally enjoy that silence. Why would you waste your time 
speaking? What you aspire to is not bearing the ‘I.’ On the 
contrary, your dignity, your virtue, your glory, lie in being a 
‘one.’ And it is this silence, this happy anonymity, this depth, 
this heaviness, this humanity, that we have denied you. I 
am speaking in your place, I am offering you the awkward 
detour of prosopopoeia, but it is precisely because you are 
dead forever. ‘It’ wanted to become not the subject of our 
discourse, but the object, the tender anonymous object by 
means of which we would travel in Paris. Is that so hard 
to understand?
Professor Norbert H. on the doomed Parisian transport 
system Aramis. Bruno Latour, “Epilogue,” Aramis or, the 
Love of Technology, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 297.
As Bruno Latour puts it, we are required to take the detour of prosopopoeia, 
the act of speaking as though on behalf of things that are abstract, absent, 
or dead. We do not have the language to avoid correlationist statements. 
The field of evolutionary biology may give us a clue to how to approach this 
issue. In biology, as in robotics, the question of teleology often arises. Living 
things are the result of millions of years of evolution by natural selection, 
with no external agency controlling our progress. For this reason, biologists 
use a form of shorthand in describing the structure and function of living 
things. This is known as teleonomy, or the practice of speaking of things 
as though they have a purpose while taking it for granted that in evolution 
by natural selection there is no purpose or objective.59 For example, it is 
commonly said that the purpose of molar teeth is to grind down food to 
make it easier to digest. In his 1888 essay on the subject, Henry Fairfield 
Osborn describes the evolutionary transition of Mammalian molars from 
those of prehistoric phyla as a “reduction of primitive elements towards 
special adaptation.”60 In reality, molar teeth are the result of random 
mutation and selection with no direction or intent. In contrast, a cheese 
grater is designed by a human to break up food. It has a genuine teleology, 
not just the appearance of one. A similar practice is proposed in this book. 
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It is necessary to use somewhat anthropocentric language in order to make 
accessible statements about nonhumans. There are always limitations to a 
text: word limits, time limits, the author’s knowledge, etc. An exhaustive 
evaluation of just one of Voyager 2’s sensors would require several volumes, 
if we are to examine everything from its subatomic particles to its impact 
on human culture. This book employs a technique that we might call 
anthroponomy. It makes a statement about a nonhuman’s sensation and 
experience using language that is usually used to describe human sensation 
and experience.
The author is human, the format is human-centric, and language itself is 
a human mode of relating to other objects. As soon as we use language to try 
to understand the experience of a nonhuman, we are anthropomorphising 
it. This book routinely states that certain technological artefacts “sense”, 
“perceive”, “experience” and “remember”. Nonhumans have “intentions”, 
“qualities” and “desires”. Human experience is not special relative to 
nonhuman experience, so I have no hesitation in hijacking our specialised 
anthropocentric psychological and ethological language for an appreciation 
of nonhuman and non-living phenomenology. Chapter 3 goes further 
and addresses panpsychism, the idea that every object in the universe 
has some aspect of mind, consciousness or soul. But for the most part, 
this anthropocentric language is merely a product of our lack of useful 
shorthand for what occurs within non-living things. There is no shorthand 
language describing nonhuman perspective. But, as Laura Gustafsson and 
Terike Haapoja point out, this lack of non-anthropocentric language is 
not a good excuse for not making an attempt at writing about nonhuman 
experiences.61 In their 2013 Helsinki exhibition entitled History According 
to Cattle, Gustafsson and Haapoja endeavour to approximate cattle-like 
experiences through language intended to evoke responses in humans and 
assist in conceptualising the alien worlds of nonhumans:
Although we share many basic experiences with other species, 
abstract linguistic expression is, as far as we know, a uniquely 
human aptitude – yet language still remains hopelessly 
inadequate at conveying anything about corporeality or 
corporeal experience. Language nevertheless provides the 
human species with a mental toolkit for making sense of the 
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world; ideally it can serve as a bridge to the experiential realm 
of the Other.62
In a similar spirit, this book attempts a written exploration of technological 
experiences with only the linguistic tools available to cultural critics, 
philosophers, engineers and ethologists (all of whom are humans).
In many cases the creator or distributor of technologies has encouraged 
this use of metaphor. The Kinect, for example, is “smart”. It “sees”, “hears” 
and “thinks”. Many technological artefacts have been given a gender-
specific pronoun and are deemed to have particular qualities that align with 
human qualities, such as stubbornness, stupidity, attractiveness, kindness, 
love, and introspection. This book uses this language consistently while 
acknowledging that such human qualities are the consequences of alien 
processes inside the nonhuman. Although we clearly lack the linguistic tools 
to describe nonhuman experience, this should not stop us from trying. 
Wherever possible, the focus is on maintaining consistency throughout 
this book in the use of ethological language, theoretical terms and social 
conventions like pronouns.
There are a multitude of academic texts written in acknowledgement 
of the nonhuman turn, and many employ their own terminologies. I do not 
intend to debate which wordings are best, since I am interested in specific 
objects and not a purely metaphysical argument. The word “object” will 
be used, despite its baggage, to refer to all of the technological artefacts, 
ideas, living things and phenomena referenced. This book follows Harman 
and other object-oriented ontologists in calling all these things objects no 
matter their material status. The word “actant” may also be used, as in ANT, 
but this term does not emphasise the inherent passivity of objects that is 
suggested by Harman’s metaphysics. The word “qualities” will be used in 
place of other synonyms, again because of the word’s usage in Harman’s 
writing. Harman describes both “sensual qualities” (qualities related to the 
sensual objects that allow interaction between objects) and “real qualities” 
(qualities that belong to the infinitely withdrawn object itself, but that are 
nevertheless divided from objects). (Chapter 1 will have more to say on this 
topic.) Unless otherwise specified, the word “qualities” in this book refers to 
real qualities, which are concealed from the view of any other object.
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The use of the term “the human” is also a problematic one that I will 
nevertheless employ as shorthand. “The human” is not an object. Individual 
humans are objects, and human collectives are objects. But “the human” 
describes a set of qualities that are not necessarily universal in humans. The 
human has eyes, but not all humans have eyes. The human uses language, 
but not all humans use language. The human reproduces sexually, but not 
all humans reproduce sexually. It is important to note this caveat at the 
beginning of this work, not only to indemnify the author from claims of 
insensitivity but also to establish some object-oriented credentials early on. 
It is not tenable to support a universal view of humans. “Humanity” is quite 
another thing. “Humanity” is a concept, and it obeys the rules of concepts, 
changing over time and space in response to cultural influence. Humanity 
is a moralising term and sometimes a philosophical term, and consequently 
enters into relations with other objects. There is a difference between 
humanity and the human.63
Gendered language is occasionally used by me and others when 
describing humans and nonhumans. The gynoids described in Chapter 5, 
for example, are often given the pronoun “she” both by academics and by 
the public. The robots have been given qualities that enable them to perform 
a female identity, including certain linguistic markers. I have chosen to 
use this approach in recognition of the performative nature of gender, and 
of the attempts that are being made to erase the difference between these 
robots and humans (and humans are usually assigned a particular gender at 
birth). When it comes to humanoid robotics and AI, the aims of engineers 
and participants in the nonhuman turn are allied. Gendered pronouns are 
sometimes even used with simple robots such as Elsie and Elmer, simple 
robots described in Chapter 3. Created in the 1940s by W. Grey Walter, Elsie 
and Elmer possess little to mark them as female or male other than their 
names and the pronouns used to discuss them, but since this may also be 
true of humans I have used the same pronouns as Walter.
Finally, a comment on the use of personal pronouns with reference 
to myself and the text. Frequently, this book avoids the author’s personal 
pronouns (“I”, “me”, “myself”) depending on context. This stylistic choice 
is less common these days, since texts in the humanities depend upon the 
author’s theoretical and cultural milieu and are subjective. However, the 
Introduction 33
choice to refer to the text rather than the author is relevant to the subject 
matter of this book. I am not the same object as the book. The book 
contains information that I do not store in my body, and my body contains 
information not included in the book. A book is not an aspect of the author, 
or a medium through which they communicate; it is its own object with its 
own qualities, relations and agency. I will change over time in ways that the 
book cannot. It may be subjective, but it is not me. When I do use personal 
pronouns, I hope that the reader will forgive me and understand that I am 
using it for clarity or elegance of language.
Guiding questions
There are three main questions that help to regulate the application of 
theory to the technological objects of study in this book. The questions are 
not necessarily answered, but they are used to guide the discussion of the 
specific case studies.
How do we ask machines about their experiences?
This is a methodological question. What techniques can we use to learn 
about the phenomenology of nonhumans? The personal assistance agent 
Siri, who is a popular feature of Apple products, is known for giving witty 
responses to questions about her experience of the outside world. Obviously, 
understanding the phenomenology or sensory world of machines must go 
beyond such human-engineered approaches. We need a phenomenological 
survey of the object, performed in the same way that an ethologist would 
survey the phenomenological profile of a tick (see Chapter 3). In this book 
similar tactics are used; various questions must be asked and interactions 
pursued to encourage the object to show more of its qualities to the outside. 
Strongly associated with this question is “how does the phenomenology 
of an anthropomorphic technology affect its agency?” ANT is one way to 
approach this kind of research, and one that will be more familiar than 
OOO to most readers. ANT allows researchers to answer questions about 
phenomena of interest by examining the agency of all actants involved, both 
human and nonhuman. Latour, a key figure in ANT, sees an understanding 
and integration of nonhumans to be essential to the comprehension of 
any kind of scientific enquiry, since scientists must inevitably compel 
34 Introduction
nonhumans to behave in a particular way in laboratory or field settings.64 
But Latour was originally a sociologist, and although his examples of 
laboratories and politics ground anthrodecentric ideas in empirical studies, 
ANT lacks the metaphysical strength of OOO. Latour himself jokes: “I’m 
like a dog following its prey, and then the prey arrives in the middle of a 
band of wolves which are called professional philosophers.”65
The trouble with trying to ask machines about their experiences is that 
it must be done in a humanish way. It is impossible to fully study any other 
kind of relationship, since the author of this book is a human. But every 
effort must be made to remove the human from the centre of the analysis. 
Human concerns must be considered for these analyses, but they must not 
be privileged over other kinds of relations such as those between nonhuman 
and nonhuman. As Bryant puts it:
The human-object relation is not a special relation, not 
a unique relation, but a subset of a far more pervasive 
ontological truth that pertains to objects of all types. The 
point here is not that we should exclude inquiry into human/
object relations or social/object relations, but rather that these 
analyses are analyses for regional ontology, for a particular 
domain of being, not privileged grounds of ontology as 
such. The issue here is thus very subtle. It is not a question 
of excluding the human and the social, but of decentering 
them from the place of ontological privilege they currently 
enjoy within contemporary philosophy and theory. Nor does 
this entail that all objects relate to other objects in exactly 
the same way.66
Each chapter contains at least a short discussion of the machine’s 
relationship with human beings and often the distinction between the 
human relationship and the object itself is theorised at length. But the 
human relationship with anthropomorphic technologies is almost always 
discussed in the narrowest of terms. The texts which form the evidence for 
these observations are a mixture of technical, philosophical and cultural 
works, providing material for the attempt to describe machine relationships 
with other nonhumans, including computers, floors, languages and 
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concepts. Generally, exploring interactions between nonhumans provides 
greater insight into interactions between humans and nonhumans. We are 
limited, of course, by the possibilities of observation available to us. We can 
only witness relations between nonhumans that result in actions that we can 
sense and perceive.
Methodological questions take the theoretical foundations of this text 
out of its comfort zone. Creating a methodology that revolves around OOO 
is not easy. How can we learn about machines if we can never make direct 
contact with objects? This book merely presents some of the techniques that 
I have found useful to deploy OOO in aid of socio-political inquiry. This is 
a prevailing current in OOO, and a fortunate one. In 2018 Harman argued 
that OOO is of significant import in the age of “alternative facts”:
From a OOO perspective, there is no truth: not because 
nothing is real, but because reality is so real that any attempt 
to translate it into literal terms is doomed to failure. We can 
invoke knowledge against Trump’s deceptions and evasions, 
but only insofar as we adopt a new definition of knowledge 
that incorporates elusive real qualities rather than directly 
masterable sensual ones [emphasis in original].67
In Harman’s terms, we are capable of gaining knowledge about objects, 
even though the truth is beyond us. Consequently, there is a real object 
out there that has definite qualities, but because it is not directly accessible 
we risk being subject to billions of different human sensual relations with 
nonhumans. This is evident by the fact that a non-expert like Donald 
Trump can have a strong sensual relation with climate change through 
his denialism. In contemporary politics, the views of a non-expert are as 
impactful (or more so) as those of an expert. But by insisting that real 
objects exist, OOO resists the current post-truth environment. Greater 
knowledge of an object is possible through study. Expertise in climate 
change exists.
Harman’s early work was somewhat apolitical, being more concerned 
with pure metaphysics. When a flat ontology is deployed there is a tendency 
to see each sensual relation as equally important and valid. But when it 
comes to politics, sensual relations must be grouped and assessed as more 
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or less relevant. Metaphysics must be more interested in humans, and we 
cannot be contented with an ontology that dismisses expertise. But we 
are still left with the problem that no amount of knowledge of another 
object leads us to absolute truth. Hayler has described the possibility of an 
“asymptotic approach” to knowledge, one in which we may come closer 
and closer to a real object through “repeatable successful action”.68 Having 
studied the artificial agent SHRDLU, an object that few people outside 
AI history circles have heard of, I am confident that this book has greater 
knowledge of it than most objects do. The character of the sensual objects 
between SHRDLU and this book leads it to draw particular informed 
conclusions. So while the method is not scientific, it is one derived from the 
acquisition of knowledge, both by humans and by nonhumans.
Harman argues that a “theory of everything” is not to be found in the 
natural sciences.69 He has several reasons for this, but one of the most 
important for the purposes of this book is that the natural sciences omit 
non-physical or incorporeal things. This means that things like concepts are 
left out, as are fictional objects. This is a significant weakness of the natural 
sciences, because concepts like gods and theories exert a tremendous 
influence on our world. This idea is returned to several times in the case 
studies, because since they are so closely connected to humans there tends 
to be a lot of influence of incorporeal objects like brands and political 
movements. We cannot easily observe these things through the natural 
sciences. The alien phenomenology of an anthropomorphic machine must 
pursue things in a transdisciplinary fashion to be most successful, with the 
deployment and problematisation of multiple kinds of expertise.
What does sensation mean for machines?
Machines experience the world in a very different way from humans. Their 
sensory organs mean that their relationship with the world may seem to 
be seriously impoverished compared with humans, although they may 
be capable of sensing their environments in ways that humans cannot. A 
personal computer senses information through a mouse and keyboard, 
which brings about certain kinds of experiences and reactions in the 
computer. But these are not the only germane sensory experiences possible. 
The computer senses and experiences data from a keyboard by making 
changes to its display. Perhaps it also senses and experiences the creation of 
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a dent when it is accidentally dropped on the floor, albeit in a different way 
(its experience may be made evident to us by seeing it change its shape). 
The computer is in a relationship with its operating system, its programs, its 
network, the desk, the Earth (since it is fixed in place by the Earth’s gravity) 
and the glass of water carelessly spilled on it. It is vital not to forget these 
other relations which contribute to the computer’s rich experience of its 
world. In the near future, machines are likely to become significantly more 
agentic while remaining intrinsically reliant on alien sensation. The Internet 
of Things, a popular term describing the blossoming network of artefacts 
capable of exchanging data, exposes us to new deliberately engineered 
processes but also opens the possibility of all sorts of unthought-of relations 
between technological artefacts and other objects.70 At this critical time, 
I believe it is important to develop new theories of relations between 
technological artefacts and other objects that attempt to understand the 
agency of the nonhuman. I have chosen to investigate sensation in order to 
emphasise not only the alien nature of the interface, but the alien nature of 
the technological artefact as a whole.
To this end, this book involves critical engagement with several key 
theorists and attempts to relate their work to anthropomorphic technological 
artefacts. It draws upon postphenomenology, Umwelt-theory and ANT, as 
well as OOO. In doing so, it will critique the ideas of several theorists in a 
close analysis of its case studies. It is thus both an empirical and a theoretical 
study. This book’s point of departure from many of the theorists discussed 
in this book is that they write from an anthropocentric position, as has been 
the tendency for most of the history of the philosophy of technology, and 
indeed of philosophy more generally. Martin Heidegger, Jakob von Uexküll, 
Don Ihde and even Latour have seen the human perspective as a privileged 
position; the human is fundamentally different from all the other objects 
in the world, or it is the only perspective worth understanding. This book 
attempts a bidirectional study of humans and machines from a position that 
takes nonhuman agency seriously. But although this project owes a great 
deal to cybernetics, it is not simply mechanistic. Experience, sensation, mind 
– these are all words that will be critically explored.
This may sound like a lot of different theoretical approaches to address 
in one text. In The Democracy of Objects, Bryant describes himself as a 
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“bricoleur, freely drawing from a variety of disciplines and thinkers whose 
works are not necessarily consistent with one another.”71 This book proceeds 
in a similar fashion, touching on multiple theoretical traditions that 
reflect the author’s own intellectual background. But there is no intention 
here to provide an in-depth analysis of any of these approaches, only to 
discuss those aspects that pertain to the case studies and the decentring of 
anthropomorphic technologies. The main focus of this book is on OOO, 
and so to a certain extent all the other theory will be positioned through 
this frame. This is not part of an attempt to advocate OOO over other ideas, 
but rather because flat ontology permits a conceptual expansion in many 
diverse fields.
To what extent is the sensation of anthropomorphic machines  
relevant to their cultural role?
A machine’s sensation and experience are highly relevant to its cultural, 
political and social position. It is evident that the way in which a machine 
senses its world affects its relationships with individual humans. When my 
Kinect detects my face, it begins a sequence of relations that end in me 
adjusting my behaviour to affect the phenomena visible to the Kinect. What 
is less clear is the way that sensation in machines affects their political and 
cultural positions. If the Kinect can identify me, then what questions of 
privacy and power are raised? Questions like this are anthropocentric but 
nevertheless significantly affect nonhumans. A machine may experience 
a serious change in its composition, relations and internal world if it is 
smashed with a blunt weapon. My Kinect would not sense me in the same 
way if it were unplugged and stored in a box inside a cupboard. In general, 
anthropomorphic machines are strongly affected by their relations with 
humans and with humanity.
The ethical issues associated with anthropomorphic machines are a 
frequently raised topic of public debate. These ethical issues are often 
connected to questions of machine sensation of other objects such as human 
personal data (in the case of the Kinect) and of pedestrians (in the case 
of self-driving cars). Natural language processing machines, natural user 
interfaces, and robots are all commonly connected to these kinds of issues 
because of their unknown and obscured sensory capabilities. This ties into 
larger questions about machine ethics. Can a technological artefact ever be 
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morally responsible for its actions? Drew McDermott argues that it is not 
yet possible for a technological artefact to make ethical decisions because 
no technological artefact is yet capable of making a choice between “the 
right thing” and its own self-interest.72 This is because, as McDermott says, 
no modern machine fulfils the criteria for really wanting anything. We can 
program a robot to be attracted to light but it is too easy to flip a switch and 
make the robot seek darkness instead. Without truly having desires (perhaps 
the desire to fulfil the needs and wants of its human user?) technological 
artefacts make decisions with moral consequences in the same way that 
they make any kind of decision. A computer may be programmed to start 
executing people when the Euro drops below a certain value, but it has not 
made a moral choice any different from if that computer were programmed 
to turn on a blinking light in response to the same stimulus. This book will 
argue that machines can and do have desires, in a thoroughly unhuman 
sense of the word. It is only by speculating about the internal world of 
an object that we can draw conclusions about what we might call its own 
ethical obligations. This is connected to a functionalist view of consciousness 
(see Chapter 3). The question of what it means to be conscious is highly 
relevant to the question of machine ethics. Kenneth Eimar Himma claims 
that an intentional state is necessary for agency, and without it no machine 
can make a moral choice.73 There is a great deal of debate around machine 
ethics and the nature of consciousness.
Since alien phenomenology involves the study of nonhuman-nonhuman 
relations just as human-nonhuman relations, there must also be speculation 
about the phenomenal worlds of the nonhumans that surround the object 
of study. It is difficult to talk about the presence of an object in a room 
without describing the room itself. So numerous accounts are given of 
how nonhumans relate to one another. This is easier when we are speaking 
of physically embodied or corporeal objects, but it apparently creates 
difficulties when we begin to describe relations between objects and 
incorporeal objects like concepts or brands. But this is one of the most 
important ways that technological artefacts become culturally relevant, and 
cultural relevance is a huge part of being an anthropomorphic machine. One 
significant methodological distinction between this and other approaches to 
the philosophy of technology, and even where it deviates from some other 
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applications of OOO, is that it emphasises concepts as objects. One of the 
prevailing themes in this book is its struggle and attempts to differentiate 
between different objects that may be grouped together by humans under 
the same word. Anthropomorphic machines are such potent ideas that the 
concept of a machine may be radically different from the machine itself, 
arbitrarily grouped by humans using unhelpful language that exacerbates 
problems with machine ontology and, more practically, encourages hype 
and misleading statements. The concept of a machine obeys the laws of 
concepts, and its existence in the world and relations with the world are 
entirely different from the machines themselves. Both (or all) objects that 
we thus group together commonly have significant bearing on one another. 
For example, the idea of sexbots is a significant motivator for the way that 
humans approach specific sexbots. The specific sexbot also has a relationship 
with the concept of sexbots, the nature of which is discussed in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 2 and 4 there is yet another complication: incorporeal objects 
(games, programs) that themselves are instances of another incorporeal 
object (an idea or brand). Take for example the book that you are reading 
now. You might have a hard copy in your hands or an electronic copy on 
your screen. But while that specific book is its own object, the book also 
exists as an object that transcends physical instances. Harry Potter and the 
Prisoner of Azkaban is an object; my copy of Harry Potter and the Prisoner of 
Azkaban is an object. Unfortunately, the two objects have the same name 
so confusion may occur. The same applies to the objects of study in this 
book. They exist in specific incarnations, but often also as ideas that are not 
limited to platform, location, or material composition.
Structure of this book
The four case studies in this book are described in a very rough ascending 
order of their apparent resemblance to human beings. They are, however, 
described in different theoretical terms and are used to reflect upon the 
writings of different theorists relevant to the nonhuman turn. It is hoped 
that some evolution of ideas is evident through this book, but each case 
study is relatively self-contained. And this is as it should be. Each case study 
is as radically different from the others as they are from humans with respect 
to their modes of existing in and navigating the world. The superficial 
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taxonomy of technological objects typical of human descriptions is not all 
that relevant to their internal experiences. Certain similarities are observed, 
but the differences between them are fundamental. Some texts associated 
with the nonhuman turn are deliberately constructed with this in mind. For 
example, Object Oriented Environs, a collection of essays arranged by the 
authors’ names, is intended to be read in an order determined by “some 
object that you will allow to exert its aleatory agency over your reading” 
such as a twenty-sided die.74 It is best to read the chapters of this book in 
the order they are presented, but while bearing in mind the independence 
of each case study. Regardless, Chapter 1 should be read first for the 
background on OOO that frames the studies of technological objects in 
Chapters 2-5.
The Microsoft Kinect (Chapter 2) is an add-on to the Xbox line of 
videogames consoles, comprising of a sophisticated camera to detect 
human movement and a microphone to detect voice commands. When first 
released, much of the discussion about it centred on its ability (or inability) 
to “see” and “hear”. The Kinect for Xbox One is the first case study for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is comparatively (or deceptively) simple when compared 
with the other case studies. There is no visible movement in the Kinect. It 
does not appear to have a great capacity to communicate its experience to 
human beings. Secondly, because the Kinect is almost universally portrayed 
as a watcher and listener (both in Microsoft’s promotional material and by 
users – see Chapter 2), it is an ideal case study for beginning to explore this 
book’s guiding questions. What does sensation and experience mean in the 
Kinect, and what can we say about it?
Much of the research for Chapter 2 was conducted in the first half 
of 2014, shortly after the release of the Kinect for Xbox One and a time 
when the evidence of human first-hand experience of the Kinect’s sensory 
and perceptive systems was ample. User accounts were gathered from 
online forums describing a sort of collective effort to engage with the 
phenomenology of the Kinect. Individual users described their attempts to 
coax the Kinect into seeing and hearing them correctly. This is captured in 
this book with two examples: the “Xbox on” problem and the videogame 
Kinect Sports Rivals.75 The Kinect often proved unreliable. Difficulties in 
persuading the sensor bar to detect human bodies and faces have resulted in 
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the alienation of certain sectors of the “gamer community”, notably the self-
described “hardcore” gamers. It has proved difficult to persuade these users 
to form relations with the Kinect, which has had an effect on the cultural 
relevance and reputation of the device.
An essential part of this analysis is the distinction between the different 
types of object that are erroneously conflated by the signifier “Kinect”. 
The Kinect is many things to different humans: a harbinger of more 
casual games for the Xbox One; an unnecessary but compulsory add-on 
to an expensive console; a practical voice-activation technology enabling 
contactless direction of the Xbox One; a means of engaging in physically 
energetic play; the subject of online trouble-shooting; and, a potentially 
malevolent eye spying on your living room. But it is also an individual 
Kinect, beneath my television and connected by a cable to my Xbox One. 
The term “Kinect” becomes insufficient when asked to represent two such 
different levels of identification, so this chapter employs a simple method 
of distinguishing between the brand and the situated artefact. This book 
contends that these are two different objects, not two different aspects of a 
single object.
This apparent bifurcation of physical and cultural identity is also 
present in William Grey Walter’s robot tortoises, the so-called Machina 
speculatrix. Chapter 3 builds on the idea of this division within a human-
made object and goes into detail about the tortoises’ sensory world. Built 
in the late 1940s, the robots existed as sensing and moving agents but the 
human interest in them is more strongly connected to what they indicated 
about living things. Walter was a cyberneticist, and in his view the robots 
confirmed his ideas about life, sensation and identity. Jussi Parikka wrote 
about the tortoises in his book Insect Media and briefly discussed them 
in relation to the ideas of Jakob von Uexküll.76 Chapter 3 continues 
this analysis and extends it by drawing on contemporary panpsychism. 
There are, then, two steps to this process: the acknowledgement of the 
tortoises’ sensory worlds followed by an appreciation of the heterogeneity 
of nonhuman “minds”. The two theoretical structures are occasionally in 
conflict with one another, and this is also explored.
The tortoises, which were entirely synthetic, were anthropomorphised 
in many ways. They possessed eye-like structures capable of sensing light 
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and contact switches that enabled them something like a sense of touch. In 
this way, they could find their way back to their hutches when it was time 
to recharge their batteries. Walter gave them names and studied them as 
an ethologist might plot the progress of an ant or mouse. Possibly the ease 
with which these simple machines can be anthropomorphised promotes 
the application of panpsychist ideas. In other words, the blurring of the line 
between human and nonhuman suggests that the mind is not exclusively 
human, but is in some way a universal quality of matter. However, it is 
important to avoid prioritising minds in this analysis, since that could 
mean the inflation of a human idea beyond its importance in a nonhuman 
object. The mind must be treated like any other object. Consequently this 
book questions whether sensation and experience are best interpreted as 
metaphors in nonhumans or as the product of a conscious mind, but the 
chapter ultimately concludes that this is unknowable and irrelevant to the 
study of nonhumans by humans.
Chapter 4 is less focussed on the internal world of nonhumans and more 
interested in the ways in which objects extend the sensation and perception 
of other objects. The case study presented is the natural language processing 
(NLP) program SHRDLU, built by Terry Winograd between 1968 and 
1972, and in particular its relations with the human user (and vice versa). 
The concept of postphenomenology, particularly that of Don Ihde, is placed 
in a more anthrodecentric context for this purpose. Postphenomenology is 
an example of a phenomenological approach that places greater emphasis 
on the role of nonhumans than traditional phenomenology, however it is still 
too one-sided to fit entirely comfortably into this book.
SHRDLU is a language-user and possesses the capacity for sensation 
and action within its own tightly constrained world, a world in which blocks 
of different colours and shapes are stacked and restacked by a virtual 
robot arm. It is designed to understand a human user’s commands, and to 
answer questions about the way the blocks are stacked, and about its own 
actions. Because of its extremely limited world and capacity for action, it 
is an excellent model for elementary philosophical inquiry. Like the robot 
tortoises, which are all thought to be destroyed or otherwise removed from 
public consumption, it was not possible to interrogate Winograd’s SHRDLU 
directly. The analysis relies on first-hand accounts and on a version of the 
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software remediated for an early version of Windows.77 Nevertheless, with 
these sources it is still possible to interpret the way in which SHRDLU and 
the human extend each other’s worlds.
Of all the case studies presented in this book, the sexbots and gynoids 
of Chapter 5 are the most human-like in their physical appearance. They 
require physical humanlike form even if their sexual organs are the only 
ones required for the act of coitus, or if their faces are the only ones required 
for verbal communication. They are also subject to significant political and 
cultural scrutiny. Sexbots, of course, can be of any or no gender, but the 
focus here is on gynoids – that is, feminine-presenting humanoid robots 
that, in theory, are to androids what women are to men. Some space is 
devoted to the cultural role of the gynoid, which is highly dependent upon 
the metaphysical commitments guiding their development and presence in 
different cultural contexts.
The real focus of the chapter is on the concept of gynoid sexbots and how 
we can study a concept through the interrogations of other objects (such 
as texts, humans, real specific gynoid sexbots, etc.). A great deal has been 
written about gynoids, both in popular fiction and in academic contexts. 
However, very little interest has been shown regarding their experience of 
the world. The sensory capabilities of a gynoid reveal a great deal about the 
concept of gynoid sexbots, as they tend to be deliberately engineered into 
them by humans. Those robots exist in a bidirectional relationship with the 
concept. It is hoped that this chapter on gynoids might demonstrate how 
OOO can be a powerful tool for stimulating political discourse, in response 
to criticism of its apolitical nature. There is also some criticism of OOO 
and suggestions of how alien phenomenology might best be deployed. As 
in previous chapters, the focus is twofold: an in-depth analysis of the case 
study, plus the acknowledgement that ontology guides the cultural criticism 
of technological artefacts.
Chapter 1
ANT and OOO for technology
Different writers have approached the question of technology within 
different prevailing paradigms, often as an extension to other philosophical 
or methodological commitments.78 There is significant variation in the 
estimation of how much technology can be said to affect human society and 
culture, and how much cultural forces shape technological artefacts. Over 
time, machines have come to occupy a vast spectrum of complexity, making 
it difficult to encapsulate them with any single political or cultural theory. 
There is no exception to this for OOO. OOO tries to describe the reality of 
objects and their relations with the rest of the world, but that doesn’t in itself 
make it a good tool for analysing anything. Even though it is an increasingly 
useful tool for discussing technology, it is still just one tool out of many. But 
it prompts an unusual approach to talking about machines, one that I think 
brings certain things to the fore of the analysis. For one thing, OOO has a 
great power to alienate the human and distract from the “user”, which is a 
great asset in the study of anthropomorphic machines.
This chapter will briefly present the key insights of OOO as metaphysics, 
which was the foremost emphasis of Harman’s early work. Hopefully those 
who are new to OOO will find it a good explanation, but the main aim 
of the chapter is to show the relevance of OOO to studies of technology. 
The applicability of OOO to disciplines other than philosophy is the 
focus of more recent OOO literature. This chapter will turn to how 
OOO can be turned towards the study of specific objects, and especially 
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objects with which humans are strongly concerned. The transgression of 
disciplinary boundaries is essential to this. There is a gap between science 
and technology studies (STS) and metaphysics because one is implicitly 
concerned with specific instances of human-nonhuman relations and the 
other is implicitly concerned with everything.
Before talking about OOO this chapter will talk about actor-network 
theory (ANT). OOO is by no means a successor to ANT, although they are 
sometimes compared. They are different tools with different implications. 
Harman’s study of ANT has led him to conclude that while OOO is led by 
objects in themselves, ANT reduces objects to their mutual effects on one 
another. While OOO’s objects are fairly passive, ANT’s actors or actants are 
very active. Actants also have reciprocal and symmetrical relations, whereas 
in OOO relations are asymmetrical and may be non-reciprocal.79 ANT also 
has origins in the study of science and technology and is very relevant for 
contemporary STS. By contrast OOO has its origins in phenomenology 
and is therefore a roundabout route to the study of technology. Yet there is a 
similar cadence to the two fields that may be apparent to the reader.
Actor-Network Theory (ANT)
Bruno Latour was central to the development of ANT as part of his 
studies of science and laboratory practice. ANT is self-consciously non-
anthropocentric and was developed by Latour and others such as Michel 
Callon and John Law to explain the work of scientists and engineers in 
interaction with the world. A particular hallmark of this strategy is the 
commitment to considering human and nonhuman things in a flat way. 
As Harman has noted, ANT scholars are therefore different from most 
other post-Kantian Western philosophers who write within the paradigm of 
“the bland default metaphysics that reduces objects to our human access 
to them.”80 Each human or nonhuman actant has its own agency and 
is constantly changing its relations with other actants. No actant is ever 
reducible to any other actants, as this would mean creating a hierarchy of 
objects. For example, a human body is not reducible to organs, systems, 
cells, evolutionary history or demographics. Each of these actants is 
identifiable as an entity but are in relation with the other actants.
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The agency of nonhumans is revealed by ANT to be key to the success 
or failure of scientific projects. For a program to succeed, the scientists must 
engage with all the relevant human and nonhuman actants and persuade 
them to behave in a particular way. A classic example is Callon’s study of 
St Brieuc Bay in which marine biologists attempted to find out how to 
increase the number of scallops living in the area.81 Callon demonstrated 
that in order to make the project work, the scientists had to attract the local 
authorities and laypeople and persuade them not to sabotage the study. 
But he also showed that the scallops themselves were active participants in 
the network and needed to be encouraged to behave a certain way so that 
the scientists could study them. The human or nonhuman, and even the 
living or non-living status of the actant is only relevant insofar as it affects 
its agency. Agency and ontology are generated through relations between 
objects. In Latour’s ANT, objects only really exist as a set of relations, 
shifting ontologically and mutating constantly in response to the entities 
around them. A leaf sitting in the palm of my hand is constantly embroiled 
in competing networks. The wind wants to push air particles through the 
space that the leaf occupies, moving it gradually out of the way. The air 
wants to drag water molecules out of the leaf ’s stoma. The leaf is also part 
of my network, behaving in a typical and uncomplicated way, allowing me to 
discuss its metaphysics. The leaf is subject to plants, humans, ideas, physical 
forces, subatomic particles, radiation, and time, constantly changing as each 
of these objects moves around it. The leaf’s agency and ontology emerges 
from the sum total of these networks.
Since the 1980s, ANT has been used widely beyond science studies.82 
Yet it may be said that even ANT is too anthropocentric. Latour’s ideas 
have been reinterpreted by Harman as metaphysics in his book Prince 
of Networks.83 Harman is critical of ANT’s relational ontology and the 
way Latour construes the agency of objects, but praises the “power and 
precision”84 of his ANT. Speculative realism has been influenced and 
critiqued by scholars from many different backgrounds, including (but not 
limited to) Latour.85 As mentioned in the introduction, speculative realists 
are united in their rejection of correlationism in philosophy. Correlationism 
is the assumption that all human research, analysis and endeavour is done 
for the ultimate benefit of humans. In the words of Quentin Meillassoux, 
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correlationism insists that it is not possible “to consider the realms 
of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another.”86 Anti-
correlationism does not distinguish between the existence of an object and 
the way that a human encounters an object; an object is not the correlate of 
human thinking. In the words of Levi Bryant, “we must avoid, at all costs, 
the thesis that objects are what our access to objects gives us” [emphasis in 
original].87 Correlationism carries the implicit belief that humans are special 
and unique, perhaps even that we are a special ontological case, and is based 
upon the increasingly problematic binary of “human” and “nonhuman”. 
ANT’s emphasis is mostly on the relations between objects. The objects 
themselves only exist in the background of processes of translation and 
delegation. Ian Bogost claims that in ANT “entities are de-emphasized in 
favor of their couplings and decouplings. Alliances take center stage, and 
things move to the wings.”88
The context and emphasis of disciplines is a not insignificant indicator 
of their metaphysical commitments. ANT is a sociological methodology, 
and therefore must privilege human priorities above all others. In Callon’s 
study, he only discusses the agency of the scallops and other nonhumans 
with reference to how human actants may manipulate them and arrange 
them into networks. The agency of nonhumans is something that must be 
overcome. ANT is a part of the epistemological project in the philosophy 
of science; scholars work to understand how science progresses and how 
humans gain information about the world. Harman, however, insists 
upon maintaining a distinction between the ontology of objects and 
epistemology.89 These fields may consider objects independent of all other 
external actants, including humans, and the nonhumans are therefore better 
represented. Harman places Latour’s work in an ontological context to give 
his own work greater depth and a sense of legacy, but Latour himself has 
typically been focussed on the history of science in an effort to understand 
the success or failure of particular human endeavours, such as the 
sequencing of a peptide or the attempt to implement a new public transport 
system in Paris.90 Harman and others, in contrast, focus on how individual 
objects exist in the world and how they may be said to interact. These ideas 
have implications for specific episodes in STS, but they can also exist as 
purely theoretical disciplines.
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Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO)
Speculative realism has spawned several different anti-correlationist 
schools of thought, and OOO is one of the most well-known. OOO is an 
emerging field, and it is prone to contributions by individuals from many 
different disciplines. Harman initially used the phrase “object-oriented 
philosophy”91 (but has latterly embraced the term OOO, as is evident in 
his use of the term in a recent book title92), Levi Bryant invented the word 
“onticology” 93 to describe his particular approach, and Ian Bogost prefers 
to think in terms of “unit operations”94 to distinguish his ontology from 
object-oriented programming. OOO seeks to reverse the linguistic turn 
in Western philosophy and social science and return them to a study of 
materials. It is interested in objects for themselves, not objects for humans. 
The word “object” is used here in an extremely broad sense. It does not 
only refer to the simple inanimate objects accessible to humans. According 
to Harman, objects do not need “to be physical, solid, simple, inanimate, 
or durable…”.95 Tom Cruise, Superman, orange blossom, Drosophila flies, 
manganese atoms, pulsars and the concept of free will are all examples 
of objects. Like in Latourian metaphysics, objects are not arranged into 
hierarchies, nor are they reducible to more fundamental explanations. 
Timothy Morton argues that OOO has arisen in the wake of the threat of 
environmental apocalypse.96 It rejects “Nature” as a concept imbued with 
correlationism, and it also “offers a middle path – not a compromise, but a 
genuine way out of the recent philosophical impasse of essentialism versus 
nihilism.”97 In the modern world, humans are becoming more aware of the 
agency of powerful nonhuman actants, such as climates, carbon footprints 
and oceans. All these objects seem to exert an agency independent 
of humans, particularly individual humans or small groups. They are 
objects without subjects, and thus lend themselves to a non-correlationist 
approach. OOO studies all actants as objects, not as what happens between 
subject and object.
Harman is arguably the best known object-oriented ontologist. Since 
the publication of Tool-Being in 2002 he has since written several books 
and papers on OOO. In Tool-Being, Harman closely analyses the work 
of Heidegger, whom he clearly admires, although his interpretation is 
unusual.98 Timothy Morton states that Harman:
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…discovered a gigantic coral reef of sparkling things beneath 
the Heideggerian U-boat. The U-boat was already travelling 
at a profound ontological depth, and any serious attempt 
to break through in philosophy must traverse these depths, 
or risk being stuck in the cupcake aisle of the ontological 
supermarket.99
The first of Harman’s major discoveries comes through the study of 
Heidegger’s tool analysis in Being and Time. Heidegger distinguished two 
types of relationships between humans and machines, expressed through 
his well-known example of the use of a hammer. The hammer is generally 
ready-to-hand (zuhanden), available to us as a tool and untheorised. Harman 
uses “tool-being” as a synonym for readiness-to-hand.100 Tool-being is 
apparent when the tool is used unconsciously to achieve a goal. Very rarely, 
we might need to theorise the hammer, such as when it is broken.101 At 
such a moment, the hammer is said to be present-at-hand (vorhanden). The 
“broken tool” is a metaphor for when objects become noticed, theorised or 
even just gazed at. Most of the time, objects are ready-to-hand for humans. 
Objects appear in the background of our lives, taken for granted, and are 
not the centre of our attention. Objects that work well from a human point 
of view become invisible. For instance, most of the time a screen is taken for 
granted by us, but it becomes present-at-hand when we notice that it has 
started to malfunction, or when we begin to theorise it. Harman makes an 
implicitly realist claim about objects: that the tool-being of objects is utterly 
separate from the way that the object appears to other objects.102 Harman 
claims that the multi-faceted configurations of objects are incommensurable 
with each other since the readiness-to-hand (or “tool-being”) of an object 
always rushes ahead of its presence-at-hand.103 Each interaction with an 
object is different, and no other object can ever encounter the whole of 
an object’s tool-being. Because of the infinite number of objects in the 
universe, there are therefore an infinite number of different present-at-hand 
experiences, each of which is invisible to other objects. From this, Harman 
concludes that objects withdraw infinitely from all relations. An object can 
only be ready-to-hand or present-at-hand at one moment, and presence-at-
hand reveals only those qualities that we are equipped, at that moment, to 
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sense.104 So no object can experience all of another object, or gain access to 
the object’s true essence, its inwardness.
Harman’s retelling of the tool-analysis means that readiness-to-hand 
and presence-at-hand are always at play in interactions between all objects, 
including inanimate ones. Harman’s description of tools originates from 
Heidegger’s famous account of hammers, but the principles described 
by Harman need not only apply to “tools” in the conventional sense. The 
model developed by Harman applies to every object, including both human 
and nonhuman objects. Readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand are types 
of relations between two objects, in this case the human and the hammer. 
Yet readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand are, for Harman, evident in 
every kind of object relation. This is not simply a panpsychist argument, 
although panpsychism or panexperientialism have been embraced by certain 
participants in the nonhuman turn (see Chapter 3). Harman himself asserts 
that Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, a word that describes human being, has 
been incorrectly interpreted to refer only to humans. Harman argues that 
Heidegger spoke of human Dasein but that he did not necessarily intend 
to restrict Dasein to humans.105 In Harman’s view, the kind of being that 
Heidegger spoke of referred to any being that was concerned with its own 
being, which was not necessarily limited to humans, although Heidegger 
probably would not extend Dasein to inanimate objects.106 However, the 
extension of Dasein to all objects is not necessary for Harman. For him, 
readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand become radically separated.107 
He identifies a depth in an object’s readiness-to-hand that cannot be fully 
experienced by any object, not just a human. He gives the example of a 
metal appliance resting on a lake of ice:
I hold that the resulting interaction between stove and ice is 
philosophically identical with the more familiar case of Dasein 
and the broken hammer. For what is decisive in the famous 
account of the “broken tool” is not that implicit reality comes 
into conscious view, as if human surprise were the key to the 
reversal within being. Rather, the important factor is that the 
heavy object, while resting on the ice as a reliable support, did 
not exhaust the reality of that ice.108
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Presence-at-hand is not something that only happens when a human 
interacts with an object. A stove only reacts to certain things about the ice: 
hardness, coldness, brittleness, and perhaps other things. The hardness, 
coldness and brittleness of the ice do not constitute the whole of its being. 
Coldness is a “relational property”, and in Harman’s later terminology 
constitute a part of the sensual object formed between stove and ice.
Unlike in ANT, Harman’s objects do not become different objects when 
exposed to relations with other objects. They are withdrawn from the rest 
of the universe and “interact only by way of abstracting from each other.”109 
Objects are separated from other objects’ access to them. A human might 
experience an apple in terms of redness or, at another moment, in terms of 
ripeness. But these are only a human’s conception of an infinitely withdrawn 
object. The apple-ness of the apple is inaccessible. The apple may also have 
an experience of the human, though this kind of bidirectional relationship 
is always asymmetrical.110 Two separate interactions occur. For example, the 
human may experience the texture and taste of the apple as they bite into 
it, while the apple experiences the piercing hardness of the teeth by having 
a section removed. Two metaphysical processes occur at the same moment. 
Two separate interactions also occur when two nonhuman objects relate to 
one another, but we must speculate about the senses of nonhumans. If a 
stone sinks into mud, then both the stone and the mud encounter certain 
qualities of the other. We might speculate that the stone senses a downward 
movement and a wetness that adheres to its surface. The mud changes 
shape, sensing the weight of the stone and reacting to it. Perhaps each of 
the nonhumans experiences a slight change in temperature. But the mud 
does not encounter what we would call the colour of the stone, because it 
does not have the faculties to sense light (to my knowledge). Note that this 
does not imply that objects are completely immutable for Harman, only 
that the object does not become another object moment by moment. The 
apple, for example, changes when it is bitten, and its real qualities change 
correspondingly. Once the apple is eaten or decayed in a rubbish dump 
somewhere, it is destroyed and ceases to exist. This is dealt with further in 
Chapter 3 in the discussion of the withdrawal and change of robots.
No two objects can ever make direct contact. Harman speaks of a 
“mutual darkness”111 of objects, a withdrawal that requires “a third term 
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or mediator”112 for contact to occur between the “noncommunicating 
crystalline spheres sleeping away in private vacuums.”113 The world of 
real objects needs something to explain interaction. Here Harman takes 
inspiration from José Ortega y Gasset’s distinction between real objects 
and the access that humans have to reality through metaphor.114 The 
influence of Ortega is evident in Harman’s frequent use of metaphor. Ortega 
distinguishes between the “images” of objects, which is what we encounter 
when we look at or use an object, and the reality of objects.115 Objects exist 
in their own right, and Harman calls them “real objects”. Ortega’s “images”, 
which are “nothing more than correlates of our own experience,” are 
“sensual objects”.116 Real objects really exist – that is, they have their own 
reality outside of our perception of them. The sensual object is analogous 
to Husserl’s intentional objects; that is, the sensual object is the one that 
exists to another object. But it is not “an idealist prison” removed from the 
inaccessible real world, as in Plato.117 It needs to have a corresponding real 
object that other objects can only access indirectly.
Real objects exist for themselves and still exist when we turn away from 
them. Sensual objects exist only to facilitate relations between real objects 
permitting indirect interaction between the two withdrawn objects, so that 
“the actors involved in [the interaction] are no longer separate, but form a 
new object with its own interior.”118 In the example of the apple, the human 
does not experience the real object but aspects of a sensual object such as 
“sweetness”, “redness” or “hardness”. The sensual object is a mediator 
between the apple and the human. It is not possible, for Harman, to claim 
that the human is interacting with a partial object, namely, that part of 
the apple that is sweet. He rejects Hume’s characterisation of objects as 
“bundles of qualities”.119 Objects are inherently irreducible and whole. 
Therefore, the apple is withdrawn and inaccessible to every other object, 
no matter how many interactions occur. This indirect interaction between 
objects themselves is what Harman calls “vicarious causation”.120
The myth of the off-shore drilling rig from his book Circus Philosophicus 
may help to explain this position.121 Harman compares the lack of direct 
interaction between his objects to the occasionalism of medieval Islamic 
philosophers, who claimed that objects could only interact with God.122 In 
this view the human and the apple do not interact directly: each object is 
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in a relationship with God, and thereby indirectly affect each other through 
divine intervention. In other words, God acts at every occasion. But in 
Harman’s ontology each object is reduced to an image that is conveyed 
by a sensual object.123 God is replaced by the metaphor of the oil rig, and 
each object is reduced to an image. (Harman appears to borrow “image” 
from Ortega as a substitute for “sensual object”.124) We can only obtain an 
image of each of these objects, not the objects themselves; that is to say that 
the metaphorical oil rig receives metaphorical sensual objects but not real 
ones. Every object becomes “a hazy caricature of its deeper plenitude”125 
to the other objects. Oil rigs, in Harman’s poetic description, convert any 
number of dead organic objects into fuel by siphoning them out of the 
earth: “It draws them to the surface of everyday life, where they are used 
as energy for the most prosaic modern actions.”126 Before siphoning, they 
are decayed accumulations of hydrocarbons from the time of the dinosaurs. 
After siphoning they are crude oil, and become tangled in a set of human 
concerns and ideals. The oil rig turns past objects into present objects. 
In the myth, it is not only objects from the past that are transformed, but 
objects from the present and the future; living, dead and non-living objects; 
human objects and nonhuman objects. In the above example, the oil rig is 
the human and the image is the sensual object that comes from the apple. 
Harman envisions each object in the universe as an oil rig, equivalent 
in their inability to access real objects through interaction, all siphoning 
images of all other oil rigs, so that “[a]ll real objects of every size now have 
the power to interact with all other things, at the price of turning them 
into images.”127 The real objects do not touch each other directly, but can 
interact through sensual objects. Siphoning does not reduce the object. The 
real object remains withdrawn, and only images of it are accessible through 
the oil rigs. Harman offers this myth as a metaphor for vicarious causation. 
In this metaphor, it is also impossible to represent the materialist view of 
symmetrical interaction, since oil rig A cannot interact directly with oil rig B. 
The apple siphons an image of the teeth while the human siphons an image 
of the apple. Harman’s description is a sublime account of object relations, 
and it succinctly argues for the lack of legitimacy in any anthropocentric 
metaphysics. Nevertheless, it is a challenging position to accept.
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Over time, Harman has become more and more interested in art and 
aesthetics, even declaring that aesthetics is “first philosophy”.128 This is 
based on his concept of “allure”, which he describes as the disconnect 
between the real object and the sensual object. (This disconnect is discussed 
further in Chapter 3 with reference to Edmund Husserl.) The disconnect 
between real object and sensual object is evident in human uses of metaphor 
in the description of objects. Harman gives the example “my heart is like 
a furnace”.129 It is a metaphor that evokes certain furnace-like qualities 
(such as intensity or warmth) while explicitly ignoring others (such as 
size and metallic composition). In the case of the metaphor, then, it is 
the spectator or reader who is the “real object” to which sensual qualities 
bind.130 Harman’s metaphysics makes a point about aesthetics that exposes 
one of his most important concepts. It represents in very clear terms the 
withdrawal of objects. It expresses the need for a metaphysical explanation 
of the way that art can “move” humans without physically touching us; as 
Francis Halsall points out, this is appealing to artists because it supports 
the idea “that works of art have an autonomous identity”131 (although, 
like all objects, they are only as autonomous as their relations with others 
allow). Emmy Mikelson makes a similar point, commenting on the artwork 
as an object in its own right to which observers only have a single point 
of entry.132 Mikelson argues that speculative realism has “a constructive 
rapport” with the beheading of the subject in art.133 It is curious that such 
an anthrodecentric approach should find such use for something as human 
as art, and in a way it exposes the paradox inherent to attempts to find a 
non-correlationist metaphysics.
Ian Bogost’s metaphorism draws on this part of Harman’s metaphysics. 
The effect of one object on another can be depicted as a process of one 
thing becoming like another, either physically or figuratively.134 When I place 
a mug on a table, the mug models itself on particular qualities of the table: 
immovability and position in space. As a plant absorbs water through its 
roots, the water conforms to the shape of the tree, adhering to the walls of 
the xylem and shooting up towards the leaves. As a text is read by scholars 
of a different tradition, it is translated into a different technical language and 
forms analogies with ideas that the author did not intend.135 This resembles 
the myth of the oil rigs because each object detects a caricature of all others, 
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but without requiring us to accept the concept of vicarious causation. Of the 
two accounts, I prefer Bogost’s, mainly because it seems less reliant on a set 
of a priori assumptions derived from yet more ancient philosophy. OOO is 
preoccupied with new approaches that radically differ from almost all older 
ontological models. It therefore seems incongruous to articulate a complex 
theory of object interaction that has its origins in medieval Islamic theology. 
I am not alone in this discomfort. Levi Bryant has said that “[p]erhaps no 
element of Graham’s thought has been more maligned than his doctrine of 
vicarious causation.”136 Harman, however, brings OOO more into line with 
traditional phenomenology and therefore lends the discipline a sense of 
authority that it might otherwise lack.
Alien phenomenology
We might conclude that OOO is in conflict with phenomenology. 
Traditionally, phenomenology claims that the human experience of objects 
is the only possible way of knowing the world. The existence of objects 
independently is of little interest and, in some cases, impossible. Tom 
Sparrow has explored the contradiction in phenomenology.137 Sparrow 
argues that while phenomenology retains a belief in the reality of objects, 
phenomenological research would in fact do better with a commitment to 
idealism rather than realism.138 When compared with speculative realism, 
its weaknesses are revealed: it can only study how conscious entities relate 
to the world.139 But in OOO, and other speculative realisms, the implicit 
realism is evident. Objects really exist and two non-conscious objects 
can form relations. OOO claims that objects have inherent qualities that 
do not emerge from relations. This is particularly clear in Bogost’s work: 
phenomenological ideas may simply be extended to apply to inanimate 
objects as well as humans. Instead of studying how objects appear to us, we 
study how objects appear to nonhumans. His book Alien Phenomenology, or, 
What It’s Like to be a Thing asks what sorts of phenomenological experiences 
machines (and other objects) are capable of, without making hierarchical 
distinctions between classes of objects.140 Levi Bryant reframes Bogost’s 
argument in terms of his own ontological commitments by suggesting that 
alien phenomenology seeks “to determine the flows to which a machine 
is open, as well as the way that machine operates on these flows as they 
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pass through the machine” (Bryant is not only referring to technological 
artefacts when he speaks of “machines”).141 Alien phenomenology, therefore, 
involves making inferences about objects and the kinds of interactions that 
they have with other objects, based on observation of the structure of the 
object and the kind of relations that it forms. It has been called “applied 
speculative realism” [emphasis in original].142 Being based on speculation, 
alien phenomenologists can only make second-hand observations about 
nonhumans. Metaphysically, this is a problem. But this is a strength as well 
as a weakness.143 In the case studies in later chapters, it will be shown that 
anthropomorphism in technological objects is a persuasive tool, and it is 
argued that alien phenomenology presents a means of arriving at a more 
critical study of objects.
There are now numerous scholars devoting time to applying 
anthrodecentric ideas to nonhumans. The Parliament of Things project 
publishes submissions from authors who write in a Latourian style about the 
existence of nonhumans, as well as identifying this style in earlier authors.144 
Also, as mentioned in the introduction, Bogost and Christopher Schaberg 
have edited a series of short books intended to provide insight into the 
being and relations of objects. This series encompasses many mundane 
objects. Eye Chart by William Germano describes the historical background 
to contemporary eye testing equipment, and Drone by Adam Rothstein 
explains the relative significance of different engineering traditions, as well 
as the software and hardware involved in contemporary drones.145 The 
series exposes un-interrogated relations between physical objects (especially 
human-made ones) and seemingly unconnected ideas, texts, and physical 
objects (especially historical ones). This, in my view, is an important part 
of alien phenomenology, although not all of it. Often, the work of alien 
phenomenology of the object is left up to the reader in a way that erases 
the background and theoretical connections of the author. John Garrison’s 
Glass is a good example of this.146 The title is simple and broad enough to 
highlight the various ways that the word “glass” is used by humans, and the 
themes that bind them together: “the matrix of time, self-reflection, desire, 
and world-creation that this book has been tying together – and tying to our 
cultural fascination with glass.”147 This fascinating history connects mirrors, 
microscopes, sea glass, and Google Glass (the Augmented Reality artefact). 
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But the broadness of the word “glass” is also a limitation, because the tying 
together of glassy objects from so many temporal and physical contexts is 
a very human practice. The objects are connected through language and 
analogy, but from the point of view of the sea glass, Google Glass is a very alien 
object. For us, the analogy becomes reality, and the qualities that set these 
objects apart are less emphasised than the qualities that keep them together 
in our minds. For this reason, Garrison’s account is anthropocentric. 
Garrison’s focus is the concept of glass, rather than any of the corporeal 
objects they describe. It is a tool that the alien phenomenologist can use, 
certainly, and it is used frequently in this book. We sometimes group 
together vastly different phenomena under a heading that make sense to 
humans, not machines. In this case, grouping objects together under a 
heading like this enables the human practice of alien phenomenology which 
cultivates interest in their way of being in the world. In this way we can 
expose the arbitrary nature of those anthropocentric groupings that feel 
natural to us, or that we have perhaps inherited from other humans.
Knowing more about the relations between sea glass and other objects 
is useful for discovering its inner qualities. But it can only provide a partial 
glimpse into the phenomenology of a glassy object. This is not a criticism – 
no author can provide a complete account of sea glass, since we are not the 
sea glass. One book in the series that goes some way to evading this issue is 
Earth by Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Linda T. Elkins-Tanton.148 Co-writing 
a book on this subject, particularly by scholars in different fields (Cohen 
directs a medieval and early modern studies institute and Elkins-Tanton 
is a planetary scientist), brings the partiality of human attempts at alien 
phenomenology into the foreground. Parts of the book are taken from 
conversations between the two scholars, and their disciplinary training is 
evident in the way that they speak about their area of study. As Cohen says:
Earth is an object of such immensity that it beckons us to 
think outside of our comfortable orbits of career path and 
discipline. The risks must also include that we would talk at 
each other (your Earth might be a planet with a history so 
long that humans simply do not figure much; mine might 
be an Earth that is too much a home for humans and does 
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not adequately engage with the longevity of stones, water, or 
atmospheric gases).149
The two authors are still communicating in a human way and are 
inevitably drawn to anthropocentric inquiries. But their cross-disciplinary 
collaboration forces them to confront the truth that both their views are 
partial; both their views are only part of the story for Earth. Earth itself has 
no way of providing humans with a complete account of its being and its 
relations with other objects. But there is no reason why we cannot attempt 
to know as much as possible and thus arrive at a more detailed and faithful 
alien phenomenology. This is closer to the sort of methodology that we 
could use to apply OOO to the study or interpretation of specific objects.
Human interpretation of phenomena is less likely to be questioned 
than machinic interpretation of phenomena. We are more likely to believe a 
human view of events. This is despite evidence of humans’ underwhelming 
ability to detect what is “really there” and our tendency to be fooled by 
illusions. For centuries scientists have become more and more aware of 
the subjective nature of human vision and we now know that the mind is 
not a passive receiver of information but is actively involved in sensing and 
perceiving.150 Eyes are prone to error and eccentricities. But they are human 
errors and eccentricities. Light is received by the eyes and is immediately 
a part of the complex biosemiotics of the human eye involving reactions 
of photosensitive material, changes in ion concentration and the release 
of neurotransmitters. No inorganic material is capable of carrying out this 
sequence of events, and the sensed and transmitted information conveyed 
by machines is subject to completely different encoding and decoding. We 
perform similar sensory-perceptive acts in our relations with all objects, 
including concepts and other incorporeal objects. Although every object 
(be they human, machine, or idea) has a sense of the world, humans are 
typically better at conveying information to other humans. It may be a 
challenge to describe what I see, but because most humans share the same 
visual apparatus other humans are likely to grasp my take on events. If a 
machine were to describe its experience of the sensation of light and colour, 
it might not be so easy to understand because artificial sensors are not 
structurally similar to human eyes. Similarly, I am more likely to understand 
Cohen and Elkins-Tanton’s take on Earth than that of the Earth itself, 
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since I am not attuned to magnetic fields, gravity, and tectonic shifts that 
span long beyond my own lifespan. Alien phenomenology will always be 
anthropocentric to some extent.
Anthrodecentric thinking has yielded many accounts of ordinary 
material. Jane Bennett’s vital materialism is distinct from alien 
phenomenology, and it is heavily informed by the tradition of Deleuze 
and Guattari,151 but her description of “Thing-Power: the curious ability of 
inanimate things to animate or act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle” 
[emphasis in original]152 suggests a similar anthrodecentric goal to that of 
alien phenomenology. This is particularly evident in her analysis of metal 
and metallurgy.153 Bennett describes the many ways in which metal has 
traditionally been portrayed as passive, dead, and uniform.154 However, she 
points to both contemporary scientific and ancient metallurgical texts that 
highlight the activity and idiosyncrasy of individual metallic objects. Some 
of our reluctance to appreciate this activity is due to human limitations, 
such as the shortness of our lifetimes and inability to perceive the tiny 
imperfections, holes, and quivering of atoms that give metallic objects their 
unique properties.155 Similarly, in Stone, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen describes the 
nature of stone (in everything from cultural to tectonic terms).156 Cohen’s 
background in medieval studies naturally leads to the work being concerned 
with the connotations of stone within that time and place, and like Bennett’s 
work it is peppered with cultural references. It is an anthropocentric 
approach, certainly, but Cohen’s choice of subject matter (“that mundane 
object on which a philosopher might perch in order to think, ideation’s 
unthought support; or in the palm, a spur to affect, cognition, and 
contemplation”157) seems inherently anthrodecentric in that it brings such 
an apparently bland object to the forefront of the reader’s mind.
Harman identifies two different tendencies in philosophy that deflect 
attention from objects and consequently interfere with alien phenomenology. 
He calls these tendencies undermining and overmining. Harman claims that 
most kinds of ontology attempt to explain objects by either reducing them 
to their most fundamental units (undermining) or reducing them to their 
effects on other objects, particularly the human mind (overmining).158 For 
Harman, objects are not reducible to either of these extremes. Undermining 
might involve reducing objects to their atomic structure (or even to smaller 
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objects), or, for example, asserting that individual objects emerge from 
a boundless apeiron as in some pre-Socratic views. While undermining 
claims that objects are “too shallow to be real”, overmining claims that 
objects are “too deep to be real”.159 An example of this is idealism, in 
which the existence of objects outside the mind of a human is uncertain 
or irrelevant. But Harman also includes social constructionism, in which 
reality is found in language, discourse or power. Relational ontologies such 
as Latour’s are also examples of overmining, since they reduce objects to 
nothing but their relations with other things.160 Both these extremes deny 
the autonomy of objects like tables, cats and leprechauns, which are the 
foundation of Harman’s philosophy. Harman also identifies a tendency 
that he calls “duomining”, which is the strategy of both undermining and 
overmining objects at the same time. Harman argues that modern science 
duomines objects by simultaneously reducing downwards to the most 
basic units of matter and claiming that all objects are knowable through 
mathematisation.161 There are numerous examples of undermining and 
overmining in this book. Because humans have built machines from very 
small and basic materials, it is easy to believe that the key to explaining 
the sensation, experience and behaviour of technological artefacts lies in 
examining smaller and smaller components.162 This is undermining the 
object, and it may be seen in the perusal of circuit diagrams or source 
code. The technological artefact may be overmined by reducing it to its 
relations or to its role in cultural discourse or power structures. We also see 
overmining in some ways of attributing a quality of mind to technological 
artefacts, which explain machine experience and behaviour in terms of 
consciousness. The artefacts are thus reduced to flows of thought which 
account for things like movement and speech. Both overmining and 
undermining avoid consideration of the alien nature of objects. Reduction 
in either direction is reduction away from the inscrutable and unknowable 
experience of nonhumans and towards something that humans can more 
easily understand. For example, it is easier to explain the actions of Voyager 
2 by reducing it to its fundamental units than to speak of it as a unified 
and agentic being. It is also easier to understand Voyager 2 in terms of 
its relations with other objects, like planets, photons, electromagnetic 
radiation and components of its structure such as sensors. While this book 
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presents thinkers that either undermine or overmine objects (or both), it 
is hoped that the analysis, in the main, walks a middle path between these 
two extremes. This is an important part of alien phenomenology. It is not 
acceptable merely to avoid anthropocentrism in the description of events; 
the language used must reflect this ongoing commitment. It must produce 
an uncomfortable feeling of alienation.
Harman notes that art is the domain in which undermined and 
overmined qualities converge.163 This brings us back to the convergence of 
OOO and art. Bogost argues that the job of the philosopher should be to 
perform ontology or, as he calls it, “carpentry”.164 We should be “tracing 
the exhaust of [things’] effects on the surrounding world and speculating 
about the coupling between that black noise and the experiences internal 
to an object.”165 OOO is a laboratory, a place to build knowledge through 
the juxtaposition of conventionally ignored viewpoints. Bogost describes 
his own work with the game Cow Clicker, an exercise in both game design 
and activism, as an example of enacting his concerns through practical, 
carpentry-like philosophy.166 For Bogost, written work is obfuscating and 
inaccessible, and he speaks sentimentally of his own engagement with the 
field: “so much of object-oriented ontology is, for me, a reclamation of a 
sense of wonder often lost in childhood”.167
In Harman’s early work, politics takes a back seat to metaphysics. 
However later work has drawn a link between politics and OOO.168 And 
despite OOO’s commitment to anti-correlationism, there are elements 
of the metaphysics that lend themselves to particular anthropocentric 
research programs. The application of OOO ideas to ecology is particularly 
significant, as in Morton’s study of ecology. Nonhumans constitute both 
human bodies and the world in which we are irreversibly embedded.169 
OOO is a valuable site for transdisciplinary work, such as the intersection of 
ecological thought and philosophy.
OOO ideas have proliferated in different fields, but sometimes in 
reaction to it rather than by embracing it without reservation. The core of 
OOO has met with resistance from some feminists. A book of collected 
essays, Object-Oriented Feminism, edited by Katherine Behar, discusses the 
points of difference between OOO and object-oriented feminism (OOF). 
OOF is a reaction to OOO that shares some of OOO’s convictions while 
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rejecting others. After all, as Behar points out, groups such as women, 
people of colour, and the poor have historically been considered tools 
“there for the using”.170 Behar refers to the unpaid work of housewives: 
“Tools behave nicely. They are demure. They present themselves for 
service retiringly, to be used without reward in contrast to the work.”171 
The woman who demands remuneration for her work is a “broken tool.”172 
Objectification is not a novel experience for all humans. In my view, OOO 
breaks down the subject/object dualism, but does not go far enough in 
breaking down other dualisms, since breaking down dualisms is presumably 
not a high priority for most nonhumans. OOF also comments on the 
notably sexualised language used by writers like Harman, and plays with the 
erotic overtones, such as in this passage from Frenchy Lunning’s essay:
Despite Harman’s assertion of ensnarement, these objects 
made of severed qualities never totally consummate their 
attraction. Instead, they remain forever in foreplay, in flux, 
in desire, and sometimes, in disgust. And it is in that strange 
alchemical exchange that the metaphor is successfully 
achieved.173
This essay juxtaposes Harman’s concept of allure and Julia Kristeva’s work 
on abjection. Even Harman’s discussion of allure in Guerrilla Metaphysics 
implies a coquettish quality in metaphors, but OOF unapologetically 
emphasises what is left unsaid by Harman.174
OOO provides an ontology that invites comparison with a search 
engine. A search engine is sometimes erroneously thought to treat all 
inquiries the same. Any inquiry is valid, and results may be surprising 
and varied. However, in actuality, results appear based on “relevance”, 
and the relevance may be determined by factors outside of the inquiry’s 
control, such as censorship, sponsorship, popularity, and the user’s previous 
search history. Alien phenomenology performs the same imperfect task. 
Objects are explicitly on an equal footing and we expect an exhaustive and 
impartial description. The carpentry of tools to explore the phenomenology 
of objects is based upon this impartiality. But humans who perform alien 
phenomenology are susceptible to biases. Just as Google’s algorithm remains 
a secret, we cannot expect any one author to have certain knowledge of their 
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own predispositions. This is why input from multiple authors is important. 
Objects withdraw, and we are left with only the sensual objects to which we 
are open. Just as a stone cannot perceive colour, an author with no training 
in medieval studies could not arrive at Cohen’s conclusions.
Technology is not necessarily the focus of OOO, and there is no 
immediate link besides its origins in the tool analysis. OOO is metaphysics 
after all, and maintains the conviction that all objects are sites of wonder 
for those who choose to investigate them, not just marvellous objects. 
Yet there is a flavour to OOO that invites the discussion of technology. In 
many ways it is reminiscent of the idea of the cyborg. A cyborg comprises 
of technological parts and organic parts. Yet it is irreducible to either of 
these parts. The cyborg object becomes an object in its own right, able to 
form certain kinds of relations and totally unable to form others. The same 
is true of anthropomorphic machines. As humans, we are able to identify 
certain qualities in machines that are more like us or more alien. But there 
is no sense in which those anthropomorphic parts form relations in one 
way and alien parts form relations in another way. The human feelings they 
create, from emotional connection to a sense of the uncanny, belong to the 
whole object.
As OOO matures, it is increasingly mobilised politically, and therefore 
less inherently reliant on flatness. But we were always already unable to 
speak flatly. Jane Bennett has said that she believes the target of OOO to 
be “human hubris”, the rejection of humans’ search for truth and belief in 
reason.175 Latterly, what she calls the “ethical impetus” of OOO has become 
more apparent.176 Harman argues that OOO is increasingly relevant in a 
post-truth world, because it denies the possibility of true understanding 
of any object, despite insisting upon the object’s reality.177 OOO confronts 
the concept of truth in investigation as problematic from the beginning. So 
rather than insist upon any kind of flat analysis, or lament the need to speak 
in an anthropocentric way, we should make the socio-political implications 
of the analysis the focus of the inquiry. OOO analyses will always be 
political, and rather than ignore this we should emphasise it.
OOO also rejects human-centred politics, “which treats the political 
sphere as if it were the product of human nature and a purely human 
history”.178 Because of its implications for the flatness of ontology, 
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nonhumans are allowed to take centre stage whenever OOO is used to 
discuss a social or political problem. This means that the study of technology 
using OOO is unusual. Technology has often been considered a special 
category of nonhuman objects, an idea that is in conflict with the principles 
of flat ontology, which rejects human-imposed hierarchies and groupings. 
However, flat ontology is not the final step in creating useful philosophical 
theory.179 There must be some human creation of taxonomies of objects.
OOO is useful for the study of technology because objects are in the 
foreground, rather than existing in the background of scientific or social 
inquiry. In the interpretation of OOO presented in this book, technology is 
just as real and just as important as humanity – or at least a technological 
object is important for the technological object. Studying technology with 
OOO also permits an analysis of artefacts that includes the social and 
cultural background of that artefact, it just does so without privileging the 
social over other types of relations. A technological artefact may not require 
a different ontological analysis than a river or an electron. They are all 
equally objects. But technological artefacts are created by humans, and thus 
are strongly in relation with objects like ideas, platforms, and institutions, as 
well as things like metals, light, and individual humans.
Alien phenomenology focusses on individual objects, not vast groupings 
of objects. “Technology” is a term of convenience, but meaningless when 
considered from the perspective of each individual technological artefact. 
“Anthropomorphic machines”, despite being a term used frequently in 
the book, is resisted as an ontologically significant category. Each of the 
case studies presented is anthropomorphic in its own way, both visually 
and functionally. In the case of SHRDLU, the specific incarnation of the 
object of study is available to us only through relations with a computer. 
The concept of the gynoid sexbot relates strongly to various different objects 
but is inherently incorporeal. They are both dramatically different from 
embodied objects like Grey Walter’s robot tortoises. And as shown in the 
next chapter, the Microsoft Kinect’s embodied status comes into conflict 
with its disembodied brand. Anthropomorphic machines may be grouped 
together for the sake of human convenience, but the grouping means little 
to the individual machines. Anthropomorphism is very important to us, but 
not to the machine itself. The machine really exists in its own right, and it 
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may not experience humans or humanity as special objects with which it has 
a connection. OOO gives us this dialectical capacity: to rigorously attend 
to our own relationship with machines while holding in mind the alien 
nature of nonhumans. This is an unconventional approach to categories of 
technological artefacts, but is a part of the method for alienation that this 
book proposes.
This book apparently commits the very error Bogost warns against in 
privileging written work over carpentry. But perhaps it will inspire carpentry 
in future work embedded in the design, construction or exhibition of 
anthropomorphic machines.
Chapter 2
Kinect and “Natural” Interfaces
What else does Kinect see?
Kinect settings menu, Xbox One 
Accessed June 8 2017
The first case study of this book is the Microsoft Kinect, a natural user 
interface (NUI) with many remarkable aspects, not the least of which is its 
relative prevalence in living rooms throughout the developed world. There 
are two versions: Kinect 1.0 was released in 2010 for use with the Xbox 
360 console and Kinect 2.0 was released concurrently with the Xbox One 
console in 2013.180 Although initially bundled with all Xbox One consoles, 
Microsoft has since announced that the Kinect is no longer compulsory for 
all Xbox Ones in a move widely described as the “death” of the Kinect.181 
The story of the Kinect is one that highlights the inherent risk of deliberate 
anthropomorphism in technology for both users and corporations.
The performance of the Kinect presents a useful example for anyone 
interested in the strangeness of nonhuman worlds in a strongly human 
context. This chapter aims to arrive at an alien phenomenology of the 
Kinect that emphasises the unhuman agency and the contrived humanity 
of this apparently bland consumer product. Investigating agency means 
investigating the sensory world of the object, since an agent can only 
respond to things that it senses, which means that the sensory world of the 
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Kinect is very important for understanding the relationship that it has with 
humans. This chapter performs similar work to Adam Rothstein in Drone 
(mentioned in Chapter 1). The historical contexts available to this book (due 
to the author’s disciplinary training) are incorporated with what Rothstein 
calls the “anatomy”182 of the technological artefact. As emphasised in the 
previous chapter, this account can only ever be partial and anthropocentric. 
But as will be explained, collective alien phenomenology gives a more 
complete (if more confusing) view.
The complexity of the Kinect as it exists both in its individual and 
branded contexts demands a comprehensive explanation of how this artefact 
can sense, perceive, think, and act. This chapter argues that the Kinect 
brand is a distinct object which relates with objects like news articles, user 
forums, and advertisements; it is separate but in strong relation with any 
physical Kinect artefact. There are two different things to interest us here: 
a physically embodied sensor and a concept. Each is equally an object, and 
each is radically separate from the other. For OOO the absence of a physical 
form does not affect an object’s ontological status. This chapter aims to 
argue for the existence of this division, then to investigate each object. There 
is an important complication to this analysis, which is that the brand and 
the individual unit have a very close relationship. That is perhaps why we 
humans tend to use the same word to refer to each object. “Kinect” can 
mean either the artefact or the brand. This chapter will attempt to discern 
one from the other, marking where the corporeal artefact ends and the 
incorporeal brand begins. This is something of an experiment, but it has a 
bearing on the case studies of the next chapters, all of which in some way 
depend upon the possibility of discerning different objects within the same 
linguistic umbrella.
The chaotic methodology of this chapter is representative of the 
transdisciplinary nature of alien phenomenology. Both artefact and brand 
are discussed separately and together. Because they are such different 
objects, this needs to be done through the lenses of different disciplines. 
The embodied artefact must be discussed in technical terms; what exactly 
is the Kinect, and what are the physical qualities that affect its relations 
with the world? Most of our information about this comes from Microsoft, 
which put some effort into explaining the technical capabilities of the 
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Kinect in 2012 and 2013, from the type of sensors that the NUI uses and 
the kinds of inputs it responds to. Since the approach of this chapter is 
derived from alien phenomenology, it will not skip over these vital details. 
Only by knowing more about the qualities of the object of study can we 
gain an appreciation of its most significant relations in its experiential 
world. The embodied Kinect is quite opaque for the average user, with 
its sensory capabilities quite difficult to comprehend. Learning about the 
way the Kinect relates to its world can tell us something about the way it 
experiences its world, and we acquire data on these relations by accessing 
and evaluating other people’s observations. With the Kinect, we do this with 
user forums and trouble-shooting guides. This is a case of collective alien 
phenomenology, the struggles of ordinary human users to investigate the 
Kinect’s sensory world through pseudoscientific collaboration.
The other object of study, the brand, is an incorporeal concept. 
Investigating the qualities of the brand requires different tools. The brand 
has strong relationships with very different objects from those that the 
artefact relates to. An artefact’s sensory world comprises the immediate 
physical world, like the table on which it sits. The brand’s sensory world 
tends to feature things like texts and other concepts.
There is a need for a degree of anthropomorphic language in this 
chapter, which will be exaggerated as much as possible in order to 
highlight the alien in the Kinect-artefact and Kinect-brand. Human 
phrases sometimes seem to readily apply to nonhumans and in setting 
up a multiplayer game one human might say “The Kinect can’t see 
you”, prompting the players to reorganise player positions in front of 
the television. As discussed in the introduction, such anthropomorphic 
phrasings used in daily life can be useful for increasing the tension between 
artefact and human reader, which aids in the juxtaposition between alien 
object and the language used to describe it. However, care must be taken 
in this analysis not to privilege the human in relation with the Kinect, since 
different interactions may be more salient for the Kinect at different times. 
Light bouncing off human bodies may not be the most important thing 
in the Kinect’s sensory world at any given moment, although analyses of 
media often focus on this relationship. In addition, the cultural position of 
the Kinect is a significant factor in human-Kinect relations, but as far as 
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possible these will not be prioritised over those factors that are significant 
for other objects that form relations with the Kinect. In fact, objects from 
the domain of cultural criticism come into close relation with objects 
from the domain of engineering in this analysis, and neither is privileged 
over the other.
We may not discover what it’s like to be a Kinect, but we may gain 
insight into the way that humans conjecture that Kinects might sense, 
perceive and behave. Or perhaps more accurately, I will interpret the 
evidence of personal observation, technical accounts and reports by other 
users, and I will present this through the lens of my own view of the world. 
Unavoidably, you are reading a product of my relationship with the Kinect.
The objects themselves
NUIs
Natural user interfaces (NUIs) are a class of entities that are built with the 
aim of allowing humans to interact more “naturally” with machines. As a 
taxonomic group the class is rather problematic, since the “natural” aspects 
of the interaction are always in the eye of the human beholder. Two of the 
most important interfaces in NUIs encode gestures and natural speech, 
which are processes that do indeed come naturally to most humans but are 
contrived processes in machines. Gestures and natural speech must undergo 
a translation process in order to make sense to a machine. The NUI is an 
ideal to be strived for, but it is an anthropocentric ideal that erases the 
alien qualities of technological artefacts. NUIs in general are engineered 
to produce interfaces that are natural for humans, but the engineering 
challenges posed by capturing human gestures and speech result in 
interfaces that frequently fail to live up to the hype. Moreover, while 
more and more natural interaction with machines is attempted, natural 
speech and seamless gestural control remain elusive for the time being. 
Nevertheless, the idea of humans interacting “naturally” with machines is 
a popular one, and in 2014 Microsoft tied the future of its console line to 
the Kinect, which is designed to engage with both humans’ gestural and 
speech-based “natural” modes of communication. To date, many entirely 
Kinect-based games exist but fewer have appeared over time. (There are 
also Kinect games that make use of traditional controllers in addition to 
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speech or motion capture.) In support of this “natural” rhetoric, a team 
of animal-computer interaction (ACI, rather than HCI) researchers has 
introduced the Kinect to a group of orang-utans at Melbourne Zoo. Simple 
games on Kinect aim to enrich the animals’ habitat and change the nature 
of encounters between humans and orang-utans.183 Orang-utans do not play 
the same Kinect games that humans play in their homes, but the gestural 
interface is similar. This supports the view that all kinds of apes, including 
humans, are capable of learning to adapt to NUI technology quickly enough 
to make the technology accessible and usable. Another NUI designed for 
gaming interaction is Leap Motion, which is intended for the human use of 
virtual reality headsets.184 A sensor for detecting hand motions is built into 
the headset so that users can interact with a virtual environment.
In addition to providing interfaces for entirely Kinect-based games, 
Microsoft and others have also been drawn to the possibilities allowed by 
“gestural excess” in controller-based games.185 Gestural excess describes 
actions that do not contribute to success in a game but that are still 
performed by the player. Examples of gestural excess include recoiling 
from a blow in a fighting game and pumping one’s fists in the air after a 
difficult win. The reactions are unnecessary because all the input to the 
machine comes through the controller and the console or computer’s 
experience of the world does not extend to registering these enthusiastic 
human responses, but the responses are natural and often unconscious. 
Experiments in harnessing gestural excess have begun. For example, in the 
game Kinect Sports Rivals (KSR) wake racers can turn more quickly when 
they lean into a turn. Of course, once they become a part of the game the 
gestures are no longer excessive and become strategic ways to improve one’s 
performance. This is an example of “grokking”, what we might consider 
to be the opposite of gestural excess. Grokking a system means not merely 
understanding it but intuitively responding to it. The word “grok”, first 
used by Robert A. Heinlein in his 1961 novel Stranger in a Strange Land, 
might describe the programmer’s becoming very attuned and habituated to 
a programming language, or the relation that develops between a driver and 
a racing car. Humans learn the best way to communicate with nonhumans 
and, incidentally, gain knowledge of their qualities and way of relating to 
the world. In the Kinect’s case grokking means a knowledge of gestural 
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and spoken commands that the Kinect is able to sense, which then become 
second-nature to the user. It also means using the sensor in a way that works 
for the idiosyncratic home entertainment set-up, perhaps rather than the 
manner that is described in the manual. Movements come to be learned 
and rehearsed by humans until they lose the sense of being contrived or 
unnatural. Richard Harper and Helena Mentis identified this embodied 
comprehension in families, who did not know what “grokking” meant but 
still practised it, becoming adjusted to the system’s shortcomings and quirks 
to the extent that they could take advantage of them.186
Other NUIs have been developed for purposes other than game console 
manipulation. A widely referenced (although fictitious) example of a NUI 
is the one used in the film Minority Report by Tom Cruise’s character at the 
beginning of the film.187 He organises images, zooms and makes mistakes 
with his gloved hands. The aesthetics of this moment have become iconic, 
both in interface design and in the cultural imaginary. The NUI in the film 
permits the quick manipulation of information by those who use skilful 
gestures. The NUI used in the film was in fact a real interface developed 
by John Underkoffler and controlled by gestures.188 More recently, an 
interface using either Leap Motion or the Kinect has been trialled for use 
by radiologists and surgeons in sterile environments, the rationale being that 
staff can use the interface without risking infection in surgery patients.189 
The Kinect has also been used to develop user interfaces specifically for the 
use of elderly human users, who may not be digital natives and who may 
have difficulties with visual acuity and motor difficulties.190 In the view of 
the researchers, “natural” interaction is particularly important for elderly 
people who may have difficulties with memory. Because it may be hard to 
remember specific hand gestures there must therefore be a reliance on the 
“instinct” of the human user.191
Don Norman’s criticism of NUIs, entitled “Natural User Interfaces are 
Not Natural”, points out that gestural systems are neither new nor ground-
breaking.192 He traces the history of digital non-contact gesture interfaces 
back to the invention of the theremin in 1928, which puts into question 
the impression of NUIs as futuristic technologies to be aspired to. He 
notes the similarity between modern NUIs and the first GUIs (graphical 
user interfaces). But as he explains, gesture-based NUIs are not merely as 
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“natural” as GUIs are, they are actually even less intuitive because of a lack 
of feedback. Contemporary NUIs like the Kinect sometimes give feedback 
mostly by displaying images of the human bodies (and other objects) that 
they encounter,193 while others provide feedback only by showing the effect 
of the gesture, such as by moving a videogame character’s body in the same 
way as the human’s.194 In contrast, the use of a mouse provides immediate 
feedback to the human, who is following the path of the cursor on the 
screen with their eyes. But very few gesture-dependent interfaces deliver 
immediate feedback to the user that permits them to materially improve 
their use of the system. In addition, GUIs have become easier to use because 
a grammar of gestures has evolved over time. As an example, there is now 
a fairly universal text selection interaction. We can now see this grammar 
solidifying in haptic technologies as well. Norman’s example is the scrolling 
action on smartphones. Over time, the “viscous friction” of the window 
has become standardised (in other words, the speed of the finger flick 
causes the scrolling to continue for a consistent length of time). Zooming 
has also become standardised. NUIs have not had the same penetration 
as touchscreens to date. The Kinect remains the only prevalent NUI on 
the market, both as an interface for the Xbox and for Windows PCs. But 
because the creation of Kinect games is no longer a priority for publishers 
(see below) there has been limited opportunity for Kinects to teach most 
of us how to communicate with them. Passing interaction with a Kinect 
permits it to teach humans basic rules, but thorough understanding of 
Kinects’ experiences of the world and its way of feeding information back to 
the human user requires more extended sessions.
Natural language communication with machines is also an aspect of 
the ambition of NUIs, and also specifically of the Kinect. The Kinect is 
capable of listening for command words and prompting responses in the 
console, although as discussed below the communication between human 
and Kinect is not seamless or unbiased. A media archaeological study 
reveals an extended history of voice interaction in digital games, stretching 
back as far as the early 1980s in consoles and modules. Attempts to 
integrate voice interaction have come in waves, driven by new hardware and 
changes in how human users communicate and form relations with virtual 
characters.195 Before the first attempts to commercialise voice interaction, 
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there was a boom in attempting typed natural language communication with 
computers. SHRDLU, a natural language processing program built by Terry 
Winograd in the 1960s and 70s, is the subject of Chapter 4. The “natural” 
language used by the system pertained exclusively to the description and 
manipulation of a digital block world. But more recently the ambition of 
building NUIs that can understand and respond to humans has resulted 
in the creation and marketing of virtual assistants. Spoken communication 
with smartphones was popularised by Apple’s Siri and is now replicated in 
other interfaces. Chatbots are seemingly ubiquitous. We are also witnessing 
the penetration of home assistants that exist purely to understand and 
respond to human speech. As shown later in this chapter, the Kinect has 
been accused of sexism, and the same is true of home assistants, although 
for different reasons. A home assistant that can not only listen but respond 
to questions must have a voice, and like human voices it must have an 
accent and the suggestion of a gender, which belies the presumed neutrality 
of home assistants.196 Like motion capture, NLP technology has the implicit 
goal of creating nonhumans capable of interacting “naturally” with humans. 
It is still far from perfect in this regard. And the trouble with NLPs is that if 
they ever do become indistinguishable from human language users then they 
will be embroiled in the conflicts and struggles that surround and implicate 
all human voices.
Each part of the name “natural user interface” may be questioned from 
the perspective of the sensor itself. What is “natural” to the human is always 
engineered into the machine, so those aspects of the interface that are 
natural to the human are neutral for the artefact. A NUI constantly scans 
the environment for signs of human bodies and/or for sounds recognisable 
as human speech. In the case of the Kinect, “middleware” interprets these 
movements and sounds to decide what is relevant and what is not (see 
below). What is natural for a sensor is to detect everything that comes into 
its sensory field. The “user” part of the name is also problematic from the 
sensor’s point of view. From the human perspective, we are the “users” of 
the NUI. But in a way, the sensor uses the human as well. Its program of 
action (to borrow an ANT term) is to detect images, sounds and depth, 
and to convey this information to the console. The sensor uses the human 
as a part of this environment. “User” in this book is typically qualified as 
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“human user”, but in accordance with OOO we must ask about the uses to 
which the sensor puts its environment. Finally, the NUI sensor is only part 
of the “interface”, and relates to the console or computer, the screen, and 
the human. These are relevant issues to raise since the following account is 
of a NUI sensor and its way of being in the world.
Kinect-brand and Kinect-artefact
The Kinect has been mass-marketed relatively successfully. Originally given 
the codename “Project Natal”, themes of revolution and innovation have 
been part of the Kinect mythology since its inception (it is also the name of 
a city in Brazil, following Microsoft’s tendency to name projects after cities). 
Clearly the name “Kinect” is intended to evoke the “kinetic” motion-based 
play that represents a significant part of its interface, and “connect”, which 
signifies connection and harmony with the game system and perhaps with 
other people.
The original Kinect was announced at E3 on June 1 2009 to a generally 
positive audience. Microsoft told the world there would be “no barriers and 
no learning curves”197 when playing with Kinect 1.0, which was compatible 
only with the Xbox 360 console. It was released in 2010, several years after 
the Xbox 360 console which was launched at the end of 2005. The ambition 
of NUIs as a class was in evidence, such as in the slogan “You are the 
controller”.198 There was considerable speculation about what technology 
such as this would mean to gaming. The Kinect is used to augment 
videogame experiences, and some games are completely Kinect-based 
without the need for a traditional videogames controller like the standard 
Xbox One controller or non-traditional motion-based controllers such as 
the Playstation Move.
With the introduction of new hardware, Microsoft promoted a wider 
range of Kinect experiences for all Xbox users. The Xbox One was 
announced on 21st May 2013, as a successor to the Xbox 360 (in the media 
and gamer forums it was frequently referred to as “the Xbone”, either 
affectionately or not so affectionately). It was released in November 2013. 
A Kinect 2.0 was bundled with every One sold, and they were featured 
prominently in pre-release advertisements, with claims that it would allow 
players to “reach into games and entertainment like never before.”199 The 
appearance of the Kinect 2.0 is of a long horizontal black bar supported on 
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a stand. On one side is the Xbox logo, and on the other side is a circular 
cluster of sensors. Its minimalist design understates the sophistication of the 
sensor technology.
Other technological actants are important to define semantically in a 
study of Kinect. The term “console” will occasionally be used to denote 
the Xbox One console. The word generally refers to a computer specialised 
for videogames, typically suited for use with a television and with a games-
oriented input device (or sometimes a handheld gaming device). Bernadette 
Flynn discusses the way that console gaming has eventually come to replace 
the family hearth, as the radio and television did before it.200 Flynn’s idea 
is particularly significant for studying the Kinect because there is often a 
necessary reorganisation of the living room to revolve around this “hearth” 
and the playing area in front of it. The Kinect is the main mode of input 
for some games, although often the menus can be navigated using the 
conventional controller and some games such as Ryse: Son of Rome use both 
input devices, sometimes simultaneously.201 The console is the mediator 
for all of these objects: the playing space, the Kinect, the game disc, the 
installed content and the screen interface, facilitating their interaction to 
create the preconditions for play.
Further to this definition we must acknowledge the debate around the 
word “videogame”. This is a topic that has been debated fiercely and with 
little resolution.202 Definitions have changed and been contested for over 
sixty years, with definitions always seeming to leave out some electronic 
games and incorporating others.203 Jesper Juul offers a definition that aims to 
bridge the gap between what seemed to be the inescapable debate between 
ludologists and narratologists.204 According to him, games have six main 
qualities, including:
1. Rules
2. Variable, quantifiable outcome;
3. Value assigned to possible outcomes;
4. Player effort;
5. Player attached to outcome; and
6. Negotiable consequences.205
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Bogost has called Juul’s “an implicitly realist position about games, but 
a troubled one.”206 This definition will suffice, however, as the relevant 
question here is what facilitates the videogame in its interaction with the 
Kinect. The videogame is not simply recorded on the physical disc or 
somehow within the digital download. These elements are necessary, but the 
videogame is also installed onto the console’s hard drive. Therefore when we 
speak of a “videogame” we speak of a distributed entity (or actor-network) 
that links software, console operating system, sensors, the console’s brand, 
the sensor’s brand, hard drive, disc/downloaded entity, screen, input devices, 
the hands and brain of the player, internet presence as well as encompassing 
a concept that is influenced by other videogames and other kinds of games 
(such as board games) past and present.207 Lack of cooperation between 
human player and those cultural or material relations may cause disruption, 
such as when an input device lacks electric power or the manufacturer 
ceases to update the console. However, in a OOO sense the videogame is 
more than the sum of these components and their interactions. Viewing 
a videogame as simply a product of material and cultural influences 
constitute a duomining of the videogame, since parts of it are reduced to its 
material embodiment (undermining) and other parts are reduced to things 
like cultural impact and power relations (overmining). The videogame is 
undermined when we speak of it only as the impact of code on electronic 
signals. The videogame is overmined when we speak of it only as part of 
a broader cultural milieu. The videogame exists in relation with the hard 
drive, sensors and so on but these disparate elements also form part of the 
ontology of the videogame. The videogame is an integrated whole that acts 
in accordance with internal qualities, and relations are formed between 
the whole videogame and objects as diverse as consoles, humans, and 
online reviews.
Having defined the other closely related technological actants, we must 
turn to an articulation of what object is meant by the term “Kinect”. For 
our purposes, the Kinect as a signifier relates both to the brand and to the 
artefact, which is an unsatisfactory arrangement for critical object studies. 
Yet neither brand nor artefact is more the Kinect than the other, and neither 
can be reduced to the other. The names of objects often hide the existence 
of several objects which, to humans, are simply described by a single 
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label. To emphasise the importance of this distinction, for the purposes of 
this book the situated artefact will be labelled “Kinect-artefact” and the 
collective brand will be labelled “Kinect-brand”. Initially, this distinction 
may seem reminiscent of Plato’s theory of Forms.208 We could conceive of 
the brand as a form that identifies certain qualities shared by all the Kinect-
artefacts in the world: a “Kinect-ness”. But the meaning of the term Kinect-
brand presented here is quite different. The Kinect-brand is an object just 
as much as a Kinect-artefact (Harman has called brands “charismatic 
objects”209). It has its own qualities and relations. Often, as will be shown, 
these qualities and relations are significantly different from the qualities and 
relations of the Kinect-artefacts. The Kinect-brand is the ideal, untarnished 
imaginary that conveys certain ideas about the Kinect-artefact – such as 
those from Microsoft, and those from prominent users. Unlike the artefact, 
the Kinect-brand is abstracted and incorporeal. It carries with it the implicit 
understanding of its users and is a factor in Microsoft’s planning process. 
Kinect-brand is the aspect of the machine that is present in popular culture, 
internet discussion and Microsoft presentations (unless the specificity of 
an individual Kinect is important). But it is not restricted to interactions 
with humans and the social since it acts and responds to other actants, such 
as the Microsoft corporation, retailers, regulatory authorities and so forth 
without forming one-to-one interactions with humans. As Scott Lash and 
Celia Lury put it, “the commodity is dead; the brand is alive.”210 By this they 
mean that the commodity (or artefact) is finished and final while the brand 
is self-modifying and possessing a memory. Although of course, as anyone 
who has ever owned a console knows, an artefact does not cease to be 
modified, either by software updates or by errant water spillages.
The Kinect-artefact is a material object: a plastic-encased set of sensors, 
including its middleware but ending, for lack of a better barrier, at the end 
of the cable connecting Kinect to console. The Kinect-artefact contains 
its knowledge of individual habits and interfaces with a specific Xbox One 
console. It is present in a way that the Kinect-brand is not; one buys a 
Kinect-brand but gets a Kinect-artefact. Neither object is comprehensively 
Kinect-like or human-like. It is important to note that this notation does 
not imply that the Kinect can be split into these two aspects: they are two 
different objects that both exist in the world, erroneously conflated into one 
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by human (and specifically English) language conventions. It is also not 
the case that Kinect-artefacts are the real objects while Kinect-brands are 
sensual objects in OOO terms. The Kinect-brand is a real object too, with 
its own way of acting and its own way of sensing the world. The sensual 
object formed between Kinect-artefact and human is one in which light, 
sound, and movement play a key role. An individual human may also form a 
sensual object with the Kinect-brand, but it is likely to be through text and 
advertisements. Like all relations, it is unequal. The Kinect-brand may have 
a profound influence on the human, while most humans could only hope to 
make a tiny influence on the Kinect-brand, such as through the publication 
of an article, employment by Microsoft, or through activism.
It is difficult to arrive at a definition of either the Kinect-brand or the 
Kinect-artefact, but the signifier “Kinect” is also used by Microsoft to 
describe thousands of identical products. Each of these identical Kinect-
artefacts shares similar Kinect-artefactish qualities, but they are in different 
relations. One Kinect-artefact might be in a strong relation with a table, 
another is still in its box. One Kinect-artefact can identify my face, another 
can identify yours. The term “Kinect” refers at once to one object and 
a distributed network of Kinect-brand and Kinect-artefact experiences. 
Treating the brand and artefact as two distinct objects is the only way to 
avoid blurring boundaries between the sensory relations of the more static 
artefact and the complex world of the idea of the object. And it also focusses 
our attention on the object itself, its inner essence, sensual connections 
with other objects and therefore how they touch and exert influence in their 
worlds. Of course, “artefact” and “brand” are very human-centric terms, but 
as the introduction to this book argues we may use human experiences to 
explain alien phenomena; in fact, this can strengthen our understanding.
The Kinect-brand
The Kinect-brand has evolved from an anthropocentric perception of a 
gimmicky (albeit entertaining) artefact to a more serious (albeit troubled) 
artefact. Kinect-brand 1.0 was originally marketed mostly to families. The 
portrayal of the technology facilitated by advertising and the assortment 
of available games signalled the intention of Microsoft to market the 
game to families and groups. This intended audience is hardly surprising 
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given the history of gesture-based interfaces in gaming. The Nintendo Wii 
(2006) was strongly marketed to families, featuring games designed to 
appeal to all age groups as well as “games” like Wii Fit,211 which used an 
electronic balance board to integrate fitness play into NUI use. The Eyetoy 
for Sony Playstation 2 (2003), and Playstation Eye for Sony Playstation 3 
(2007), were aimed at children. One reason for the Kinect-brand’s lasting 
association with children’s games is that the physical nature of the play is 
well-suited to family and group interactions. Harper and Mentis suggest 
that the Kinect-artefact is used in households as a way of safely mocking 
others (particularly parents) when the system requires them to make some 
absurd movement or gesture.212 In addition, the work of John Downs 
suggests that the role of the audience (“paraplay”) becomes more varied 
when watching physical games, so there is greater engagement while waiting 
for a turn.213 Another reason why the first Kinect was predominantly used 
in social and family gaming is because its detection of fine details was 
minimal. The responses to humans are more coarse-grained because the 
sensor either could not detect more detailed human movement, was unable 
to distinguish between humans and other objects, or because it could only 
communicate part of the information detected to the console. Social and 
family videogames are usually not so dependent on precision as are, for 
example, first-person shooters. The artefact and its way of being in the 
world exists in a bidirectional and asymmetrical relationship with the brand, 
determining the kind of human user to which the artefact is marketed. This, 
in turn, prompts the creation of artefacts that can be used effectively by 
children, families and groups. Coarse-grained relations between humans and 
the Kinect-artefact have had a gradual but inexorable effect on the Kinect-
brand. Because the Kinect-artefact is so often (and so successfully) used by 
families or in other social settings, the Kinect-brand has become associated 
with this type of gameplay. But it has been argued that games with an 
affective component like Kinectimals,214 which is aimed at young children, 
may be deployed for the didactic purpose of training human users,215 which 
educates young people about the NUIs that are expected to become more 
prevalent in their lifetimes. The didactic induction of children into NUI 
use is a good way of shifting this cyclical relationship between artefacts 
and brands into eventual widespread adoption of NUIs like possible future 
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Kinect-artefacts. It is important to know this, because the Kinect-brand 
underwent a significant transformation when it came to relate to the Kinect-
artefact 2.0.
The casual and family-friendly qualities of the Kinect-brand prior to 
Xbox One are evident from the kinds of games that were made for it. Games 
like Kinectimals make use of the technology by allowing users to reach into 
the virtual world and stroke pet animals. These and similar family games 
make use of Kinect-brand gimmicks, like the dubious promise of physically 
entering the game through body movements, but there are relatively few 
games that incorporate gestures into ordinary gameplay. There are many 
reasons for this, but the primary difficulty lay in the primitive nature of 
the technology (described below) which made it unsuitable for “hardcore” 
games. One online journalist opined:
The Xbox 360’s Kinect, Wii Remote and PlayStation Move 
are all rubbish and have spawned a handful of decent games 
between them, enveloped by piles of filthy, filthy shovelware.216
There are notable exceptions to this general rule. In 2011, Microsoft 
attempted to rebrand the Kinect-brand 1.0 for so-called “serious games”.217 
This makes use of the rhetoric surrounding “casual” and “hardcore” 
games, and attempts to alter perceptions of the technology, presumably 
to raise the anticipation of the Xbox One and Kinect-brand 2.0. Some 
examples of hardcore games released specifically for the Kinect-brand 1.0 
include survival horror game Rise of Nightmares,218 which creates a creepy 
atmosphere by requiring the player to stand completely still, to swipe 
insects off virtual arms and to adopt a “fighting stance” to kill zombies; and 
Fable: The Journey,219 which builds upon the popular Fable franchise and 
allows players to play sitting down, using gestures to attack monsters and 
other villains. By promoting these games, Microsoft aimed to associate the 
Kinect-brand with more mature themes and complex gameplay. In ANT 
terms, there was an attempt to enrol “hardcore” gamers into the Kinect-
brand’s network.220 The artefact and its qualities remained the same but 
were repackaged for humans who were inclined to resist the idea that the 
Kinect-artefact could be useful or interesting for them. The “program” 
of the Kinect-brand resisted the “anti-program” of “hardcore” gamers by 
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creating videogames that would counter the perception that Kinect-artefacts 
are only useful for casual games.221 But the qualities of the Kinect-artefact 
made enrolment difficult. Both Rise of Nightmares and Fable: The Journey 
received mixed reviews.222 These mediocre responses are typically blamed 
on a Kinect-artefact 1.0’s slow reaction time and its difficulty in picking 
up subtle movements.223 Developers also tended to incorrectly estimate 
the capabilities of the sensor. This is a good example of the misjudged 
phenomenology of an artefact causing it to form undesirable relations with 
cultural objects. Often, the games were made to show off the capabilities 
of the Kinect-artefact, rather than to make a good game that uses whatever 
hardware is available. This is likely due in part to the limited penetration 
of the Kinect-artefact into gamers’ homes, which means that the market 
was small and there was little money to be spent on developing new 
games. This is a curious circumstance. The gamer’s relationship with the 
earlier Kinect-artefact is one in which the machine was often privileged 
above the human’s enjoyment for the purposes of building expectations 
for the forthcoming Kinect-artefact 2.0. Steve Woolgar describes this kind 
of thinking in “Configuring the user”.224 Users do not necessarily know 
what they want, because they are not attuned to the anticipated future 
of the technology, or because they desire a particular feature but are not 
prepared to pay for it.225 Human users of the first Kinect-artefact did not 
possess the same information as Microsoft developers, such as the kinds of 
gaming experiences that would become possible with Kinect-artefact 2.0. 
However, the human-Kinect-artefact relation had an effect on the Kinect-
brand, one that is contrary to that which was presumably intended. A 
poor understanding of the Kinect-artefact’s phenomenology, either by the 
developers or the users (or both), meant that these “serious” games tended 
to damage the Kinect-brand from Microsoft and other developers’ points of 
view. This perception of Kinect 1.0 set the scene for Kinect 2.0’s release.
Another problem for the Kinect-brand is the widespread belief that 
the 2013 Kinect-artefacts could be used for covert surveillance, further 
privileging other interests above those of the gamer. When the Xbox One 
was first announced, it was revealed that Kinect-artefact 2.0s would need 
to be plugged in and active before the console could be used properly. This 
sparked considerable anger with gamers, and some bloggers and journalists 
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worried in the aftermath of the announcement that Kinect-artefacts would 
represent a serious invasion of privacy, especially since the new sensors are 
powerful enough to detect heartbeats and can distinguish between individual 
voices.226 This response was likely amplified by Edward Snowden’s exposure 
of PRISM and its large-scale surveillance activities which came to light only 
a week after Microsoft’s announcement, and also the subsequent allegation 
that Microsoft had provided the NSA with the ability to access email and 
other user applications.227
After these revelations became public, Microsoft entered a period of 
damage-control which permitted them to disassociate the console from 
the new concerns surrounding the sensors. The Kinect-brand needed to 
change its relationship with the Kinect-artefact. Microsoft assured gamers 
that Kinect-artefacts can be switched off when the console is not in use, 
but comparisons to Big Brother still abounded.228 The influential gamer-
themed webcomic Penny Arcade called the Kinect-artefact “the mandatory 
evil camera”.229 (Indeed, in February 2014 it was discovered that this fear 
was quite justified after the revelation that a UK intelligence agency had 
allegedly monitored webcam chat for several years and had considered using 
the new Kinect-artefact.230) This and other criticisms of the console meant 
that the announcement of the new system was surrounded by anger and 
confusion.231 The Kinect-brand swiftly shifted stance from promoting the 
impressive sensory capabilities of the sensor to distancing itself from privacy 
concerns.232
Microsoft promised to remove other controversial features such as the 
mandatory DRM technology.233 But despite the violent reaction from major 
videogames commentators, Microsoft did not announce that the Xbox One 
could be purchased without a Kinect-artefact. They explained that the high 
level of integration of Kinect-artefacts into the operations of the console 
meant that it was now impossible to sell it separately, and that they wanted 
the console to be consistent for developers. Maybe Microsoft did think the 
use of NUI technology could enhance traditional videogames, but to many 
it seemed that the self-described “hardcore” fanbase of the Xbox 360 would 
be obliged to pay more money for a device that was almost universally 
considered only suitable for casual and family games. Even if there was 
little miscommunication between the Kinect-artefact and the human, the 
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Kinect-brand was standing between them. Humans would almost never 
enter into a fresh and untarnished relation with a Kinect-artefact, free from 
concerns about privacy and the possible loss of “hardcore” status, and the 
Kinect-artefact could not enter into a relation with certain humans because 
many would now be compelled to switch it off or unplug it. This and the 
Xbox line’s apparent transition from a powerful gaming engine to a home 
entertainment hub with a focus on television integration and wide range of 
entertainment media could be considered a way of distancing the console 
from “gamer culture” and its sometimes impenetrable language, tropes, and 
skilful gestures.
With a yet more drastic severing of Xbox One from the Kinect-brand, 
Microsoft seemed to cut its losses with its console. After the poor reviews 
of its flagship game Kinect Sports Rivals, and a little under a year after its 
initial announcement of the new console, Microsoft issued a statement 
stating that the console would no longer be compulsorily bundled with a 
Kinect-artefact. The post, entitled “Delivering More Choices For Fans”,234 
has been widely called the death of the Kinect. The decision has been widely 
condemned by those who already own the console but appreciated by those 
who now have the opportunity to buy the console at a reduced price. In any 
case, the lack of incentive for new users to purchase Kinect-artefacts has led 
to fewer games integrating gestural and spoken commands, and the identity 
of the Kinect-brand is becoming less and less relevant, although many 
games have been released since this so-called “death”. Would-be developers 
for the Kinect-artefact have to convince gamers that their product is so good 
that it is worth purchasing a peripheral as well. As for the Kinect-artefacts, 
their experiences were significantly affected by the announcement. Those 
users who did away with their Kinect-artefact changed the way that their 
Kinect-artefact senses and experiences its world, causing it to enter into 
relations with the back of cupboards and landfills, and preventing its sensory 
organs from activating those electronic pathways that were previously so 
central to its way of being in the world.
Kinect-artefact 1.0
Let’s turn now to the sensory worlds of those Kinect-artefacts. Kinect 
1.0’s sensory organs function in a way that resembles human sensation, 
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although they are not the same structurally. Kinect-artefact 1.0 combines 
the use of two types of sensors to achieve something that its developers, 
speaking on behalf of the artefact, claim is similar to human vision; it has a 
camera for the detection of the visible light spectrum; and a second system 
that emits and records infrared signals. The infrared sensor allows the 
Kinect-artefact to gauge depth, making users’ gestures three dimensional. 
It emits infrared light from one point, which bounces off the player (and 
any other objects) before returning and being interpreted by the infrared 
sensor.235 The Kinect-artefact also uses stereo microphones with complex 
software to reduce the problems of sound reverberation common to a 
home theatre situation, enabling the use of voice commands.236 The only 
feature possessed by a Kinect-artefact 1.0 but not a Kinect-artefact 2.0 is a 
responsive tilt motor built into the stand which permits the Kinect-artefact 
1.0 to respond to changes in player height or position. The IR emission and 
tilt stand adjustment are the only two interactions it can initiate besides its 
communication with the Xbox 360 console. The Kinect-artefact 1.0 was 
intended to be an affordable but high-quality intuitive interface for casual 
consumers, but it was difficult to use and required the user to exaggerate 
their movements.237 There were serious challenges to creating meaningful 
communication between human and machine. Kinect-artefact 1.0 acted 
in accordance with the internal qualities determined by its structure, 
which often brought it into conflict with humans who wished it to act 
in different ways. The Kinect-artefact 1.0 had an unfortunate effect on 
the Kinect-brand by failing to perform as well as the Kinect-brand had 
enthusiastically advertised.
Despite these issues, several individuals and groups tried to gain an 
appreciation of Kinect-artefact 1.0’s phenomenal world. Early exhibitions of 
the Kinect-artefact emphasised the capture of human movements through 
the “stickman” or skeletal visualisation, a crude depiction of the Kinect-
artefact’s idea of human bodies (which is the only relationship most creators 
and consumers were really interested in). It is a representation of human 
body parts as seen and interpreted by the Kinect-artefact. In Kinect-artefact 
1.0 the skeletons were quite rudimentary, with straight lines connecting 
dots representing joints. The simplicity of the representations highlights 
the impression that the Kinect-artefact 1.0 used very sophisticated, labour-
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intensive technology to contrive an image recognition that most humans 
could do easily. The Kinect-artefact, despite its efforts to be natural (read: 
human) struggled even to perform what would be a very simple task for 
most humans. Nevertheless, this visual was part of the campaign for Kinect-
artefact 1.0 for Windows, part of the effort to encourage people to do their 
own things with their Kinect-artefact.
Stick-man is an attempt to code certain aspects of the Kinect-artefact’s 
phenomenal world for human consumption. It gives the user or the engineer 
an insight into the machinic experience. However, it is not intended as an 
interactive art project. Rather it is a tool for those individuals who want to 
persuade the Kinect-artefact to do something. It is an expedient hijacking 
of Kinect-artefact sensory systems to ensure future compliance with human 
motion. Many impressive projects were attempted with the implicit or 
explicit blessing of Microsoft. Among them is Chris Vik’s 2011 performance 
at Melbourne Town Hall. Vik used a special Kinect-artefact-based interface 
to control a 4-storey organ with hand gestures.238
However, there were serious problems with basic gameplay in the 
Kinect-artefact 1.0. As argued later in the chapter, the Kinect-artefact wants 
to communicate well with the user. But it can only ever react to events 
in accordance with its qualities. One significant problem was the Kinect-
artefact failing to recognise humans when the lighting was wrong. A quality 
of the Kinect-artefact 1.0 vision system is that it recognises the presence 
of humans by the colour of the light that it receives through its lens, and 
because lighting affects the colour of light, the Kinect’s interpretations 
were unpredictable to humans. The body mapping software was also 
too simplistic to capture all the subtleties of human movement and the 
gestures did not work as consistently as one might hope. Voice commands 
were not so ineffective but were underused by the software. These kinds 
of problems that the Kinect-artefact 1.0 struggled with are to some extent 
understandable to us, since humans also struggle to detect objects when 
conditions are too light or dark. Humans make errors in perception. But it is 
a little more difficult to say that we could mistake a person for a nonhuman 
object simply because they use a wheelchair, are moving too fast or are in 
poorly-lit conditions. We usually have little difficulty tracking the movement 
of a person’s hand in space or knowing that a hand concealed behind a 
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person’s back is still there. These frustrating and sometimes inexplicable 
problems come from the extreme restriction of the Kinect-artefact 1.0’s 
world. It has limitations to its sensory capabilities that mean it has real 
difficulty carrying out its program of action.
Despite all its limitations, the Kinect-artefact 1.0 remained popular 
through the three years prior to the end of the Xbox 360 console cycle, 
selling more than 24 million units.239 We can readily identify what was 
beneficial about this arrangement for Microsoft: it made money by selling 
Kinect-brand games (even if it possibly lost money on the Kinect-artefact 
itself) and it set the stage for future success in the console wars. It sustained 
Microsoft through a longer-than-average console cycle brought on by the 
Global Financial Crisis. And it offered a tantalising look at what might be 
possible with the next Kinect-artefact.
Kinect-artefact 2.0
The advertising, statements from Microsoft, and sensationalist news 
stories240 prior to the release of Kinect 2.0 initially raised human user 
expectations. With the release of the Xbox One, Microsoft promised that 
the Kinect-artefact had been “completely re-engineered”241, and seemed 
intent on reversing the popular perception of the device as a gimmick. The 
sensor now had a much larger field of view, compensating for one of the 
Kinect-artefact 1.0’s biggest problems. The lighting problems were also 
fixed by adding imaging technology that does not depend on visible light. 
Both cameras working in concert create a more complete image of the user. 
It seemed that Kinect-artefact 2.0 would be better able to achieve its goals 
than Kinect-artefact 1.0, to the overall benefit of the Kinect-brand.
The Kinect-artefact 2.0, unlike the Xbox 360 model, uses a time-of-
flight (TOF) camera. It measures the round trip time (RTT) of photons 
emitted in flashes from the Kinect-artefact.242 The photons bounce off 
objects and return to the Kinect-artefact, from which the distance of objects 
can be measured using the speed of light constant. This creates a 3D image 
of whatever objects are positioned in front of the Kinect-artefact, and in 
far greater detail than that offered by a Kinect-artefact 1.0. Added to the 
1080p visible light camera there is also an active IR sensor that addresses 
the lighting problems experienced with the Kinect-artefact 1.0. With a 
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Kinect-artefact 1.0, too much lighting on one side of the room could 
adversely affect the sensor’s ability to pick up players. But the new sensor 
not only fixed this problem, it allowed users to interact with the sensor in 
total darkness.
Two pre-launch videos made by Microsoft were entitled “Behind the 
eyes of Xbox One Kinect” and “Inside the brains of Xbox One Kinect”,243 
names that continue Microsoft’s efforts to anthropomorphise the Kinect-
brand and to encourage gamers and users to think of their product as an 
active, smart participant in creating entertainment experiences.244 The 
videos provide visual representations of one part of the Kinect-artefact 
2.0’s world: its experience of the human and the human’s engagement with 
the console and software. They show how the Kinect-artefact integrates 
TOF cameras, active IR and visible light cameras in different ways. Most 
of the focus of the videos is on how the Kinect-artefact can sense and 
perceive human bodies and eliminate other objects. A team of developers 
demonstrated this using their own bodies. The videos all came from a 
sample of a session created and published by Microsoft Research, in which 
humans moved around and demonstrated the capabilities of the Kinect-
artefact in use. The room in which the video was recorded is quite large with 
few obstacles. This permitted the participants in the video a wide range of 
Figure 1: Diagram of a Kinect-artefact 2.0’s basic technical relationship to other objects.
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movement. Presumably the participants were already very familiar with the 
Kinect-artefact’s abilities and deficiencies, and they were able to use the 
Kinect-artefact skilfully, possibly with a history of grokking.
Firstly, there was an image of the human body as the Kinect-artefact 
“sees” in total darkness Next, there was a coloured skeleton image, 
which was evidently more complex than the stick-man images of the 
Kinect-artefact 1.0. The Kinect-artefact 2.0’s skeletal tracking has greater 
articulation of the hips, spine and shoulders as well as recognition of thumbs 
and the length of the hand. In addition to the skeleton, what the developer 
teams called ”block-man” revealed how the Kinect-artefact sees rotation 
in the joints and how body parts relate to each other. Instead of straight 
lines, major parts of the human body (head, shoulder, lower leg, hand, etc.) 
were depicted as coloured blocks. Block-man showed the orientation or 
“rotation” of the body parts.
Developer Kareem Choudry claims in “Inside the brains of Xbox One 
Kinect” that the skeleton is only a small part of the story when it comes to 
mapping the body. “If you really want to understand what’s going on with 
the human you need to understand and describe what’s going on with the 
muscles, the forces, the torque.” The next image in the video is “muscle-
man”, and it depicts how the Kinect-artefact 2.0 thinks the muscles in the 
human are behaving. Muscle-man is similar to the skeleton image, but with 
more rounded muscle-like lines representing limbs, torso, and head. The 
body parts are coloured on a spectrum from red to green; green represents 
“no force” and red represents high intensity. A leg carrying more of the 
human’s weight is darker in colour, and circles under the feet represent 
impact on the floor. When the individual is punching the air, as one might 
do in a fighting game, the power of their blow is represented with a circle of 
varying size. While the skeleton and the block-man are merely closer to the 
ways that humans perceive bodies, muscle-man is a mode of perception that 
the Kinect-artefact has which humans lack. Similarly, the Kinect-artefact 
uses its alien senses to detect exertion in humans. The visible light spectrum 
camera and the Active IR camera work together to deduce the user’s heart 
rate by detecting tiny changes on the skin. This is a type of sensation that 
humans do not experience, although they are typically able to draw similar 
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conclusions to the Kinect-artefact (i.e. “this human has recently exerted 
themselves”).
These visual models are a good representation of what the Xbox deduces 
about human bodies from its “eyes”: the colour camera, active IR sensor 
and time-of-flight sensor. The videos are, however, of varying utility to 
exploring the phenomenal world of the Kinect-artefact. They are attempts to 
render human figures in human terms by first translating them through an 
alien interface. The videos are, after all, promotional images and reflect the 
“brain” of the Kinect-artefact. The “brain” is located in the middleware of 
the Kinect-artefact that makes sense of what the sensors detect – identifying 
certain patterns as human bodies, for instance.
The Kinect-artefact is an extremely human-oriented device, both in 
its sensation by the sensors and the mediation by the middleware. Its 
sensors were designed to emit and receive radiation that is best able to give 
information about human bodies, as well as certain other things such as 
the floor the human stands on and the controller the human holds. The 
middleware takes these already-biased observations and further exaggerates 
the body positions before relaying the information to the console. Not all 
the information picked up by the sensors is used. From the representations 
shown in the promotional videos it seems clear that the Kinect-artefact 
is not interested in the position of furniture or what is hung on the walls, 
beyond its role in obstructing the Kinect-artefact’s vision. The Kinect-
artefact is oriented to the human. And yet, it would be difficult to claim 
that the Kinect-artefact is human-like in its sensing and perceiving. It is an 
extraordinarily alien object, even for a videogames accessory. It constructs 
a view of the human using bursts of photons and block-like models that 
are quite foreign to human vision; it receives input from one direction but 
can only send data onwards to the console; and it can be put into a state in 
which its sensors do not respond at all.
The phenomenology of nonhumans is ever more pertinent to everyday 
life. The Internet of Things project aims to construct a new internet-
based way of living as that of a planet so enriched with interlinked sensors 
that it is capable of far more advanced coordination than previously. The 
Kinect-artefact is a sensor that affords a different kind of relation between 
human and console. But can we really only describe a Kinect-artefact-
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console hybrid as a sensor? In a personification of the phenomenon we 
would surely describe it as a sensory-perceptive entity. But the concept 
of perception, when applied to a nonhuman, is a problematic one for the 
information processing theory of knowledge.245 The interiority of machines 
is questionable, and their irreducibility seems absurd when each component 
is created by humans. This will be addressed further in the next chapter, 
with the discussion of Umwelten and consciousness, but briefly, it seems 
evident from the way by which the Kinect-artefact conveys and transforms 
information from human to console that it at least possesses some interior 
qualities. These are the qualities that cause it to relate in certain ways 
– Kinect-artefactish ways. Consequently, if we put aside for a moment 
questions of mind and consciousness, the study of the alien phenomenology 
of the Kinect-artefact is valid. And due to its status as a contentious cultural 
object, its phenomenology is of particular interest to humans.
Communication, sensation and relation of the Kinect-artefact
At the time of release, Microsoft billed Kinect-artefact technology as 
something that makes interaction with the Xbox One more natural. The 
language of “eyes” and “brains” conveys the impression that the Kinect-
artefact has an implicit humanity so that humans may communicate with 
it more easily. The human need not learn and adapt to use the system, 
because the system has been adapted to be human-like. The Kinect-artefact 
participates in semiotic interaction with multiple objects, most notably the 
console, but also with humans, furniture, the speed of light constant and 
the Kinect-brand. Human relations with a Kinect-artefact are affected by 
all of its other relations with the world, and it is not always clear why. Under 
these conditions, humans often band together to investigate an object in an 
informal and practical way, as in the case of the “Waking up” problem.
“Waking up” the Kinect-artefact
In the immediate aftermath of the release of the Xbox One, corporation 
and customers came to a gradual equilibrium with regards to complaints 
and suggestions about Kinect-artefact 2.0. Several major bugs and design 
problems were reported to Microsoft and resolved. Difficulties for Kinect-
artefacts included identifying humans and conveying information about 
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humans (and their surroundings) to the console, and the console had 
difficulty interpreting that information. Software updates made it easier 
for Kinect-artefacts to behave in a way that was more pleasing to their 
humans, improving the relationship. However, many problems remained. 
One example is that the furniture in the room containing the Kinect-
artefact must be carefully arranged. The Kinect-artefact is widely described 
as “finicky” or discriminatory, and the lack of a general understanding 
of its phenomenology has resulted in an abundance of pseudoscientific 
explanations for its behaviour. Humans needed to understand what the 
Kinect-artefact wanted from its environment before they could form 
meaningful semiotic interactions with it, and eventually grok the system. 
The most prominent issue after the Kinect-artefact 2.0’s release is known 
as the “Xbox On” problem, and it represents a starting point for engaging 
with the phenomenal world of the Kinect-artefact. The data for this section 
was gathered from the official online Xbox One support forum246 and from 
Reddit’s Kinect and Xbox One subreddits.247
The “Xbox On” problem has become an emblematic instance of the 
communication problems between human and Kinect-artefact. A major 
emphasis for this generation of the Kinect-brand is on voice commands, 
largely replacing the hated gesture controls of the Xbox 360. Kinect-
artefacts (those that are able to hear and understand human voices) convey 
that information to the console and thus are able to control many aspects of 
the interface. But Kinect-artefacts often have trouble understanding human 
intent through language, and this causes humans to come into conflict with 
the Kinect-artefact as well as the Kinect-brand. To use Heidegger’s terms, 
when ready-to-hand for the human the Kinect-artefact hears, understands, 
and acts. It can become present-at-hand for the human by failing to hear, 
understand, or act. A user can play movies without needing to touch a 
controller, and they may perform all the additional playback commands with 
voice as well. Kinect-brand games and many major menu operations can 
be activated with speech. These features have been welcomed by users with 
physical disabilities (specifically blind people or people with low mobility), 
pregnant women and parents with small children, and are reported to be 
useful when cooking and while sick, since without voice controls the Xbox 
One cannot respond to immediate human needs without input from a 
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controller. One user reported being able to use a voice command to turn the 
Xbox One on from the ground floor so that it would power up while they 
were making their way down to the basement. The Xbox One also learns 
the cadences of individual users’ speech so that over time it responds more 
easily to voice commands.
But there is one problem which has been extensively identified: the 
difficulty encountered by many users trying to switch their console on with 
the “Xbox On” command. When the console is on “instant-on” standby, it 
can reactivate in response to a human uttering the voice command. In the 
Microsoft advertising materials for the new Kinect-brand, this feature was 
given particular prominence. On its website, it claims that “Xbox One was 
designed for today’s fast-paced lifestyle. It wakes up instantly when you say, 
‘Xbox On,’ and even turns on your TV.”248 But unfortunately many users 
find it difficult or impossible to wake the console up without physically 
touching the box or controller, leaving them wondering whether the Kinect-
artefact is poorly designed or whether their environment is simply not 
convivial for a Kinect-artefact.249 This is an important instance in which the 
Kinect-brand becomes disassociated with the Kinect-artefact, which simply 
cannot perform what the Kinect-brand has promised. The Kinect-artefact 
does not hear, understand, or act on the voice command. Identifying why 
this happens requires learning about the Kinect’s way of being in the world. 
It becomes present-at-hand for the human, and it becomes the subject of 
alien phenomenology.
The desire to switch the console on without needing to touch a 
controller is a practical concern. But those users that found difficulties 
with this command exhibited a frustration and disappointment that may be 
judged excessive for a practical issue. Several commenters expressed a sense 
of “betrayal” after buying consoles with the belief that it would work like 
it does in its advertisements and subsequently spending considerable time 
and effort trying to make the feature work. There was a particular anger 
because users felt they were “forced” to buy the Kinect-artefact with the 
console despite the widespread privacy concerns. There was also a feeling of 
being ignored by Microsoft and particularly of support staff failing to read 
the forums and therefore not realising that there was a problem, or perhaps 
even that Microsoft was refusing to admit that there was a problem. This 
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may have been a residual sentiment from Microsoft’s failure to acknowledge 
the “Red Ring of Death” problem, a malfunction that rendered Xbox 
360s unusable.250 Presumably, the Kinect-brand also experienced a sort of 
frustration from this issue. It threatened the relationship between Kinect-
brand and existing users of the Xbox One console, which may have made it 
less likely that other users would purchase a Kinect-artefact. User forums 
and social media comments may be in a strong relationship with the Kinect-
brand, and at the time of this problem these online influencers of opinion 
were consumed with the “Waking up the Kinect” issue. The sentiments of 
the posters leave the impression that there was something greater than a 
practical concern inherent to this difficulty, especially since other practical 
problems, such as the lack of a choice when using the Kinect-artefact 
for voice communication in multiplayer games, did not attract the same 
demands for a solution. It may be that this disproportionate response 
emerged from the portrayal of advanced computers in science fiction as well 
as in corporations’ depiction of present-day technology as becoming closer 
to anticipated Artificial General Intelligence computers. There is a craving 
for anthropomorphism in machines. Patterns of sleep and wakefulness are 
among the most culturally deterministic aspects of our biological existence, 
and any kind of “smart” machine that approaches human intelligence 
should be wakened in a human way.
The community of users trying to find a solution to this problem 
explored many possible avenues. One interesting class of explanation 
suggests that users with certain types of voices had greater success than 
others. The main observation made by many users was that female voices 
were often able to activate the console while male voices could not (although 
some users reported the opposite effect). Some users reported success after 
uttering the command in a falsetto register. Many users had suggestions for 
the best pronunciation of words. A particularly common piece of advice in 
any region is to pronounce the word “on” like “ahn”, with more of a North 
American accent. One user claimed that using a “really nasally ‘nerd voice’” 
improved the voice commands. Some users claimed that it is better to say 
it very quickly, and others claimed that pausing between the two words 
might be an improvement. There was an awareness that Kinect-artefacts 
possess similar internal qualities that affect relationships – in other words, 
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the beginnings of an informal assessment of the machine’s experience of 
the world. Several users reported using a Youtube video to turn on the 
console, made by individuals whose voices were easily understood by 
Kinect-artefacts. At the time of my research there were two videos that 
were being used, both including the apparently male filmmakers turning 
on the console with their voices.251 By sampling the recording, users 
were able to turn on their consoles using the voice of the filmmaker. One 
caused a particular sensation, since the filmmaker with a British accent 
was able to turn on previously recalcitrant North American systems. One 
possibility proposed is that a recording on an electronic device clips out the 
lower tones in a person’s speech, supporting the theory that higher tones 
improve performance. The degree of indignation on this point reflects the 
predominance of male gamers as users of the previous Xbox consoles. The 
anger among early adopters came from feeling as though Microsoft owed 
“us” the best possible user interface and had not delivered.
There were also apparently problems with accents. The “Xbox On” 
command was not provided in Australia at launch; there was no option to 
put it in an instant-on energy level when it was switched off, so it needed 
to be switched on manually. It could be very simply accessed, however, by 
switching the console’s region settings to one of the countries for which 
the “Xbox On” was available, such as USA, UK or Canada. This meant, 
however, that the Kinect-artefact was not able to comprehend an Australian 
accent all the time. Changing the region changes the language that a Kinect-
artefact understands and responds to. An utterance made with a different 
accent does not always produce the desired effect. The human speaks 
Australian English, but the Kinect-artefact hears imperfect US English. 
These restrictions may make the ”smart” object seem remarkably slow-
witted, or possibly even sexist or racist.252 Users are beginning to expect 
natural language processing that can communicate additional information, 
respond to jokes and understand idioms (Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa 
come to mind), which are all much more tied to local culture than to broad 
language groups.
The Kinect-artefact itself does not tell us explicitly what gender or 
nationality it prefers; users have been required to work it out by observing 
the positive and negative feedback given by the Kinect-artefact. Some users 
96 Chapter 2
performed experiments to find ways of making contact. They engaged 
in an informal program of alien phenomenology, deducing the nature of 
Kinect-artefact sensation from the positive and negative feedback of the 
Kinect-artefacts. It is not clear whether the problem was in the position 
of the Kinect-artefact, the room acoustics, the calibration of the Kinect-
artefact, the energy settings, or a hardware problem, but it is clear that the 
interaction of the Kinect-artefact with other nonhumans was a significant 
factor in whether it could communicate effectively with humans. Microsoft’s 
advice for the Kinect-artefact microphone is fairly simple: follow the 
calibration procedure properly and make sure there is not too much noise 
in the room.253 Yet on the forums there were a vast number of suggestions 
for ensuring that the Kinect-artefact works properly. Some users reported 
having completely moved their console and the rest of their home media 
ecology to another room, particularly smaller rooms or rooms with 
carpeting. A collective effort to find the ideal positioning of the Kinect-
artefact was underway by humans, and Kinect-artefacts participated in 
this process by punishing and rewarding consistently, according to each 
artefact’s internal qualities. The investigation into positioning included 
ideal distances between the Kinect-artefact and the human. One user 
recommended crouching down 4-5 feet away, another suggested two inches. 
The forums were full of appeals to describe users’ home theatre set-ups, 
sensor positions and room design factors. Its ability to hear also appeared 
to change over time, depending on how long it had been switched off. The 
“sleep” metaphor seems apt, since at first its sleep appeared to be light 
but it then became less easily roused. The Kinect-artefact became sealed 
off from the humans attempting to make contact with it. In the absence 
of instruction from Microsoft or successful hacks of the Kinect-artefacts, 
the participants in this process, in short, adopted a sort of naïve alien 
phenomenology. The quiddity or interiority of the Kinect-artefact was 
assumed, and the users experimented with different kinds of objects to try 
to gain access to as much information as possible. But they could never be 
their Kinect-artefact and seemed to be repeatedly frustrated by failures to 
access the real root of the problem.
A common theme in the forums was describing the Kinect-artefact and 
Xbox One as though it were an animal to be tamed. One user suggested 
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that the sensitive Xbox One needed a “caring, motherly voice”, and many 
expressed the sentiment that the Kinect-artefact needed to be disciplined 
and educated. The Xbox One needed taming (or domestication254) because 
it entered into entanglements in pre-existing and highly heterogeneous 
living room set-ups. It must be nestled into the pre-established network 
of television, other consoles, cable television or set top box and peripheral 
gaming objects as well as becoming a focal point of all these activities. 
The Xbox One was intended to make these other electronics controllable 
through a single system (at least in the United States).
The Xbox One also domesticated its human user. Using negative and 
positive feedback, the human was encouraged to position the Kinect-
artefact prominently in the room, to rearrange their furniture and alter their 
electronics set-up. They were even compelled to change the way they speak 
and move. The Kinect-artefact cannot give clear instructions to the console 
without this domestication and must encourage the human user to act in 
a way that engages with certain parts of the Kinect-artefact’s way of being 
in the world.
Another part of this domestication involved encouraging the human to 
use the applications compatible with the Xbox One. In their book Games 
of Empire, Nick Dyer-Witherford and Greig de Peuter chart Microsoft’s 
moves and describe them as processes of “deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization”.255 They were speaking of the two older Xbox consoles 
in addition to certain occurrences in the world of personal computing, but it 
may also be found in Microsoft’s strategy with the Xbox One. The key is to 
create a multimedia platform that forms an entertainment hub in people’s 
homes, from which additional services can be marketed and sold. The 
Microsoft-owned services included:
•	 Skype
•	 Xbox Video and Music (paid subscription or single 
payment libraries)
•	 Integrated Bing internet search
•	 Internet Explorer
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•	 Xbox Fitness (purchasable work-out videos designed for Kinect-
artefact integration)
•	 SkyDrive
•	 Upload Studio (allows users to create, modify and publish videos 
of gameplay).
As well as products that are not owned by Microsoft:
•	 Netflix
•	 Amazon Lovefilm
•	 Twitch (leading machinima and gameplay video platform) and 
Machinima (gamer and programming network)
•	 Youtube
•	 TED
•	 Hulu Plus in addition to many regional premium cable channels 
and video streaming apps.
The console comes to control the gaming, social, video and music services. 
Once the cable television, speakers and other elements of the home theatre 
are under the control of the console (or the Kinect-artefact) it becomes a 
vital component and cannot be abandoned. The user is encouraged to use 
Microsoft services on other platforms and perhaps even to buy Microsoft 
smartphones, tablets and to run Windows on their personal computers. The 
hardware and applications used for socialising, home entertainment, mobile 
entertainment, internet surfing, gaming and media library management are, 
in this metaphor, “territories” that Microsoft is endeavouring to capture 
in the everyday media consumption of its users. The domestication of the 
user by the Kinect-artefact allows Microsoft to capitalise on the prominent 
position of the Xbox One in homes. If one platform can provide so many 
different functions, and interacts so seamlessly with other software sold by 
the same company, why use products made by Google, Sony, or Apple? In 
the terminology of ANT, the platform becomes an obligatory passage point 
in the home entertainment system.256 The human-object and object-object 
relations prevent any direct human-Microsoft relations, and the brand 
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remains safely abstracted and uninterrogated. The Kinect-brand is like the 
lancet liver fluke Dicrocoelium dendriticum, which manipulates the nerves 
of ants (through unknown means) to compel them to leave their colony. 
As Jan Pechenik puts it, the ants are then “obliged to crawl upward on a 
blade of grass and to bite down firmly upon its tip”.257 They are unable 
to open their jaws during peak ruminant grazing times, and cattle, sheep, 
and pigs are thus more likely to consume the ant, and the fluke completes 
the next phase of its life cycle in the ruminant’s digestive system. Many 
parasitic organisms change the behaviour of their hosts in similar ways. In 
this analogy, the Kinect-brand alters the brain of the human in subtle ways, 
compelling the human to change its behaviour in a way that better suits the 
brand. Of course, particular individuals in a species may develop resistances 
to parasites, or the parasite’s genetic profile may drift, altering this optimal 
arrangement. Similarly, some humans are already inhabited by other 
parasites (such as those of the Google or Sony genus), develop a disinterest 
in the brand over time, or are so over-exposed to attempts at corporate 
manipulation that they do not cooperate with the brand.258
This is an important way of ensuring that users of the previous system 
adopt the next system. To some extent this tactic enabled Microsoft to 
retain a core of Xbox 360 users who did not wish to abandon their Xbox 
Achievements (rewards that may be earned by achieving certain goals 
during gameplay), avatar and profile, plus the rewards of Xbox Live 
Gold membership. There were also advantages for Playstation 3 users to 
upgrade to the Playstation 4, such as the retention of Trophies in the new 
system. But the Playstation 4 with its many other arguable advantages, 
lacked the totalising home theatre presence and was therefore less likely 
to become a permanent fixture in any home theatre set-up, especially 
given the increasingly long console cycles. Perhaps Microsoft believed 
that the generation of gamers that were loyal to the Xbox 360 for eight 
years had matured and wanted their gaming history to be preserved 
with the additional advantages of partner- and child-friendly features. 
The “Xbox On” command was a fundamental feature of this process of 
territorialisation. The user could perform the science fiction-like act of 
communicating with their computer through speech – a novelty which the 
core users represented on the forums appeared to enjoy. Furthermore, 
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in regions where the process was supported, the “Xbox On” command 
awakened all the home theatre elements. The word “Xbox” here is meant 
to substitute “complete entertainment experience”. The Xbox is domestic 
entertainment.
In addition to the logic of domestication in console expectations, the 
nature of machine learning and preponderance of “smart” devices has 
led to a set of impossible expectations for this generation of consoles. 
Microsoft is not the only company responsible for this impression, but 
it certainly cultivated the anticipation of a device that would have an 
agency and anthropomorphic intelligence well beyond previous consoles. 
Anthropomorphising machines is a powerful method for conveying 
the utility and sophistication of an electronic entity but is often highly 
misleading. In the case of the Xbox One, this tactic backfired and caused the 
impressions of treachery and deception that resounded in the forums. The 
trick of anthropomorphism was exposed.
Kinect Sports Rivals
Another re-negotiation of the line between humans and nonhumans is to be 
found in the game Kinect Sports Rivals259, which turns humans into avatars. 
Kinect Sports Rivals (KSR) was one of the first titles to explicitly focus on 
the Kinect-brand. It is a sports-themed game in which gamers play several 
minigames: wake racing, bowling, soccer, sharp shooting, rock climbing 
and tennis. Originally planned for concurrent release with the Xbox One it 
was delayed until release on April 8 2014. The title was an opportunity for 
Microsoft to exhibit some of the new Kinect-artefact’s power and potential, 
but the game also demonstrates a fascinating use of AI in collocated social 
gameplay. Gamers can play in multiplayer groups as in earlier Kinect-brand 
party games; up to four individuals can use a single system at once (and all 
may be logged into their personal Microsoft accounts). But an additional 
social element occurs online, either playing with an absent friend in real 
time or via the use of an AI avatar who can play against its user’s friends 
without the gamer initiating or authorising the game. In other words, 
Player 1 can play against Player 2 even when Player 2 is asleep. Human and 
nonhuman can play in the same way as human and human, but with the 
added complication that the nonhuman mimics a specific human rather than 
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a general one. Forza 5 for Xbox One has a similar arrangement in which the 
human player can be represented by their “drivatar” AI simulation.260
The game is comparable to Wii Sports, a game released to showcase the 
Nintendo Wii in 2006.261 Wii Sports is a similar game albeit much simpler 
both in ambiance and in gameplay. But because the pared-down Wiimote 
tended to respond to player intentions under the best conditions, the game 
was generally acknowledged to be a success. KSR was not as successful. 
Although the creative island setting is compelling, and the social functions 
work well, the game received mediocre reviews with a resounding tone 
of dissatisfaction at a sensor that had failed to live up to expectations for 
the second time in three years. The production company, Rare, has since 
been forced to lay off staff in the wake of the game’s failure.262 Perhaps 
this is because the standards for the game were set too high, as after the 
release of the demo Kinect Sports Rivals Preseason in November 2013,263 
many reviewers were optimistic about the game’s prospects. Chris Carter 
of Destructoid reviewed Preseason and pronounced it “Surprisingly Not 
Terrible”,264 which is a significant endorsement from a “hardcore” games 
publication. The demo contained one single wake racing track with relatively 
intuitive controls and clearly showcased the best that the full game would 
offer. Most reviews acknowledge the wake racing as the most successful 
feature, while going on to say that some or all of the other minigames fail to 
replicate its elegant simplicity.
For the purposes of this book, the avatar creation and autonomy of the 
avatars used in KSR are the most interesting qualities. A detailed modelling 
of a human player into an electronic avatar aims to recreate the human 
player in the game.265 This modelling is three-fold. Firstly, the creation 
of the avatar’s physical form is performed, in surprising detail, by the 
Kinect-artefact’s view of the player, particularly of the player’s face (the 
game appears to be fairly diplomatic when estimating the player’s body 
proportions). Microsoft’s promotional materials claim that the Kinect-
artefact “instantly scans you and captures your likeness as a champion”.266 
The avatar is, of course, something of a caricature, the game having selected 
those most distinctive or significant features in a human’s face. Secondly, 
it makes a social representation of the player towards the human’s friends 
or other online competitors. Thirdly, it creates an AI representation of 
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the player’s tactics and skill level which can then appear in the games of 
other players, so that you do not need to be playing for your avatar to 
compete against your friends. Here again is the discourse in Kinect-brand 
promotional materials toward the erasure of boundaries between player and 
game, between human and nonhuman.
At the beginning of the game, the avatar creation process begins with a 
call to acknowledge the almost magical rendering of the human body within 
a game. The claim by the voice-over is that the console will use the player’s 
“digital DNA” and create an avatar through the hardware’s “technical 
wizardry”. The avatar creation process makes use of bright lights and sound 
effects to highlight the magical nature of transformation from an unformed 
and unhuman collection of grey squares into an anthropomorphic form. 
Like the golem of Prague, unconscious matter is magically transmuted, 
except in this case the Kinect-artefact plays the role of the rabbi. The avatars 
and avatar creation process have been described as “surprisingly accurate”267 
but also as “a cartoon approximation” 268 and one reviewer claimed that the 
avatar “may or may not bear a likeness to you.”269 Several reviewers have 
criticised the logistics of the avatar creation process, which requires the 
player to kneel down next to the Kinect-artefact in what one reviewer called 
“a submissive stoop towards [the] TV”.270
The original Wii and subsequent Nintendo consoles may have 
contributed to this, since the digital avatars or “Miis” represented 
players in several games. But again, the avatars in the Nintendo world 
are much simpler and cartoon-like. Nintendo’s choice not to aim for 
true verisimilitude is in keeping with their minimalist and family-friendly 
approach to the industry. Similarly, Microsoft’s choice to aim for relative 
accuracy in their portrayal of players represents their emphasis on high-
performance machines with excellent graphics, a sensor that is not just a toy 
and their rebranding of Kinect-brand for adults. This hit-and-miss portrayal 
must therefore have been a significant disappointment for Microsoft, those 
objects that are in strong relation with Microsoft, and the Kinect-brand. The 
specific Kinect-artefact’s frustration is much more situated in the moment 
of disconnect between Kinect-artefact and human user.
The idea of the avatar creation process is generally inoffensive and 
predictable, but as with any kind of biometric analysis it is important to 
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seek out the restrictions of the technology. As a body-mimicking device for 
a game aiming to reproduce human ability, the game automatically creates a 
negative territory of bodies that do not conform to the requirements of the 
sensor and of the game. This is a territory containing individuals with low 
vision or hearing, mobility restrictions or without a certain normative body 
part such as an arm or ear. Any media form imposes certain restrictions on 
use including non-ergodic literature which at least requires “trivial” effort 
by the reader to perceive light and dark and to turn pages.271 But the failure 
to encompass a broad range of players does seem contrary to Microsoft’s 
stated intention to provide effortless play. The direction to kneel on the floor 
for avatar creation is, for example, an impossible feat for many individuals. 
It does not appear to support portrayal of individuals without two arms 
and legs, and most of the games can only be played while standing. On 
the support website for the Kinect-brand, Microsoft acknowledged that 
the Xbox One may not be accessible to everybody but argued that it is 
individual developers that must be “educate[d]”.272 The Kinect-artefact 
looks for certain ideal characteristics in humans, but every individual human 
presumably deviates in some way from these ideals. “The human” never 
presents itself to the Kinect-artefact.
The game causes a human body to position itself in a particular way. Part 
of this process might include moving furniture so that the Kinect-artefact 
can pick up more of the players’ bodies. Once this process is completed, the 
individual is directed to either a sitting or standing position, then to move 
one’s body parts to correspond to virtual stimuli, such as moving one’s arms 
and making a grasping movement to hold virtual handholds during the 
rock-climbing game. On various online forums, some users reported that 
these actions are both possible and enjoyable with the ideal furniture and 
room size, but for many users without these luxuries their more strenuous 
moves were punished by a sensor that could not pick up all of their bodies. 
There was also some disconnect with the screen because the body is shaped 
both by what the Kinect-artefact detects (or is thought to detect) and by 
the screen, which may not be in complete accord. When shooting for a goal 
in soccer, the size of the screen may change the player’s idea of where the 
goal and goalkeeper are located. Once the player is capable of grokking the 
system this problem disappears, but initially at least the body is shaped both 
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by visual cues (screen) and by visual feedback (Kinect-artefact and screen). 
The concept of a “natural” user interface starts to become a bit tenuous at 
those moments.
There is little variation between champions, with all features changeable 
and found in menus. Two ages (“adult” and “junior”) and two genders 
(“male” and “female”) are available. Still, once the champion is created it 
is intended to be a representative of the player. Since the Kinect-artefact 
recognises individual users, each player can step into play and their specific 
champion is brought up at once. But what is more, the game apparently 
learns what kinds of behaviour an individual is likely to use at a given time. 
Examples include using power-ups at particular times and using particular 
moves to gain extra points. This is an additional level of complexity for 
the use of the avatars. Wii Sports, for example, restricts itself to assigning 
a numerical skill level to each avatar. KSR aims for a much stronger 
correlation between real player and virtual version of the player.
More abstracted from the game is the player’s indirect behaviour after 
interacting with the game. KSR is designed to be a social game, so both 
the game and the player should benefit from engaging more players. The 
game becomes (ideally) more fun with competitors both in front of the 
same Kinect-artefact and connected via the internet. Therefore, the person 
who owns the Xbox One system is implicitly encouraged by the game to 
convince his or her friends to purchase their own Xbox One consoles. This is 
of benefit to the brand and the game, each of which wants to be successfully 
marketed and sold (see below). This could also be one of the motives for 
successful avatar creation, because it facilitates online play with friends. 
Champion scan artist Iain McFadzen claims:
It really does put an extra edge on competition when the 
person you’ve just pulled of the rock wall in climbing, or 
barged in to a mine in wake racing, looks and plays like one of 
your friends or family. And, of course, as they’re Champions, 
they’re always available to play against, 24/7.273
Having a good representation of oneself in the game goes some way to 
breaking down the barriers of abstraction in online play, and being able to 
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play with a person known in the real world can make games more enjoyable 
for the human (and is good for the Kinect-brand).
The only way for a human to investigate a Kinect-artefact is to look 
to the phenomena it produces and ultimately to look with human senses. 
An empirical approach must provide data for the task of interrogating the 
phenomenology of the Kinect-artefact. But the overmining or undermining 
of the objects can arise and must be assessed in each individual case. In this 
case the agency of the Kinect-artefact is closely tied to the agency of the 
game, but this is not always the case. Moment by moment the allegiance 
between the entities changes, but under most conditions they align. A 
Kinect-artefactish way of behaving is typically to receive data, transform 
it into useful information for the console and to provide feedback about 
its ability to sense certain objects to the human. We might refine this into 
a human-centric statement: the Kinect-artefact aims to appear to be a 
useful and effective NUI. The game behaves in a way that conveys the code 
for specific media formats. This can be refined into the human-centric 
statement that the game aims to provide good gameplay, graphics, sound 
and online play for the human player. Ultimately both the Kinect-artefact 
and the game interact with the Kinect-brand: aiming to impress the player, 
to be well-reviewed and to sell more copies of itself.
The conflict between Kinect-artefact and Kinect-brand is evident in 
KSR as in the “Waking up the Kinect” problem. The game wants to be liked 
and sold, being created by corporate interests and thereby being inextricably 
linked to them (rather as Latour’s gun is inextricably and bidirectionally 
linked to the human – see Chapter 5). But this tenuous connection is 
easily broken by the many betrayals of the Kinect-brand and the Xbox One 
console more generally. The game’s aim of good sales is obstructed by the 
failure of Kinect-artefacts to perform as promised. Specifically, the Kinect-
artefact often fails to hear the player’s spoken commands, it often cannot 
see the tops of players’ arms while they are rock-climbing, and it does 
not always deliver an accurate image of the player during avatar creation. 
Kinect-brand programs of action are easily severed by the most immediate 
Kinect-artefact programs of actions. This is consistent with Harman’s 
claim that objects are all equally real: the game disc, the ephemeral 
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interaction between player and NUI, the corporation and the effect on the 
developer’s reputation.
A similar incident is described by Ian Bogost in Alien Phenomenology. 
The game E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial for Atari Video Computer System 
is discussed (a game so unpopular that the unsold copies were famously 
buried in a landfill). In a few pages, Bogost enumerates the multitudinous 
things that are meant by the name of this game.274 He begins by describing 
the code, then the physical form of the individual cartridge and finally 
in the context of the 1983 videogames market crash: “not just a fictional 
alien botanist but a notion of extreme failure, of ‘the worst game of all 
time’: the famed dump of games in the Alamogordo landfill, the complex 
culture of greed and design constraint that led to it[...]”275 He stresses 
that none of these examples is the “real” E.T. game. Similarly, there is no 
incarnation of KSR that is more real than any other (a problem discussed 
further in Chapter 4). But in both these games, technical and corporate 
failure are implicit and thereby reveal inner truths about the game and 
the console that are inadequately concealed. Typically, the game’s goal is 
allied with that of the manufacturer, but the inner essence of the game 
might make itself amenable to interruptions by other elements such as 
the wall in one’s living room that makes it impossible to get one’s entire 
body into the Kinect-artefact’s field of view, or the background noise that 
makes one’s voice unintelligible to the Kinect-artefact, or the availability 
of internet review websites (in strong relation with the Kinect-brand) that 
make these problems known to the rest of the world. The corporation and 
the game ceased to remain on the same side from the moment the game 
was released to the public. And while their goals may be momentarily the 
same their relations are always defined by their inner real qualities, not by 
the allegiance. Technological failures are ready examples of bidirectional 
asymmetry in interactions.
Under even more unusual circumstances we may interrogate the alien 
phenomenology of these objects much more fully. For example, the effects 
of fire or freezing temperatures reveal other kinds of agency in these objects, 
such as the tendency of plastic components to melt before metal ones, or the 
tendency of a game disc to shatter when smashed with a rock. For Harman, 
blasting the console into space is a similarly valid investigation of object 
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relations and allows the creation of novel sensual objects between the game 
and other entities. While the human experiences a far broader set of sensual 
objects by using the game and console as intended by the manufacturer, this 
is not necessarily true of the Kinect-artefact for which picking up human 
gestures is repetitive and is only a tiny portion of its potential. The Kinect-
artefact is not reducible to its experiences, just as we are not reduced by the 
Kinect-artefact, which literally takes our image and leaves us as we were.
Alien phenomenology of the Kinect-artefact
The value of OOO lies in its strong theoretical robustness. It may lack 
the whimsical irreverence that seems so inextricable from the most 
successful ANT texts (such as in the paper by Jim Johnson, alias Bruno 
Latour, meditating on the incredible and seldom recognised power of 
the door hinge276), but it is a worthy successor for a scholarly milieu 
that is unsurprised by the agency of scallops and laboratory equipment. 
The tension of materiality and immateriality that surrounds posthuman 
discourse cries out for a philosophy of technology that can account for 
ephemerality and durability in human action, and OOO provides this with 
all the rigour and forethought that continental philosophy can offer. What 
OOO lacks is a grounded empirical framework that accentuates these 
strengths while contributing to a universal grammar for those who seek to 
replicate or extend other people’s work. OOO and NUIs, in other words, 
have similar problems: a lack of widespread exposure; vehement opposition 
from groups that find more tried-and-true techniques more sensible and 
practical; a limited number of examples that herald greater things to come; 
and competing impulses toward either consolidation or innovation.
To begin a grounded empirical investigation is to experience a loosening 
of the strings that connect the strength and elegance of Harman’s OOO 
from the object under observation. We are entering a world of alien affect 
and significance with limited language and tools. As Bogost claims, the only 
way to understand an object’s internal existence and modes of perception 
is through analogy: “[t]he subjective nature of experience makes the unit 
operation of one of its perceptions amount always to a caricature in which 
the one is drawn in the distorted impression of the other.”277 Suitably 
performed, an anthropomorphic statement can accentuate the alien nature 
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of objects such as the Kinect-artefact. One might refer to a Kinect-artefact’s 
“desire” as a means of highlighting the strangeness of machine agency. The 
frequent use of anthropomorphisms by Microsoft engineers and marketing 
executives may fall into this category, although they must of course remain 
suspect because of their tendency to make products sound more “smart” 
than they really are. The aptness of any statement is, of course, subjective. 
The analogy must be sound or the anthropomorphism is suspect. In the case 
of the Kinect-brand, the promotion of the sensor made frequent references 
to the eyes of the Kinect-artefact, which as has been described led to 
inevitable disappointment from users.
The most fundamental Kinect-artefactish action is to take in information 
about its immediate world (while facing one direction). This is generally true 
unless the Kinect-artefact is broken or switched off, in which case its most 
noticeable relations might be with furniture and the ambient temperature of 
the room. These are all consequences of the real qualities of the real object, 
which exists only in the phenomenal world of the Kinect-artefact. To ask 
about the real object and its qualities, in Harman’s sense, is to want to be 
the object. The observer can only ever have access to the sensual object, the 
one that appears in our impression of the object. As discussed in Chapter 
1, for Harman the sensual object is the object that appears when one object 
forms a relation with another object. The sensual object makes it possible for 
one object to relate to another (since real objects cannot directly touch one 
another). The sensual object has particular sensual qualities that we humans 
are capable of perceiving. But this does not mean that there is no connection 
between the real object and the sensual one. The sensual object acquires its 
qualities from the real object. Harman escapes idealism by insisting upon 
this correspondence.
The connection between object and object is, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
a matter of vicarious causation for Harman. Consequently, the interaction 
between human and Kinect-artefact is bidirectional and of a different nature 
in each direction. Each object is taking something completely different 
from the other. The human anthropomorphises the Kinect-artefact and, in 
a manner of speaking, the Kinect-artefact Kinect-artefactises the human. 
That is, the figure of the human is converted into a form that the Kinect-
artefact is capable of experiencing. When playing KSR, the human impresses 
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itself upon the Kinect-artefact in the form of returning photons, infrared 
radiation, soundwaves, and light. These relations do not take anything from 
the real human underneath. Similarly, the human understands the Kinect-
artefact in terms of its ability to see, its thought processes, and its menacing 
presence in the room.
Desire in the Kinect-artefact
It is easy to point to agency in the Kinect-artefact, but can we speak of 
desire? Desire surely suggests a gradation of needs that derive from the 
object’s qualities. These range from fundamental necessities (such as 
electricity and connection to a console) which allow it to operate, to more 
minor wants (such as the correct angle of the camera and for the player to 
be properly positioned) which allow it to operate in an optimally Kinect-
artefactish way. A good illumination of this gradation may be found in 
the attempts of the “Waking up the Kinect” investigators to derive an 
understanding of an alien entity through reporting on their various sensual 
relations with their Kinect-artefacts. The investigations are attempts to 
glean more information from the sensual object and to make assumptions 
about the real object. The human users, denied access to a reliable account 
of the Kinect-artefacts’ relations with the world, initiated a program of 
research into the sensors’ “ears” and documented their attempts online. 
These attempts are a speculative program which exhaustively lists all 
possible interactions that a Kinect-artefact could have with its environment. 
It tries to position the human viewer within the Kinect-artefact. It tries to 
understand what the Kinect-artefact wants.
The Kinect-artefact’s world was thoroughly described through this 
program and some important insights were acquired. The investigators 
discovered that Kinect-artefact desire is variable and analogue, even if 
its code is not. What works for one unit may not work for another unit, 
despite the patently obvious fact that each unit ought to be identical. Each 
Kinect-artefact has a different history and a different environment, similar 
to the way in which human identical twins become different due to their 
environments. Furthermore, each unit has certain needs that are more or 
less important than others. It might be difficult to stoop down in front of the 
television to allow the Kinect-artefact to scan one’s facial features, while the 
activation of a voice command might be as easy as opening one’s mouth at 
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the right time. Some actions are needed, some are desired and some are so 
easy they might be attributed to gestural excess. But there is an additional 
understanding to derive from this incident, and that is about what the 
Kinect-brand wants. The refusal of Microsoft to acknowledge the issue is a 
very telling part of the Kinect-brand’s identity, which is one of intuitive use 
and seamless entertainment integration. The Kinect-artefact’s needs and 
experiences are ludicrously removed from those of the Kinect-brand.
It may be argued that the idea of the brand is surely just the description 
in human terms of the object; the brand is an invention to bridge the gap 
between the objective world of objects and human thought. It is a desperate 
attempt to comprehend individual objects in an environment where 
thousands of identical units are shipped en masse. Bearing this in mind, is it 
right to have devoted so much time to discussing it? The Kinect-brand is a 
human thing, not a Kinect-artefact thing. This is perhaps another, grander, 
anthropomorphism: the allocation of human-like qualities not just to one 
object but to thousands. The brand comes to have human qualities (hope, 
disappointment, stubbornness, defeat). But it is also a matter of scale. The 
Kinect-artefact and Kinect-brand are reflected upon in a huge number of 
human ways: in pictures, on websites, in videos, and in webcomics. Each of 
these entities is a siphoning of the Kinect-artefact’s real qualities into human 
media formats. There are very few entities with which Kinect-artefacts have 
a stronger connection.
In distinguishing between the Kinect-brand and the Kinect-artefact it is 
revealed that their needs come into conflict with each other. We have learned 
from this that the tiniest interference in the relation between human and 
Kinect-artefact can be catastrophic for the Kinect-brand. The tendency of 
the microphone of the Kinect-artefact to respond better to higher voices 
was immediately cause for anger in a large group of cis male gamers, the 
market which the Kinect-brand craved access to so ardently. In conceiving 
of a machine ethics this distinction would be relevant. As noted in the 
introduction to this book, desire is necessary for an object to make ethical 
decisions. There must be an opportunity for an object to decide between an 
action that is “right” and an action that is in its own self-interest. In the case 
of the Kinect-brand, if we accept that the object has something similar to 
desire, then we could say that its self-interested desire to insinuate Kinect-
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artefacts into gamers’ homes comes into conflict with what is seen by many 
as the “right” things to do, such as ensuring that human voices are equally 
easy to understand regardless of pitch or accent. As for the Kinect-artefact, 
its desire to listen all the time for the words “Xbox on” may come into 
conflict with its user’s right to privacy.
Death of the Kinect
The “death” of a non-living object can only be discussed when using a 
rather playful (if morbid) anthropomorphic eye. Clearly things that are 
not alive cannot die, but we use the word often to describe a wide range of 
non-living objects. In the novel Slaughterhouse Five, Kurt Vonnegut brings 
it to the reader’s attention by commenting “So it goes” after each mention 
of death.278 This statement emphasises the death of humans and also the 
ways that we connote death in the English language, such as the death of 
the novel. The death of both the Kinect-artefact and the Kinect-brand are 
phenomena that force us to ask how much an object needs to change before 
it is no longer the same object.
Not all Kinect-artefact experiences revolve around the human. In no 
other place is this more evident than in the discarded Kinect-artefact, 
thrown onto the vast electronic waste repositories that now litter our planet. 
Electronic waste may be considered a “hyperobject”, to use Timothy 
Morton’s term.279 The hyperobject (“hyper” relative to us) is something 
that has such a powerful influence in either space or time that it denies the 
subject-object relationship with humans from which we are accustomed 
to framing the world. Morton is chiefly concerned with the most currently 
pertinent hyperobject: global warming. But he also describes the universal 
qualities of hyperobjects. One of Morton’s criteria for hyperobjects is 
that they are “nonlocal”; that is, any immediate, present version of the 
object is not the object itself. So, the Kinect-artefact that is present in the 
moment is not the hyperobject. The Kinect-artefact’s period of existence 
will likely far outstrip our own. It has already been brought about through 
the siphoning of ancient hydrocarbons through an oil rig (literally, not just 
metaphorically as in Harman’s Circus Philosophicus) the removal of ore from 
the earth and the refinement of minerals into glass. Even if these processes 
do not strictly speaking constitute the life history of the Kinect-artefact 
(since objects are irreducible), the future existence of a Kinect-artefact is 
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certain to also be highly eventful. We cannot be certain of the future of this 
and other electronic artefacts, but at present it seems likely that they will 
be abandoned to decay over thousands of years. For almost all of this time 
the main interactions for the Kinect-artefact will be with objects other than 
individual humans. If we consider time as a continuum then the Kinect-
artefact occupies a field that stretches over this long period. Any human 
contact occurs in a tiny portion of this continuum, and much of the object is 
very distant.
As has also been mentioned, an even more abstracted “death” of the 
Kinect-brand is said to be occurring at the present moment. The Kinect-
artefact’s decay and redistribution of objects in an unhuman world will 
likely be agonisingly slow (from a human perspective), but the Kinect-brand 
can be injured quite easily. The Kinect-brand is dying because it is no longer 
being sold with each Xbox One (and may even require a special adaptor),280 
which means that fewer games will be made and fewer people will talk about 
the brand online.281 At 2019’s E3 press conference, Microsoft made only 
fleeting reference to the sensor. As of 2018 the Kinect-artefact has almost 
entirely disappeared from gaming contexts. Online forums and websites 
almost universally agree that the Kinect-brand is dying or dead. But what 
exactly is meant by the “death” when it applies to a brand?
Possibly the brand dies when games stop being made and the 
mainstream media is no longer interested in it.282 Now that not all, and 
perhaps the majority of, human users interact with an Xbox One without 
a Kinect-artefact, developers have reverted to making relatively few games 
for use with the Kinect-artefact. This has caused the marginalisation of the 
Kinect-artefact for Xbox One by Microsoft. But there is also the Kinect-
artefact for Microsoft Windows, which may see more positive results. In this 
case, the brand specific to the console may die but its structure, sensors and 
software may live on. Or perhaps the death of the brand is no longer in the 
hands of the corporation. The flourishing hobby of retrogaming or old-
school gaming attests to this possibility. Obsolete or discontinued interfaces 
may have a rebirth in this context, in which the collection and enjoyment 
of classic and unusual gaming objects is paramount. Objects can live on in 
this form until they are ready to begin their gradual physical decay on one 
of humanity’s electronic waste dumps. But can the brand be conserved in 
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this way as well? The Kinect-brand is less a corporate trademark and more 
an idea in a broader sense, which in this case does not need to die when it 
ceases to be supported by Microsoft, much in the same way that Pac-Man or 
the Nintendo Game Boy are not dead ideas. As long as there is a community 
of Kinect-artefact users the Kinect-brand may be said to have survived.
This chapter was an experiment in distinguishing between two distinct 
objects: the Kinect-artefact and the Kinect-brand. If there are two different 
objects, then there are two different sensory worlds which are very different 
in nature, and each requires a different methodological approach. Sensation 
for a machine is immediately fairly evident to a human, but the nature of 
it can be hard to pin down. We have witnessed the struggle of the human 
user to find its phenomenal boundaries, which given its collective and 
collaborative nature is probably one of the best ways of asking the Kinect-
artefact about its experience. What is the ethical consequence of this 
investigation? The alien world of the Kinect-artefact is far removed from 
those of humans and higher animals, those beings that rank so highly in 
our collective estimation. Should we be concerned for the well-being of the 
Kinect-artefact (or even the Kinect-brand), perhaps carefully maintaining 
working units as we would conserve an endangered species? Or perhaps we 
should make sure always to perform a calibration before playing? Clearly 
the possession of “eyes”, “ears” and a “brain” are typically not sufficient 
to incite a user to care for their electronic device in such a way. The death 
of the Kinect-artefact or Kinect-brand can hardly be considered cruel. 
If humans do not care about these things, then why bother with alien 
phenomenology at all?
At the start of this book I asked to what extent the sensation of 
anthropomorphic machines is relevant to their cultural role, and alien 
phenomenology emphasises the sensation of nonhumans. In the case of the 
Kinect-artefact there are certainly practical reasons why we should care 
about the machine’s sensation of the world. We should strive to understand 
any object that threatens our privacy. And we should study emerging 
technologies thoroughly before they become integral to our lives. But the 
real advantage of alien phenomenology is its capacity to appreciate objects 
like the Kinect-artefact and the Kinect-brand for their unusual way of 
being in the world, so different from our own. We know that the study 
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of the Kinect-brand is of interest, because understanding the nature of 
brands is an essential quality of people who work in many academic and 
professional roles. We know that the approach is of interest for the users of 
the Kinect-artefacts because some of them performed their own informal 
alien phenomenology in a collaborative online attempt to form stronger 
relations with their consoles. It was an analysis that Microsoft, with its talk 
of brains and eyes, could not perform without damaging the potential of the 
Kinect-brand. A far greater potential for human-avatar-console is afforded 
by the Kinect-artefact. The seeming independence of the Kinect-brand from 
the Kinect-artefact is remarkable, even for videogames hardware. They are 
a remarkable model for charting the distribution of human and machine 
agency in two complex and contentious objects under a deceptively simple 
umbrella term: Kinect.
Chapter 3
Grey Walter’s Tortoises and an Introduction to the  
Sensation and Experience of Robots
Building machines included a simultaneous building of 
milieus for the machines.
Jussi Parikka
The goal of this latter part of the book is to provide a rigorous critique 
of what has already been written about the perspective and experience of 
robots in post- and nonhuman discourses and how they may relate to alien 
phenomenology and OOO. Robots defy neat classification, with only the 
qualities of automated movement and human design being universal to all. 
Robots vary enormously. Like the Kinect-artefact, some are designed to be 
more specialised, and all their sensory systems are honed to a particular task 
(or so it seems to a human user). Some can perform a variety of tasks with a 
multitude of sensory systems that are in use at different times, as is the case 
with Voyager 2. Obviously, sometimes, their degree of anthropomorphism 
is far greater even than the Kinect-artefact, which as we have seen is often 
described in terms of its “sight” and “hearing”. A robot that assembles 
cars is even more difficult to compare to a human, despite possessing 
“arms” and sensory capabilities such as proprioception. Nevertheless, the 
metaphor of human-like qualities and behaviours is impressed upon the 
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human mind. This chapter will problematise these notions of fixedness and 
anthropomorphism with relation to the simple example of robot tortoises.
The primitive robot tortoises Machina speculatrix were designed in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s by cyberneticist W. Grey Walter. They were 
around the size of a toaster and were featured prominently in Walter’s 
writing. They are emblematic of the early years of cybernetics and robotics; 
a physical manifestation of the application of human psychology to 
machines that was so important at the time. The tortoises possessed two 
types of sensors to guide them around their environment: light sensors and 
touch sensors. They offer a charming opportunity to talk about relations 
between different materials. But while it is interesting to speculate about 
the material relations that the tortoises had or have, the actual objects of 
the research presented here are multifarious. Since objects are irreducible, 
every part of the tortoise is itself an object (wheel, motor, sensor, etc.). This 
chapter will also discuss related objects like drawings of the robots and texts 
in which they featured. Machina speculatrix is also an incorporeal object that 
has its own qualities and relations, much as Homo sapiens or humanity has 
its own qualities and relations. None of these objects is more genuine than 
any other; they all exist, they are just different.
This chapter will consider how we can speak of sensation and experience 
in robots, given that our understanding of these things is rooted in human 
experience. This book posed three research questions in the introduction, 
and one most relevant to this chapter is “What does sensation mean for 
machines?” Given the vast variety of robots, what are we saying when we 
ask about the experience of robots? We must acknowledge the huge range of 
functionalities and experiences possible for robots. It is rather like studying 
yeast and the hummingbird separately as distinct species with distinct 
experiences while holding to the idea that both are alive. Performing alien 
phenomenology means learning about the experience of individual objects. 
This chapter presents and critiques two different ideas with reference to 
the robot tortoises. The first, Umwelt-theory, privileges the importance of 
analytical investigation of an entity’s worldview; the other, theories of the 
concept of mind, emphasises the heterogeneity of mind or consciousness. 
They are both ways of questioning the experience of an entity, but Umwelt-
theory begins with the entity itself and builds up the concept of experience 
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from the ground, while theories of the mind begin with the question of 
experience before asking about the mechanics of an individual entity’s 
way of knowing the world. Both ideas are relevant to anthropomorphic 
machines, but they are used here to contrast each other and provide 
extremes of robot analysis.
When we attempt to theorise robot phenomenology we are discussing a 
range of experiences, but the language in which our description is couched 
is ultimately motivated by the particular ontology of the robot used. Having 
endeavoured to illustrate the phenomenological consequences of OOO in 
the previous chapter, this chapter will make available alternative theories of 
nonhumans and technology in particular. The domain of robots presents a 
varied terrain in which light might be shed by the use of the different ideas, 
much as the ethologist of hummingbirds must become acquainted with a 
different set of ideas to understand the behaviour of yeasts.
Umwelten and cybernetics
The comparison of animal with robot, if done with caution, provides a 
starting point for discussing their particular sensation and experience of 
the world, and alien sensation more generally. The work of Baltic ethologist 
Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944) is a case in point. Uexküll’s Umwelt-
theory is heavily influenced by Kant,283 and Uexküll was certainly no anti-
correlationist. The Umwelt allows us to see the link between the subject and 
the environment as composed of codes that intertwine to determine one 
another. Uexküll’s work, which is part zoological and part philosophical, 
was for many decades obscure, but pieces such as the monograph A Foray 
into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: with a Theory of Meaning (1934) are 
now quite well-known in Western philosophy and are seen to communicate 
complex thought about the world of animals, particularly those that do not 
share human sensory equipment.284 The key to this is Uexküll’s emphasis 
on sensory equipment as constituting animal perception, although Uexküll 
avoided anthropomorphic concepts when speaking of the Umwelten of 
other species.285 Uexküll’s work has also been discussed in Jussi Parikka’s 
2010 book Insect Media and Uexküll’s curious way of accounting for his 
observations has begun to enter the vernacular of post- and nonhuman 
thought. Uexküll has also been referred to in descriptions of animal affect 
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written by Heidegger, Deleuze and Guattari, Canguilhem, and Merleau-
Ponty. Umwelt-theory’s identification of the body as the site of subjectivity 
predates Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation 
of Uexküll highlights the semiotic component of this body-centred 
subjectivity.286
As an inquisitive scholar of biology and of philosophy, Uexküll’s 
writing is often explicitly preoccupied with the major philosophy of biology 
questions of his time. Uexküll was not a Darwinist, and he did not adhere 
to a mechanistic view of living things. This has led some to cast him as a 
vitalist.287 But as Kaveli Kull points out, Uexküll considered himself to be 
something in between these two extremes, a “machinalist”.288 It is important 
to bear this point in mind, because it is indeed tempting, when encountering 
Uexküll’s views on the status of non-living things, to argue that some sort of 
vitalist philosophy must have been present. In some ways it is also surprising 
to note that he did not hold a mechanistic view of life given that some of his 
ideas appear to be precursors to cybernetic ideas. But the emphasis in his 
texts is on the semiotic relationship between subject and environment rather 
than being confined to how effect follows cause.289 Uexküll’s main interest 
was in how living things sense the world, and how to create a language for 
talking about those sensory experiences. The concept for which Uexküll 
is best-known is the Umwelt (sometimes translated as “environment” 
or “milieu”, but better equated here to “subjective, meaningful world”). 
Umwelten are comprised of all the elements of an environment which the 
living thing is capable of sensing; in Uexküll’s words it is the “phenomenal 
world or self-world of the animal”.290 Uexküll’s writing is replete with 
musical analogies that capture both the essence of his subjective model for 
biology and his conception of a “plan” in nature that is responsible for the 
seemingly perfect harmony between the Umwelten of different organisms.291 
The Umwelt concept, in the form of the science Umweltforschung (Umwelt-
research), was developed by Uexküll over the course of his life and has 
been revived by his son Thure von Uexküll, Thomas Sebeok and others, 
particularly in his native Estonia but also more widely.292 It is a major 
contributor to the founding of the field of biosemiotics. Since Uexküll’s 
work was largely lost to the non-German-speaking world for several decades 
it is only in more recent years that its importance has been identified and 
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his position as a founder of the field of biosemiotics, particularly after 
Thomas Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok’s 1992 publication The Semiotic 
Web 1991.293 Biosemiotics is, broadly, the use of sign theory to describe 
biological phenomena, predominantly that of animals (zoosemiotics) but 
increasingly also that of plants (phytosemiotics) and other organisms.294 
Jesper Hoffmeyer even synthesises Umwelt-theory and the evolution of the 
“virtual” genetic code.295
The Umwelt is the world of experience for any given animal, containing 
things that can be sensed and excluding things that cannot be sensed. 
Everything that can be sensed enters the Umwelt as a sign, and the Umwelt 
contains the mechanism through which the sign is sensed, perceived, and 
responded to. It is the perceiver-effector of the animal’s experiential world 
and it is described in semiotic language. This might mean that the Umwelt 
relates only to the parts of the light spectrum that the animal can perceive, 
or only to certain chemicals that the animal is capable of perceiving with 
its olfactory sensors. The model organism used by Uexküll in his books 
Umwelt and Innenwelt of the Tick296 and A Foray into the Worlds of Animals 
and Humans297 is the female tick during its penultimate life stage, in which 
its experiences are truly alien and can assist us to dissociate from our 
anthropocentric view. The tick suspends itself from a leaf or blade of grass, 
waiting, sometimes for years, for the only stimulus it is honed to sense 
and respond to: the butyric acid released by mammals. When it senses this 
chemical, the tick drops with the hope of landing on the mammal’s body. 
This accomplished, the tick utilises its two other senses, permitting the 
sensation of temperature and hair typology, to find a suitable place to pierce 
the skin and feed on the mammal’s blood. Once it has drunk its fill, it lays its 
eggs and dies. These three senses represent the totality of the tick’s universe 
at that stage in its life cycle. The three senses form the tick’s Umwelt, or 
the semiotic “bubble”,298 which is the tick’s entire world. Two different 
organisms of different species may share the same surroundings, but they 
do not share the same Umwelt. The Umwelt concept does not require us to 
find analogies to compare the tick’s experience with our own. For example, 
it is tempting to describe the tick’s “smelling” of the approaching mammal, 
an inaccurate anthropomorphism that equates the use of the arachnid’s 
alien olfactory organs to our own sense of smell which is structurally 
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different and evolved separately.299 This side-steps the problematic impulse 
that may be found in much of the literature around OOO: the very great 
temptation to go too far in our description of nonhuman worlds and thus 
to humanise them and rob them of their great power of alienation. The 
power of alienation in biosemiotics is increased when we look at the vast 
variety of Umwelten that exist in the animal kingdom (and possibly beyond) 
and compare them to the Umwelten of humans. The human Umwelt is 
inextricably linked to the things that help us to survive. We cannot see very 
small things or things that are very far away, we can only detect a small 
range of chemicals with our olfactory and gustatory systems, and we only 
perceive certain, very specific, types of radiation. As Uexküll says, sensation 
is like a “garment”300 that wraps around us, revealing only certain parts 
of all possible experiences of the world. If we were to apply this idea to 
technological artefacts as well as living things, we might see a similarity 
between the limitations of the tick’s Umwelt and that of the Kinect-artefact 
when it is in its instant-on state. As far as we know, the Kinect-artefact’s 
Umwelt at that time is geared towards the sensation of sounds, allowing 
the Kinect-artefact to identify the “Xbox on” signifier that will prompt it to 
switch on the Xbox One. As for Machina speculatrix, we have the advantage 
of knowing a bit more about their structures than those of the blackboxed 
Kinect-artefacts. Walter’s writing gives us some clues as to the nature of the 
tortoises’ Umwelten. But despite their unhuman qualities their cybernetic 
context encourages the drawing of similarities between the robots and 
humans. How fortunate we would be if Uexküll had lived to use his skilful 
and poetic analytical powers to help us dissociate from an anthropocentric 
view of robots as well as that of ticks.
Uexküll, in his many surviving texts, does relate the Umwelt concept to 
technology on more than one occasion. But according to Parikka, because 
he was living and writing in the early twentieth century, his idea of machines 
“meant clocks, factories and blindly repeated processes”301 and his personal 
philosophical statements betray mistrust of the idea that living things could 
operate solely according to the same principles as non-living things. Again, 
he is sometimes accused of vitalism for this reason. A machine, such as a 
telescope, could certainly be used as an extension to a human’s Umwelt, but 
the telescope itself does not have an Umwelt according to Uexküll.302 More 
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recent writers have taken the Umwelt concept to a place Uexküll could 
not reach, with the aid of technologies that perhaps do more to spark the 
phenomenological imagination. We now have machines that are capable of 
activities that resemble perception to a far greater extent than the telescope. 
As mentioned above, humans lack certain elements in their Umwelten. 
But we now have visual technologies that transcend scale and distance by 
transposing the sensation of a machine with something that we can interpret, 
such as the translation of electrical signals into visual or audio media. 
Machines can “smell” the environment and relate their sensory experience 
of a particular chemical in numerical form so that we can understand it. 
Individual machines can pick up far more types of radiation than humans. 
And Voyager 2 can signal to Earth information about the ice giants of our 
solar system without our needing to go there ourselves. Claus Emmeche 
has asked the question “Does a robot have an Umwelt?”.303 Even primitive 
robots have “simple functional circles of semiotic processes of sign-
interpretation and sign-action. Why should they not have Umwelten?”304
The Umwelt as applied to technology bears some similarities to the 
concept of affordance. In James J. Gibson’s book The Ecological Approach 
to Visual Perception, the affordances of an animal’s environment and how 
they can be changed to be more suitable is discussed.305 The affordances 
of the environment are the aspects of the environment that are relevant 
to the animal. For humans, if a surface is “horizontal, flat, extended, and 
rigid” then it affords support (as well as being “fall-off-able”).306 Affordance 
is a different concept to the Umwelt, because affordance implies not just 
the availability of objects to be sensed, but the perception of usability and 
adaptability by a human or nonhuman: “[Affordance] is both physical and 
psychical, yet neither.”307 Umwelten do not encompass the value of the 
object for the human or nonhuman, but only contain the representation 
of sensory information. Don Norman extends the concept of affordances 
to the design of objects by humans, arguing that we adapt objects to offer 
new or different affordances in particular contexts.308 A large part of the 
designer’s efforts must go into signifying the presence of features in designed 
objects because features can exist without being perceived by the (human) 
user, and only become affordances if the user is compelled through context, 
knowledge and capability to use the feature.309
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Affordances are apparent in all different kinds of humans and 
nonhumans, and the scope of research into objects is wider than with the 
Umwelt. But because the affordance involves the perception of value of 
the object, there is an assumption that the human or nonhuman must have 
some capacity for experiencing its environment (Norman extends this 
capacity to humans, animals, and robots310). In contrast, the Umwelt invites 
the question of whether sensation must be tied to experience. It is not clear 
whether all nonhumans experience their sensory worlds in the same way, 
merely that there are sensory worlds. That is, the existence of nonhuman 
sensation is not dependent on possession of a mind, consciousness, qualia 
or any kind of experience. Thomas Sebeok argues “there can be no semiosis 
without interpretability – surely life’s cardinal propensity”,311 so does a 
robot need to be able to interpret its environment to have an Umwelt? As 
will be seen later in this chapter, the mind of a robot is a highly contestable 
entity, with the extremes of functionalism and panpsychism resulting in the 
attribution of vastly different kinds of internal experiences for non-living 
things, and even living nonhumans. It will likely be some time before we can 
really answer the question “Does a robot have an Umwelt?”, if indeed it ever 
happens. Then again, perhaps the nature of interpretability is vague enough 
for us to apply it to nonhumans regardless of whether they possess minds or 
consciousness. This book’s interpretation of OOO certainly does not require 
objects to have minds to have sensations or experiences.
There is a convergence between OOO and Uexküll’s research program, 
though they approach similar conclusions from different roots. OOO also 
rejects a purely positivist research program in favour of a richer world of 
relations, and an interest in the diversity of sensory capabilities in objects. In 
Theoretical Biology Uexküll was critical of physics for privileging the objective 
over the subjective. For him biology was the domain of the subjective:
Physical theory tries to convince the plain man that the world 
he sees is full of subjective illusions, and that the only real 
world is much poorer, since it consists of one vast, perceptual 
whirl of atoms controlled by causality alone. On the other 
hand, the biologist tries to make the plain man realise that he 
sees far too little, and that the real world is much richer than 
he suspects, because around each living being an appearance-
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world of its own lies spread, which, in its main features, 
resembles his world, but nevertheless displays so much 
variation therefrom that he may dedicate his whole life to the 
study of these other worlds without ever seeing the end of 
his task.312
Uexküll’s emphasis on a “richer world” could easily come from a text on 
OOO. The world of nonhumans is alien and constituted of alien sensory 
capabilities. But in OOO subjectivity and perception are less emphasised. 
Subjectivity and perception both imply the presence of a mind or mind-
like quality, and tend to reinforce the subject/object dualism. As will be 
shown later in the chapter, some OOO thinkers have embraced or at least 
considered panpsychism. But Harman’s body of work does not require 
panpsychism. The notion of experience in biosemiotics is the result of the 
perception of a sign, not just the change in the nature of the real object. For 
example, the tick’s Umwelt contains only three capacities for sensing the 
world. If I throw a rock at the tick causing it to fall off its perch, then that 
does not enter into the tick’s Umwelt. But in OOO terms a sensual object is 
created between the rock and the tick. Not everything that happens to the 
body of the tick is in the Umwelt, even if it affects the tick significantly. The 
Umwelt only relates to signs equipped to filter through the tick’s sensory 
organs and then interpreted, even if this occurs in a very alien way, which 
is why biosemioticians tend to be reluctant to extend the theory to non-
living things.
As will be seen in the next section, Walter’s robot tortoises are 
comparable to a tick due to the apparent poverty of their sensory worlds. 
They possess sensors that allow them to detect light and touch, and they 
have internal sign processes such as the transmission of electricity that is 
interpreted by components of their bodies, such as the motor or battery. 
Like the tick, and like humans, they do not pick up everything in their 
immediate surroundings. If the crux of this problem lay solely in questioning 
whether a robot may possess an Umwelt due to its human origins and 
electronic sensory-perceptive systems, it could be dismissed quite quickly. 
But can we say that the robot perceives and interprets its world, and 
how would we know? The case in point here is the robot tortoises. After 
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describing the robots’ existences and how they worked, this chapter will 
renew this enquiry into their internal experiences.
Robot tortoises
W. Grey Walter created several tortoises, two of which were named Elsie 
and Elmer.313 Elsie and Elmer were first exhibited to the press at the end 
of 1949, and more advanced tortoises were built in 1951.314 Robotics was 
an extension of Walter’s work on electroencephalography (EEG) and the 
brain, and began as a project in his spare time.315 Walter was a member of 
the Ratio Club in London, a pioneering group for cybernetics.316 Walter 
gave his new “species” the “mock-biological”317 name Machina speculatrix 
and observed that from their simple interactions they could develop quite 
complex behaviour.
Machina speculatrix tortoises recall the tradition of building ceremonial 
or amusing automata. The building of automata was once a common 
practice both in Europe and parts of Asia. Automata are mechanical toys, 
powered by clockwork, that commonly move in a repetitive way, and are 
very often built in human shapes or the shapes of animals. Jacques de 
Vaucanson’s gold-plated duck is a famous example.318 There was a minor 
craze for automata in the sixteenth century amongst the aristocracy in 
parts of Europe. But interestingly the practice was curtailed by church 
authorities, who eventually came to believe that the automata represented a 
heretical attempt to replicate the work of God, namely the giving of life to 
a non-living thing. This is an oft-mentioned comparison: Bruce Mazlish’s 
analysis of Frankenstein declares that “[m]an, the evil scientist, has taken 
God’s place.”319 Lois Kuznets argues that this restriction may have been a 
manifestation of the engrained Judeo-Christian taboo against the production 
of graven images.320 Jessica Riskin describes an episode of iconoclasm 
in which medieval devotional automata were destroyed, the iconoclasts 
claiming that “[m]achinery [...] could not represent divinity other than 
deceitfully.”321 In Japan, this practice was not as restricted, however. The 
building of automata was and is a job reserved for the most respected 
masters of craft. Karakuri, as they are known, play a prominent role in 
Japanese culture, notably participating in festivals and other events. Possibly 
the traditional animistic nature of Japanese culture and religion means that 
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karakuri do not seem as heretical as they did in Europe. Objects of great 
spiritual importance, such as a sword, hold a soul or kami, so karakuri 
and humanoid robots are not the only non-living objects with a soul.322 
Walter followed in this tradition when he created these fancifully-named 
and spectacular robots, but the cyberneticists of the time were deliberately 
blurring the line between humans and nonhumans.
From a human’s perspective, Walter’s tortoises constituted a significant 
leap forward in that they were capable of semi-autonomous movement and 
apparently quite complex behaviour. They were dissimilar to the automata 
in that they possessed significantly more independence of movement and 
sensors that seemed analogous to human sense organs. They were driven by 
an electric motor. A tortoise would wander around until it hit something, 
at which point a contact switch would be activated and it would move 
away in a different direction. Walter wrote a brief technical explanation in 
Scientific American, interestingly attributing the change in direction to “an 
elementary form of memory”.323 It was intended to replicate a negative 
feedback loop. There was also a photocell on the front of the machine that 
would cause it to move towards light, including their lit-up hutches where 
their batteries would recharge. This was intended to replicate a positive 
feedback loop. However, at a certain level of brightness the tortoises would 
move away from the light, so that they would get close to the light but not 
too close. As the battery depleted, the sensitivity to the light source became 
greater and the tortoises could detect the hutch from farther away, but if 
the battery was completely charged the tortoises would move away from 
the hutch and explore other areas. The tortoises could therefore return to 
their illuminated hutches when it was time for them to recharge, feeling 
their way around obstacles in their paths, and making them leave the hutch 
and “explore” when the battery was charged.324 Walter restricted Elsie and 
Elmer to two feedback loops to “discover what degree of complexity of 
behaviour and independence could be achieved with the smallest number 
of possible interconnections.”325 Elsie and Elmer’s Umwelten, if they can be 
said to possess such things, consist of light and touch at the very least. In a 
OOO sense, there are other elements to the tortoise’s world as well – Elsie’s 
alien sensation may also extend to the texture of the floor under her wheels 
and changes in temperature that affect her metal parts. But it is particularly 
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important to note that although Elsie’s Umwelt may contain light, it is not 
the same as the light in human Umwelten. Elsie’s light is constructed by the 
material of her light sensor.
The tortoises also had small lights which were originally placed to 
indicate whether the motor was running. When the tortoise was moving, it 
emitted light, but did not emit light when stationary. The effect was such 
that when a mirror was placed in front of a tortoise, it would seem to gaze 
at its own light in the reflection and make small movements back and forth 
“like a clumsy Narcissus.”326 If two were deployed at once, they would 
bump against each other, attracted to the other’s light but repelled by the 
touch of their shell. In Margaret Boden’s words, they seemed to have an 
“unseemly fascination” for women’s legs, possibly because women wore 
nylon stockings which reflected light to which the tortoises were attracted.327 
To watch the BBC newsreel of M. speculatrix is to be astonished that such 
simple rules could result in what appears to be complex behaviour (although 
it is likely that the tortoises were manipulated and made to produce more 
precise movements for the purposes of the film).328 The movements of the 
tortoises were also tracked using long-exposure photography. Walter affixed 
candles to the tortoises’ shells in darkness, and the effect was to produce 
an image of long bright lines showing where the candle (and thus the 
tortoise) had moved.
Walter and others were fascinated by the functional anthropomorphism 
they could engineer in quite simple machines. In Walter’s writing about the 
tortoises it is clear that he believed significant insights could be gained by 
observing these artificial beings. M. speculatrix was not built to perceive light 
and touch as a human would. But there was a set of impulses reminiscent 
of life, like those observable in a creeping vine. A creeping vine senses and 
responds to light by angling its leaves to catch the most sunshine, and 
it responds to touch by building structures that wrap and bind. For the 
cyberneticists, this performative sensory-motor response was the essence 
of living nervous systems. In the case of the tortoise gazing at itself in the 
mirror, Walter declared that “were it an animal a biologist would be justified 
in attributing to it a capacity for self-recognition.”329 Of course, the tortoises 
were not capable of self-recognition, possessing just one photocell and only 
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two functional elements. But cyberneticists sought to create responses to 
stimuli, not to recreate organic cognition.
The functional anthropomorphism of the robot tortoises is in stark 
contrast with the visual anthropomorphism of automata and karakuri, in 
which the visual element is much more important. An automaton’s Umwelt 
is located much closer to the surface. The puppet or statue’s sensation of 
turning wheels is a different kind of analogy from that of Elsie’s sensation 
of light, and certainly not analogous to human vision. It is instead the 
impression left upon the artefact of the human prime mover in the form of 
the gradual reduction of tension in the mainspring and methodical ticking of 
clockwork. A tick moves in response to a smell and an automaton moves in 
response to human intervention. No wonder they seem blasphemous when 
they are activated from within and only from human intervention. On the 
other hand, the lack of functional eyes and ears necessitates the addition of 
other human-like features like faces, a feature which Elsie and Elmer lack.
What kinds of experiences can we attribute to robot tortoises? For 
a few years they occupied a unique position in the boundary conflicts 
arising between the categories of human and nonhuman brought on by 
cybernetics. The nature of robot sensation and action were a reaction to 
and encouragement for more blurring of human/machine boundaries. This 
has seriously affected the way that we consider their existence. It certainly 
affected Walter’s scientific and popular portrayal of the robots, and may 
be noted in his description of them exploring, resting and considering 
themselves in a mirror. With the knowledge that the cyberneticists had 
limited success in creating an artificial mind in the 1950s and 60s, it is easy 
to look back at these accounts and smile at Walter’s attribution of complex 
behaviour to such simple robots. But perhaps all such anthropomorphic 
language is doomed to failure. The robots performed the functions required 
by Walter to exhibit his thoughts about the mind (although by all accounts 
they frequently broke down, and were, therefore, disobedient). They did 
spend periods of time positioned in front of the mirror. They did move 
erratically around the space as though exploring. And during that time they 
formed sensual objects with the different real objects around them. They 
related and, in small ways, changed, such as when they changed direction.
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Sadly, relatively little is known of the robots’ design. Knowing more 
about their structure and relations would assist in the use of alien 
phenomenology, but we must make do with what information has survived. 
We know that the 1949 batch were pieced together with spare materials: 
old alarm clocks and war surplus materials.330 Walter’s 1953 book The 
Living Brain is more a guide for how to build one’s own tortoise rather than 
a scientific study of the robots Walter had created.331 Unfortunately Elsie 
and Elmer are not thought to have survived, so we cannot be certain of 
their structure or the relations they might have formed.332 There are very 
few images or records of intermediate stages of their construction. This 
is a serious methodological problem for alien phenomenology. But in an 
object-oriented description, the robots are not simply identified by their 
components. Elsie is an object, the battery is an object, the light sensor is 
an object, the image above of her inner mechanisms is an object. No object 
is defined by another. As discussed below, we may embrace the flexibility 
of the name “Elsie” and acknowledge the changeable nature of a robot. Its 
material structure changes, its qualities change and its relations with other 
objects changes. Elsie’s tendency to break down, capacity for alteration and 
eventual loss are facets of her Elsieness. And given the sketchy accounts of 
her short period in the spotlight, these might be some of the only aspects of 
her that are accessible to modern humans, machines and texts.
Tortoises and time
The study of the tortoises depicts the presence in time of all objects, no 
matter their immediate appearance of solidity or impermanence. The 
weirdness of the tortoises brings these matters to the foreground and 
makes them a good model for explaining Harman’s concept of time in 
object-oriented philosophy. Firstly, the Elsieness described above smears a 
changing abstraction across several decades while also maintaining her own 
integrity. In other words, the tortoises maintain their existence as objects 
despite constantly changing: from the alteration of component parts to the 
slow degradation of iron when it comes in contact with oxygen. How can 
we account metaphysically for these objects remaining themselves while 
simultaneously becoming something else?333 For Harman the Elsie with her 
shell on is still the same object as the Elsie with her shell off, merely being 
encrusted with outer changes. Yet for Latour the irreducibility of objects 
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means that a new object must arise with every change, even ones as small 
as the light on the front of the tortoise switching on and off in front of a 
mirror. As Latour says in Irreductions, “[t]ime is the distant consequences of 
actors as they each seek to create a fait accompli on their own behalf that 
cannot be reversed […] In this way time passes.”334 Latour’s actants change 
constantly, shifting allegiances and switching relations. Actants do not lose 
or gain extra distinguishing characteristics over time, rather they become 
different actants as they change.335 For Latour, Elsie with her shell on is one 
actant, Elsie with her shell off is another, albeit closely related, actant.
In The Quadruple Object Harman offers an alternative perspective. His 
inspiration comes from Husserl’s phenomenology (with several significant 
caveats). In Harman’s interpretation of Husserl, the stability of objects over 
time is depicted as the solid core of the object surrounded by a changing 
flux of “adumbrations”.336 An adumbration is a particular perspective of 
an object at a given time, such as the view of a water tower as one walks 
around it. As discussed in Chapter 1, objects are withdrawn from relations 
and it is sensual objects that facilitate interaction between objects. So 
when we gaze at a water tower, we are experiencing the sensual object that 
is formed between us and the water tower. If we walk around the water 
tower later in the day in a different mood, it will appear differently to us. 
But we are unlikely to mistake it for a different object. The sensual object 
formed between us and the tower remains the same even though its sensual 
qualities change. We can identify an object despite the “gems, glitter and 
confetti of extraneous detail”.337 The tension between the sensual object and 
its encrustation of shifting qualities is one of Harman’s main lessons from 
Husserl, and he labels this tension “time”. While a sensual object remains 
the same for us, we encounter sensual qualities as “intermittent changes.”338 
Unlike for Latour, real objects and sensual objects remain the same over 
time, but the encrustations shift and change. In Harman’s theory, there is an 
inner Elsieness that remains whether her shell is on or off.
Similarly to the distinction in the previous chapter between artefact 
and brand, we must make a distinction here between the relations formed 
by Elsie in the moment and our relationship with Elsie so many decades 
later. Our typical relationship with the tortoises can only be by proxy. 
Their motion is recorded in human media such as in newsreel footage and 
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Walter’s sketched drawings in Scientific American, as well as presumably 
finding a place within the brains of those people who witnessed them first- 
or second-hand. Personally, I have had no direct relations with the tortoises. 
I have seen images and read texts about them, including texts by Walter 
himself. But it is the images and texts with which I have a relationship, 
not the tortoises. The tortoises only exist in relationship with objects when 
that relationship is bidirectional. When we read a paper on the tortoises, 
there is no bidirectional relationship with the tortoises, only with the text. 
There is a paperish mediation. There are the long-exposure photographs of 
burning candles positioned on the robots’ shells; the effect on the cybernetic 
community of the early 1950s; and the renewed academic and cultural 
interest in these and other early robots: these are all consequences of the 
tortoises’ existence, but they are not the same as Walter’s observation of the 
tortoise nor of the adhesion of the candle to the shell. The tortoises’ worlds 
were characterised by alien interactions. Many nonhuman objects were 
engaged with the robots. The wheels of the robots were in a relationship 
with the floor beneath them, and the kind of interaction that occurred was 
doubtless different depending on the particular surface. They were subject 
to the earth’s gravitational pull, the slow oxidation of iron and the qualities 
of different replacement parts. Brenton Malin points to a similar example:
For object-oriented thinkers, sidewalks are not merely 
signifiers of certain social relations. They interact with shoe 
rubber, dog paws, bicycle tires, and other objects in – quite 
literally – concrete ways that give them an important agency 
and power.339
Perhaps a Machina speculatrix shell is at this moment home to an industrious 
hermit crab, or perhaps it is at the bottom of a pile of garbage. In these 
cases, the shell’s relations with other objects are not recorded, and do not 
appear in history books, but figure in different kinds of struggles with ocean 
currents and gravity unrecorded by humans. These may seem like mundane 
and trivial considerations, but to fail to point them out would constitute the 
erasure of the validity of the access of other objects.
In addition to the actions of other agents in the early 1950s it is 
important to speculate about the robots’ enduring experiences that are 
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relatively distant from human interaction. The tortoises are lost, destroyed 
or relegated to museums: an unsurprising end to these once remarkable 
machines that have since been hugely surpassed by more modern inventions. 
They are representative of the kinds of histories that technological artefacts 
possess. Contemporary media theory is beginning to express an interest 
in the experiences of objects beyond their interaction with humans, as 
was discussed in Chapter 2 with regard to hyperobjects. The hyperobject 
is “hyper” relative to human lifetimes and individual human agencies. In 
addition, media archaeological approaches are increasingly preoccupied 
with what happens to technological artefacts after they are abandoned 
by humans. Siegfried Zielinski’s book Deep Time of the Media explores the 
existence of lost and forgotten moments in the history of media that were 
only precipitated far in the future.340 In a lecture, Jussi Parikka reframed 
this concept to theorise the material history of technological artefacts: from 
the bringing forth of natural resources to build their components to their 
eventual decay or repurposing.341 Since we do not know the fate of several 
of the robots it would be presumptuous to claim knowledge about their 
futures, and even the future of the tortoises that have survived is uncertain, 
although there is a good chance that they will survive, encrusted with 
changes, longer than we will.
These weird objects have held a certain fascination since the 1950s, 
representing a key example of cybernetic thinking. More modern writers 
are interested in the way that the robots changed the scientific project at 
the time and their long-term status as paradigmatic objects. The robots 
have endured for humans well beyond their time in the public eye. Yet they 
are also lost objects, ill-defined from the outset and so frequently invoked 
that they begin to lose their definition. In their timeless state, and in their 
inability to be present, they expose the effect of time on objects.
Sensation, experience and consciousness
Let us compare the framing of the tick with that of the robot tortoises 
provided here. In Uexküll’s conception, the tick sits, stationary, possibly for 
many years, with only very limited means of sensing the world. The three 
senses that enable it to locate and feed from mammals, such as the sensation 
of butyric acid, are the only relations that the tick has with the world. The 
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light of the sun bouncing off its body, the contact between moisture and 
legs, the movement of the grass in the wind: these do not count, because 
they do not enter into the tick’s Umwelt. As a corollary, we must decide 
which of the robot’s relations qualify as “senses”, which qualify as parts of 
the Umwelt, and which do not. (Uexküll would strongly object to this, but 
some more modern writers would not.) Light and touch, surely, qualify. 
But the contact between wheel and ground is probably more problematic. 
Who can say which elements are being “sensed” and which are other 
kinds of relations? Which part of the robot is even doing the sensing or 
experiencing? Emmeche explains this difficulty by pointing out that there is 
neither analogy between human and robot nervous systems nor evolutionary 
homology between the two systems.342 If the structure is completely 
different, how can the experience be similar? Winfried Nöth claims that the 
symbolic representation portion of a robot’s experience might correspond 
to the concept of the Innenwelt, more closely allied to the animal’s interior 
experience or “I”.343 This may present a model for conceptualising artificial 
intelligence in the language of Uexküll.
We are surrounded by machines that appear to sense things. If we 
reduce the components of the robotic Umwelt to signs, then the issue may 
not entirely be resolved. Asking a robot questions about its sensation may 
require resorting to desperate measures. If a robot tortoise is suddenly 
doused with water, the water acts as a sign to the robot’s electronic 
components, disrupting its functions and causing it to shut down. If a robot 
tortoise is exposed to extreme heat, those temperature signs are interpreted 
by the atoms in the robot’s metallic components as an instruction for 
their atoms to move more quickly, causing an expansion in the metal and 
eventually melting. If a robot tortoise moves across an uneven floor, it may 
be jostled. The change in the texture of the floor may be sensed by the wheel 
which can no longer travel along its original trajectory. The wheel may, in its 
way, perceive and interpret that sign and respond by changing the position 
of the wheel, which is made possible by the weight of the robot and the 
power of the motor. At no point is any kind of decision made, but the robot 
responds to the conditions in a similar way to the growth of a seed when 
its cells respond to gravity, some cells moving upward to become the stem 
and others plunging downwards to become the roots. If biosemiotics can 
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be applied to any living thing, including things without any kind of neural 
system, then what exactly do we mean by sensation and perception? Can 
we distinguish sign-relations from the universal relations that underpin 
Harman’s theory of objects? Is the robot’s experience anything like 
biological subjectivity? These are questions that relate strongly, although not 
exclusively, to questions of mind and consciousness.
The Umwelt is conceptually distinct from the mind or consciousness. As 
Emmeche says, the mind is a much broader concept.344 The Umwelt may 
be related to sensation and perception, but it does not depend upon the 
entity possessing/performing things as elaborate as consciousness, cognition 
or thought. So, in considering the Umwelt of an object, we encounter a 
difficult and ancient question: is sensation only done by minds? Our human 
sensation of the world seems to be strongly connected to our minds. So, 
one might reason that alien sensation also requires some kind of mind or 
consciousness. Uexküll’s tick example, though carefully pared down and 
limited primarily to the function of the semiotic bubble rather than to 
reflections on what the tick feels, can only evoke an impression of an entity 
that processes stimuli much the way we do – as experience. Do we have 
to interpret that experience as a manifestation of mind or consciousness 
in the arachnid’s tiny brain? A “yes” response to that question is surely 
at the root of Uexküll’s purported vitalism and more contemporary bio-
chauvinism. Humans struggle to fathom experience without consciousness. 
Consequently, Voyager 2 is no more capable of experience than stones or 
water. Of course, this leaves unanswered the question of where the cut-off 
should be between those entities we deem to have experience and those that 
do not have experience. If the tick qualifies, do its larvae qualify? Does a 
sponge? Or a mushroom? This is a very limited view of experience.
We have two choices if we seek to allow nonhuman or non-living things 
to experience the world. Firstly, we can accept that experience is limited to 
conscious entities but expand our concept of consciousness to incorporate 
any system of sufficient complexity. We can protest that consciousness is 
simply an emergent quality of matter that has reached sufficient complexity; 
our supercomputers and robots, past, contemporary or imaginary, may be 
said to possess that indefinable capacity for experience because they, like 
us, have consciousness. In so doing, we need not confront the experience 
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of nonhumans who encounter the world without a mind. This is a popular 
(if vague) view. Of particular note here are those transhumanists, such as 
Ray Kurzweil, who believe that so great is the resemblance between natural 
and artificial minds that each of us may one day be able to transfer our 
consciousness between them.345 A mind is something that happens when 
matter is organised a particular way and cannot exist without that matter. 
Most of this kind of speculation is derived from functionalism (and identity 
theory, which functionalism has mostly superseded).346 Functionalism holds 
that mind is a quality that arises from the organisation of physical matter. 
It is a materialist view of the mind that is both a cause and result of the 
extensive research that has been done on the mind during the past century. 
In part because of identity theory and functionalism, psychology and 
neuroscience are influenced by the view that the physical laws that apply to 
the rest of the body also apply to the brain (and consequently to the mind), 
which helps to explain how there can be any interaction between them. 
Without the belief that brain and body are subject to the same mechanised 
processes, so the argument goes, it would be impossible to explain how the 
brain senses pain in the finger, or controls a muscle in the calf. There would 
have to be some sort of other intermediary, which we have not yet been able 
to find, otherwise the mind and body are impossibly separate. One solution 
is that of the medieval Islamic occasionalists to which Harman refers.347 But 
the decline of spiritual explanations for the mind (for example, the existence 
of the soul) has led to increased belief in a monist, physicalist model. We 
will be able to identify the presence of a mind in a supercomputer because 
it will feature qualities similar to human minds. Thus we establish ourselves 
as the possessors of an ideal model of mind, to which other mind-havers will 
ultimately be compared.
The second possible option is to reject the idea of a hierarchy of 
mind. One way of doing this is to argue, as have many thinkers since 
ancient times, that the mind must be a quality of all matter, or that all 
matter must have the ability to produce a mind-like quality.348 The word 
“hierarchy” is used deliberately here in provocation of the concept of flat 
ontology, and indeed some prominent scholars associated with OOO and 
the nonhuman turn do take this idea seriously, as discussed below. The 
idea that mind is a quality of all matter can be called panpsychism, and 
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refers to the attribution of a mind, consciousness or a soul to all objects, 
including those objects we would usually think of as inanimate, such as 
robots, rocks and electrons. The word comes from the Ancient Greek roots 
pan (all) and psyche (mind or soul), and David Skrbina argues that it is 
“almost certainly the most ancient conception of the psyche” in the form of 
animism and polytheism.349 Thomas Nagel may have described this notion 
best, by claiming that it comes from a few simple premises “each of which 
is more plausible than its denial, though not perhaps more plausible than 
the denial of panpsychism.”350 Panpsychism may seem incredible now, 
but as Skrbina points out many prominent philosophers (focussing for the 
moment only on the Western tradition) have subscribed to some variation 
on panpsychism culminating in considerable popularity in the nineteenth 
century, before it became less popular with the rise of logical positivism 
in the twentieth century.351 Explanations of exactly how panpsychism 
works are rarely consistent between scholars, and even the language used 
is highly problematic. When we talk about panpsychism, are we speaking 
of consciousness, sentience, thought, qualia, the soul, experience, a 
psychological being, or the mind? Panpsychism may not be best thought 
of as a theory in and of itself, but that it is instead a commitment that may 
accompany radically different ideas. Consequently, it may be located in 
the work of thinkers as diverse as Thales, Spinoza, Leibniz, Whitehead and 
William James; with both monists and dualists, materialists and idealists.
Contemporary panpsychism follows this pattern in being a result of 
various philosophical positions. One such position is a continued adherence 
to Whitehead’s process philosophy, but there are also instances in which 
panpsychism seems to arise as a modern solution to modern problems. 
David Chalmers’ information theory invokes a view of panpsychism in 
exploration of his functionalism with, in John Searle’s words, its “tacked 
on”352 theory of consciousness. In his book The Conscious Mind Chalmers 
argues that consciousness (or experience) is a basic element of all matter 
by virtue of its capability to carry information.353 This would appear to 
be an answer to Hobbes’ point that sensation surely cannot exist without 
some sort of memory, and a reiteration of William James’ characterisation 
of waves upon a beach as a sort of memory.354 The waves leave markers 
in the sand of where they have been. In Chalmers’ parlance, the gestures 
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of Elsie and Elmer create information, which could be the foundation of 
their consciousness. In humans, that information could simply be changes 
in neuronal structure, hormone levels and so forth. In the robot tortoises, 
the information could be the tiny indentations made in the floor as they 
move, the movement of charged particles in the batteries and the slow 
degradation of iron. To be clear, Chalmers is not saying that information 
makes a thing conscious, but he does remain “agnostic”355 about it, and 
about panpsychism in general. In Searle’s scathing review, he calls this an 
“absurd view”356:
There is not the slightest reason to adopt panpsychism, 
the view that everything in the universe is conscious. 
Consciousness is above all a biological phenomenon and is as 
restricted in its biology as the secretion of bile or the digestion 
of carbohydrates. Of all the absurd results in Chalmers’s 
book, panpsychism is the most absurd and provides us with 
a clue that something is radically wrong with the thesis that 
implies it.357
Panpsychism is certainly not a mainstream view, but it does seem to be 
increasingly tolerated due to the influence of the computer as a paradigmatic 
case in philosophy. It is less and less common to posit a universe in which 
only organic life is capable of consciousness. Our greater understanding of 
the relationship between the brain and the mind and the exponential growth 
in computer speed and complexity forces us to consider the consciousness 
of inorganic entities. This has led some, but by no means a majority, to 
panpsychism.
Of particular importance here is what Chalmers calls the “winking out” 
problem: the question of which entities can be said to be conscious if we 
accept that consciousness is only something that happens to humans, or 
higher mammals, or all living organisms, or anything of sufficient complexity 
be it carbon or silicon-based. For any of these premises to be true, there 
must be a certain point when descending through the hierarchy at which 
consciousness winks out. Perhaps a bat is conscious but a bird is not, or 
perhaps a fish is conscious but a lamprey is not. According to functionalism, 
consciousness is a physical phenomenon that will be perfectly explicable 
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once we have gleaned sufficient knowledge about the brain. But if that is 
true, how can one creature possess mind and qualia and consciousness, 
while another creature that is very closely related not possess these things? 
Where is the cut-off point, and how can it ever be anything but arbitrary? 
This leads naturally to the position that consciousness, as a human-like 
phenomenon, might not necessarily wink out as we descend the hierarchy 
of living things, but might change seamlessly. Consequently, a tick will still 
have something that we have to call “consciousness” or something similar, 
even though it looks totally different from a human’s experience.
Why should we stop at the boundary between living and non-living 
things? A highly speculative panpsychist section of Chalmers’s book is 
called “What is it like to be a thermostat?”, an echo of Thomas Nagel 
(“What is it like to be a bat?”358) in which he describes the thermostat as 
“an information-processing system that is almost maximally simple.”359 
All that is required for consciousness (although probably not thought) is 
a system of “causal interaction”360, in which an external stimulus causes a 
change of state. This means that electrons meet the criteria, and Chalmers’s 
speculative panpsychism is almost total. Of course, this kind of panpsychism 
does not include fictional or incorporeal objects.
Panpsychism is very difficult to intuitively accept if one is asked to 
begin from the principle that comets and sunflower seeds are sentient 
or conscious. But if, as Chalmers appears to have done, you begin with 
advanced computers and the hard problem of consciousness, the notion 
is more palatable. Supercomputers must have a mind if the dominant 
functionalist model is correct, since they behave as though they have a mind. 
Minds are most easily identifiable in machines that seem to be more like us, 
even if they are structurally very different. This is precisely the reason why 
this chapter juxtaposes panpsychism with a very simple robot. It is possible 
to draw a pleasing comparison between a panpsychist position and Grey 
Walter’s enthusiasm for his robotic creations. A naïve view would see little 
difference between the attribution of mind or experience to the tortoises 
and Walter’s rhapsodising over his “clumsy narcissus” and its powers of 
self-recognition. Panpsychism actually reveals a much more heterogeneous 
concept of mind: one in which the activation of switches and purring of 
motors is proof enough in itself of experience, rather than merely the vehicle 
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by which the robot cons its way into consciousness by mimicking human 
proclivities.
If we extend mind, or at least subjectivity, to all things, then to some 
extent the novelty of the Umwelt is lost. An implication of suggesting that all 
information is a characteristic of mind is that all interactions are significant, 
and perhaps even that they may be represented in semiotic terms. In that 
scenario, the feedback loop may become all but interchangeable with 
Uexküll’s concept of the function-circle. The correction of a robot’s wheels 
as it moves across the uneven floor are as significant as its perception of 
light because the Umwelt encompasses the whole of the robot and every 
piece of information is part of its mind. Similarly, the motion of red blood 
cells throughout a human’s circulatory system is a part of its Umwelt. Our 
brains might not be aware of the movement, but our arteries, tissues and 
plasma sense and experience it. In adopting panpsychism, it would be easy 
for the Umwelt to become irrelevant. But there is great value in considering 
the two ideas at the same time. The strength of the concept of the Umwelt 
lies in its power to force us to confront alien worlds. In the latter example, 
it might be possible to accept the presence of a mind in not just the whole 
human but in the individual blood cell itself. An inquiry into the subjective 
world of this blood cell could yield fascinating results. As for the robot, the 
imposition of a division of parts and wholes, the sort that we employ when 
studying living things, might be contrary to the nature of non-living things. 
The wheel is connected to and strongly related to the robot, but that does 
not mean that the two components bear the same relation as that between 
the human and the blood cell. The wheel-mind might be totally different 
from the robot-mind, or they might be aspects of a whole. Panpsychism may 
seem at first to be in conflict with the idea of the Umwelt, particularly with 
Uexküll’s description, but an adoption of panpsychism might only require 
the adaptation of the theory to other kinds of sign-relations. As a bare 
minimum, it does not seem unreasonable that some adaptation be made so 
that robots can be said to have Umwelten, irrespective of the debate over 
whether they have minds.
Panexperientialism is sometimes suggested as a more moderate 
view of panpsychism; less an argument about consciousness than about 
“experience”. Gregg Rosenberger claims that it is “milder”361 because 
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it does not require anything like cognition or mentality.362 Again, it is 
presented as a solution to the mind-body problem. The concept of a “mind” 
is highly anthropocentric. A statement about the nature of an entity’s mind 
can be an ontological statement about the nature of its experience and 
consequently the question of subjectivity, whereas panexperientialism leaves 
the interpretation a little more open. The term was coined by David Ray 
Griffin. He describes the interpretation as “Whiteheadian-Hartshornean”.363 
Griffin says that “psyche” implies too high a level of experience for more 
elementary units of nature.364 As Griffin puts it, Whitehead’s philosophy 
begins with the idea of “prehension”. Prehension is something that we share 
with all other individuals, regardless of whether they have sensory organs.365 
Every individual has experience through prehension. But not all objects are 
the same. Some are “compound individuals”, which have a higher level of 
experience and that might have consciousness; others are “aggregational 
societies” which do not have higher levels of experience (Griffin gives the 
examples of rocks and telephones, and Elsie would also qualify).366 Every 
individual prehends, but not all prehensions lead to consciousness. This 
happens in human beings too. Not everything that a human prehends makes 
its way into the conscious mind, only “those that have been prehended with 
the greatest intensity will survive to this phase; the rest are blocked from 
becoming conscious.”367
Aggregational societies do not have experience according to Griffin; they 
are not “individuals”. Elsie does not have experience, but the atomic and 
subatomic particles that constitute her do have experience. In the words of 
Cornel du Toit, the “resulting position can be called process philosophy’s 
version of ‘panexperientialism’, which is applicable to all individuals but not 
to all things whatsoever.”368 Curiously, even though the “psyche” is dropped 
from the word, inanimate objects as such are still excluded. Prehension 
resembles the model for a concept of “sensation” presented in this book but 
is quite distinct. Throughout this book uses the word “sensation” to align the 
concept with Harman’s ontology (and also as something of a provocation 
of our tendency to anthropomorphise). But I would not use the word 
“prehension” because of the rejection of experience in all kinds of objects 
found in “process panexperientialism”. Fundamental to this objection is 
that all sorts of different things are objects: atoms, metallic strips, motors, 
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wheels, and robots. The part/whole model of OOO is entirely different from 
that found in Whitehead. The word “experience” in “panexperientialism” is 
not the same as the usage in this book. In this book’s terms, experience is 
evident in a response to sensation; the collision of real qualities with sensual 
objects. Panexperientialism is primarily presented as a solution to the mind-
body problem and nonhumans are not usually the focus.
Harman’s version of panpsychism is predicated on the irreducibility of 
the mind. The relation of a mind to an object outside the mind has the same 
ontological status as fire burning cotton.369 Panpsychism is not required for 
flat ontology, or vice versa, but there is some association between the two 
despite the initial misgivings Harman revealed in Guerrilla Metaphysics, in 
which he rejects “human knowledge” as being of “pivotal importance in the 
universe”.370 In The Quadruple Object Harman describes a softening of his 
ideas towards panpsychism, even if he is not prepared to adopt the label. 
He uses the term “polypsychism”371 instead, which is intended to highlight 
his point that a perceiving entity is a relating entity, and some entities are 
“dormant”372 and free of relations. Harman explains that these objects may 
exist in principle, or perhaps that an object may have relations at one time 
and no relations at another (although he does not provide an example). 
Therefore, while experience can be attributed to most entities it cannot be 
attributed to all.
Harman is not primarily interested in minds. But the idea of minds 
has historically been such a feature of the distinction between humans 
and nonhumans that it is relevant to OOO. Consider the sensation of a 
bowl of soup by a human mind, which the human experiences as hot. But 
in addition the human experiences many things that do not prompt any 
changes in the mind such as the ambient temperature and the evaporation 
of water from the surface of the skin. Vesicles in an axon terminal release 
serotonin into the synapse and it is taken up by the dendrite of another 
neuron. The waves wash over the beach. Mario completes a level and finds 
that the princess is in another castle. Each is an example of sensation of 
an object by an object, just as a human senses soup and soup senses the 
human. They are yet more examples of real objects that create sensual 
objects to allow interaction, but they create a change in the real objects. 
They produce encrustations of sensual qualities that change the way that the 
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object is able to form relations. At a very basic level, the object is affected by 
this change, and must register it. In other words, an alien kind of experience 
is taking place.
The robot tortoises don’t need a human-like mind to experience things 
either. The mind may be just another kind of object. Thoughts are sensual 
objects that appear when a relation is formed between the soup and the 
mind. When we limit experience to things that have a mind, we are framing 
everything through a human concept. Even if we concede that a robot has 
a very different mind than a human, it is still the word mind that we use. 
The word is misleading, steeped in history and particularly in the human/
nonhuman (and mind/body) dualism that OOO minimises. But we don’t 
need to be anthropocentric in our use of the word. The nature of the mind 
does not, in principle, matter, because it is as indisputably an object as 
unicorns and phlogiston. As Steven Shaviro points out, a common criticism 
of panpsychism is that it uncritically assigns human-like mind elements 
to nonhumans.373 This, Shaviro says, begs the question because it betrays 
an understanding of thought, value and experience that is inherently 
anthropocentric. Consequently, the emphasis of this book is on experiences 
rather than minds, although not in a panexperientialist sense. This is because 
if experience is universal to all objects it must apply to incorporeal objects 
as well, not to mention inanimate objects. The experience of a synapse, 
wave or videogame character does not need to be a deviant version of a 
human experience. Experiences are just as alien as the kinds of sensation 
that define an object. In a robot, the response to sensory input is evidence 
of experience. It signifies that something changes inside the object. This is 
not a panpsychist argument that depends upon the presence or absence of 
a mind connected to sense organs. The tortoise does not use its sensors to 
detect when it is lifted up in the air by a human hand, but it still senses and 
experiences it.
This chapter has focussed on one of the guiding questions of this 
book: what does sensation mean for machines? More specifically, does 
using the word “sensation” in a strict, non-metaphorical sense require 
us to believe that machines experience the world in any meaningful way? 
This chapter has argued that in the context of Umwelt-theory, it is not 
necessary to anthropomorphise experience, but it is necessary to recognise 
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some kind of semiotic exchange between nonhuman and environment. It 
is natural to be reluctant to extend a quality of mind to robots as simple 
as Machina speculatrix, but it is not necessary to do so to speculate about 
their experience of the world. It is difficult but possible to conceive of non-
anthropomorphic minds or experiences, with or without a panpsychist view, 
and even without a panexperientialist view. The Umwelt is conceptually 
distinct from the concept of a mind and yields a very different account of 
how an object experiences its world. Umwelten give an account of a sensory 
world that need not be anything like our own, despite taking place in the 
same environment. The concept of a mind relates to the experience of 
those sensations. For the anthrodecentric approach presented in this book 
both Umwelten and minds may be seen in at least all physically embodied 
objects. Yet both the Umwelt and the mind have historically been restricted 
to certain classes of objects because of the assumption that both depend on 
the presence of subjectivity. As OOO rejects the primacy of subjectivity, the 
concepts of Umwelten and minds can be better deployed as explanations 
of the elements of Harman’s metaphysics (and must be, if object-oriented 
ontologists can acknowledge them to exist at all). The Umwelt of an 
object is the impression of the environment upon an object; it is the field 
in which sensual objects are formed and maintained despite the flickering 
encrustations of their qualities. Notice that in this view the Umwelt must 
incorporate entirely alien sensations such as the impression of wheels upon a 
floor. The Umwelt is the sensory world. Meanwhile the mind, if the concept 
is made sufficiently broad, describes the way that the object encounters 
sensation. It describes a very fundamental kind of experience. It is nothing 
more than the sum total of the changes brought on by the sensation of other 
objects as those sensations change moment by moment. In this account, the 
Umwelt and the mind are not special objects relegated to the realm of living 
things for the sake of human vanity.
Anthropomorphism is a trap which must be avoided when speaking of 
Umwelten or minds. Objects that are more human-like do not have non-
alien sensation and experience, whether they are parts of humans or models 
of humans. Synapses, waves and Mario are all alien. The point is to avoid a 
hierarchy of mind-having or Umwelt-having objects, beginning with humans 
at the top and negotiating the positions of various anthropomorphic objects, 
objects characteristic of the Anthropocene or objects that typically inhabit 
human bodies on a spectrum. The point to bear in mind is that we and our 
sensation and experience are as alien to other objects as they are to us.
Chapter 4
SHRDLU and Bidirectional Postphenomenology
Postphenomenology differs from traditional phenomenology in that the 
structure of human perception and experience is changed by technologies. 
As Tom Sparrow puts it, phenomenology is almost by definition 
about humans and human lived experiences through the “principle of 
intentionality that sutures subject and object together”, but it varies greatly 
from scholar to scholar.374 Postphenomenology does not make the same 
radical claims as OOO but it does significantly depart from (what we might 
call) traditional phenomenology by emphasising the role of technology in 
affecting human experience and even being a part of human experience. 
Technologies are not merely mediators of human experience, but constitute 
our reality.375 Don Ihde is the most prominent theorist in this field. For 
Ihde, human perception and other intentionalities extend through machines. 
Technology must not be considered abstractly, but in terms of human-
technology relations.376 Many of Ihde’s examples are visual ones, such 
as the non-neutral effect of Galileo’s telescope on stargazing.377 Despite 
requiring a degree of trust in the medium to convey an image that expresses 
the world in terms humans can understand, the telescope nevertheless 
presents the human user with objects in the solar system that would 
otherwise be invisible, such as the moons of Jupiter. Indeed, in the case of 
modern telescopes, distant galaxies and phenomena outside the visible light 
spectrum may also be glimpsed. The scholarship that has arisen around this 
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concept contributes to a growing appreciation of the role of technology in 
human phenomenology.
Ihde is not an OOOer and he is not overly concerned with 
deconstructing the categories of “human” and “machine”. His 
postphenomenology explains an important and often neglected part 
of humanity’s lived experience. But for the purposes of this book 
postphenomenology is typically far too one-sided. To only use Ihde to 
understand humanity’s lived experience is to reject the OOO position 
of anti-correlationism. Therefore, this chapter will present, as far as is 
possible, strictly bidirectional and asymmetrical interpretations of Ihde’s 
work. Where Ihde describes a human-technology-world relationship from 
a human position, this chapter will attempt to describe a similar one from 
a nonhuman object’s perspective. This is an experiment in combining 
two approaches, but it is hoped that this bringing together of approaches 
yields a useful language and framework for describing the asymmetrical, 
bidirectional relations between human and technological artefact. This may 
bring us closer to the goal of conceptualising the way that machines sense 
and experience the world. Since postphenomenology is so robust in its 
treatment of human-world relations, by reversing the process we can make 
coherent statements about machine sensation.
The computer is a paradigmatic metaphor for human experience. We 
saw in the previous chapter how a technological artefact may affect and 
shape our line of inquiry about the human mind. This chapter focusses 
on a computer program named SHRDLU as it forms relations with its 
environment, an environment that includes human interlocutors. SHRDLU 
is (or was) a natural language processing (NLP) program designed by Terry 
Winograd in the late 1960s and early 70s. SHRDLU’s world was entirely 
concerned with moving and answering questions about crudely illuminated 
block shapes on the system’s monitor. The setting is deceptively simple, 
concealing a vast, complicated web of interrelated processes that make it 
possible for SHRDLU to “understand” English. Through the constructs 
of postphenomenological theory this chapter interprets the ways that 
SHRDLU extends or changes human actions and perception, and how 
these constructs might be reversed to describe the way that technological 
agents use humans.
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What is (or was) SHRDLU?
The world of SHRDLU is deliberately tiny. It is an entity with a miniscule 
capacity for direct action in its environment. Like the tortoises of the 
previous chapter, it has a small set of ways of sensing the world, the most 
pertinent for most human analyses being the way that it senses humans. 
SHRDLU’s only information about its human user comes to it through 
textual orders and interrogations, relayed through the keyboard of whatever 
system it happens to be occupying at that time (or possibly, these days, 
through voice-to-text applications). The human types instructions or 
questions, and SHRDLU responds with text and/or actions in its block 
world. Once that information is received, SHRDLU’s capacity for action 
is very limited. It can only perform actions as it has been programmed to 
do. Apart from responding to the user’s dialogue, its sole possible set of 
actions consist of moving around digital blocks with a digital robotic arm 
(the digital block world is visible to the user).378 The blocks exist as code 
within the computer but are programmed to obey the laws of the physical 
universe, so for example, a block once dropped will fall onto whatever is 
below it. This is the microworld of SHRDLU, the epitome of “hacker” 
style artificial intelligence programs designed by Terry Winograd between 
1968 and 1972, created to investigate natural language and computers. 
It has become a classic piece of AI programming, providing what was 
at the time a fresh perspective on the relationship between world and 
language. Like the tortoise, SHRDLU’s simplicity is the key to its engaging 
theoretical implications; it becomes a model for greater things, providing 
clues to unlocking more universal insights. In a 1979 paper Hubert Dreyfus 
discusses SHRDLU along with other microworlds created in the late 
1960s and 1970s, such as Adolfo Guzman’s 1968 SEE program which was 
designed as a simple computer vision program.379 Dreyfus is critical of these 
programs because he believes that human intelligence consists of “local 
elaborations of the whole” rather than isolated microworlds that assemble to 
form the everyday.380
Nevertheless, Dreyfus calls SHRDLU a “major achievement.”381 The 
program is far more complex than the interface suggests. Like any elegantly-
designed user interface, it conceals the complexity of its underlying 
processes. The language use of programs like SHRDLU is one of the most 
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studied and contentious areas of artificial intelligence research. Humans 
have a fascination with reproducing their forms in artificial entities, and 
especially in reproducing certain defining human qualities like language. 
The intelligence modelled by early systems like SHRDLU was limited 
to tightly constrained domains and therefore imitated only a tiny part of 
human intelligence. Playing chess and proving mathematical theorems 
were possible, but one could not enjoy a disinhibited conversation with a 
machine.382 SHRDLU cannot converse with a human about anything other 
than its block world. This so-called “weak AI” may be contrasted with the 
“strong AI” theorised by science fiction writers and futurists, in which 
human intelligence is not merely simulated, but from which consciousness 
and self-awareness emerge.383 Strong AI is not simply an improvement 
of processing power, but a replication of the linguistic and experiential 
qualities of the human brain, and supporting the argument that the brain 
is like a computer (as in functionalism).384 The supposed need to observe 
understanding and explanation in machines is often seen to be a major 
problem in the development of AI. Creating and responding to signs is seen 
as a step above simple performative and adaptive systems. Human brains 
understand. They interpret the world through language and other signs and 
draw conclusions after the application of symbolic logic.
One of the earliest applications of computers to be seriously considered 
in AI circles was the translation of texts from one language to another. But 
in 1960 Yehoshua Bar-Hillel proclaimed that the high-quality translation 
programs sought after and expected were nowhere near being completed, 
and used the phrase “the box was in the pen” to illustrate his point.385 He 
pointed out that no program at the time could translate the word “pen” as 
used in that sentence correctly, the way that an English-speaking human 
would be able to do immediately. The machine is in need of “extra-linguistic 
knowledge”. Winograd argues that early machine translation failed because 
language consists of more than just the concepts of “dictionary” and 
“grammar”; language must be connected to an external world.386 As he puts 
it, “the computer didn’t know what it was talking about.”387 A conversation 
is part of each participant’s ongoing attempt to gain information about their 
environments.
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A successor to the translation programs, conversational programs 
were built between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. SHRDLU is one such 
conversational program. They were attempts to build systems that had 
a limited understanding of language. One famous example is ELIZA, a 
program developed by Joseph Weizenbaum at MIT between 1964 and 1966. 
Despite the limitations of the time, ELIZA was made to be a somewhat 
convincing conversationalist by running the DOCTOR script in which it 
was themed as a Rogerian psychiatrist talking to a patient. This is a clever 
move because the inevitable non sequiturs can be mistaken for insight 
in a psychiatrist identifying hidden links.388 A Rogerian psychiatrist also 
often reflects back what the patient is saying to draw the patient out and 
get them to keep talking, which is something the program could handle.389 
Winograd points to this episode as a warning that, with clever tricks, a 
program can appear to have more insight than it does.390 Its simple gestures 
to anthropomorphism also strongly imply the presence of a human-like 
intellect. ELIZA has some similarities with contemporary virtual therapist 
Ellie, funded by DARPA to aid in the diagnosis of mental illness amongst 
veterans.391 In some ways, Ellie’s goals are the same as DOCTOR’s, since 
it is important for her to connect with “patients”, who must be encouraged 
to see past the computer interface to the connection with another entity. 
This is aided by Ellie’s advanced natural language processing as well as 
her ability to pick up on bodily cues and her own use of body language. 
But the important difference here is that Ellie has an aim beyond fooling 
human interlocutors with her use of language. She is not a purely theoretical 
project, and she exists to diagnose rather than to interpret. There has 
already been some literature discussing the advantages of virtual therapists: 
for example, people seem to be more willing to discuss sensitive or 
embarrassing topics with a computer.392 But there are also risks, as in the 
use of therapeutic anthropomorphic toys in children with autism, such as 
distress when the agent is taken away or hacked with malicious intent.393
It has been argued that these capabilities are beyond the artificial brains 
that exist in the world to date. John Searle, the critic of David Chalmers 
mentioned in the previous chapter, demonstrates this line of thinking in the 
Chinese Room thought experiment.394 Searle’s is a well-known argument 
associated with the feelings of disappointment of the 1980s that came from 
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the failure of AI to live up to expectations.395 A non-Chinese speaker is put 
inside a room. From outside the room, a Chinese speaker writes a question 
and puts it through a slot into the room. The person inside the room 
has access to a book containing many different Chinese phrases and the 
appropriate response to give. The person can copy down the response and 
return it through the slot. The result, to the Chinese speaker, appears to be 
comprehension by the computer and a salient response. However, the entire 
exchange takes place without the person inside the room understanding 
the question or answer. Searle argues that this is how a computer appears 
to return intelligent answers despite no comprehension taking place. 
However, Ray Kurzweil disagrees and claims that the Chinese Room model 
is a construct that reveals what occurs in simple single-neuron systems.396 
In a system like the human brain, great complexity and volume of data 
transforms the performative neural response to a supposedly semiotic one 
through processes of emergence, and there is no reason why, given sufficient 
complexity, something like thought might not occur in a computer.
This question is pertinent to the creation of modern NLP agents such as 
Watson, the IBM computer reportedly capable of writing poetry. The depth 
of human skill and wisdom required to write good poetry is considerable, 
so it is easy to see why comparable creative output from a computer would 
lead the casual observer to ascribe it to human-like intelligence. In 2015, 
the IBM Watson team capitalised upon this in an advertisement starring 
music legend Bob Dylan.397 Watson and Dylan discuss the themes in Dylan’s 
poetry, including love and the passage of time. Watson notes that although it 
can read 800 million pages per second (and can clearly parse and interpret 
poetry), it has never known love. Watson’s natural language capabilities are 
extremely advanced and are informed by the input of vast quantities of text, 
so that it is able to answer sophisticated questions on a huge number of 
topics.398 In one sense its knowledge of love is doubtless extensive. But it is 
not grounded in the world with respect to that notably human emotion. Its 
sensation and experience of love is alien. Given Watson’s incredible linguistic 
skill, however, it may well be perfectly capable of writing poetry that mimics 
Dylan’s characteristic lyrics. Whether it understands them the way a human 
would is another question, as discussed in the previous chapter.
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Language is considered one of the defining qualities of human nature, 
and it is only to be expected that we would try to reproduce it in computers, 
if only to see if it is possible. But the practical possibilities for such an 
endeavour are also enormous. One need only look to the contemporary 
examples of Amazon’s Alexa and Microsoft’s Cortana to see the vast 
cultural value attached to communicating with machines “naturally”, and 
consequently the economic value thereof. As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
goal of interacting “naturally” with a machine is problematic but appealing. 
Natural language communication with computers is also a common trope 
in science fiction and is commonly a quality of advanced user interfaces, 
such as the computer character Samantha in the film Her (played by Scarlett 
Johansson).399 In this film, the ability of the computer user to communicate 
through natural language with his computer leads to an intense intimate 
relationship. The computer is anthropomorphised in other ways as well, 
but her presence is located in her ability to speak; it is the facilitator of her 
sensation of the human.
SHRDLU can be seen as an earlier relative of today’s more advanced 
NLP programs, hampered by its inability to access information about 
anything other than its block world and system. The world in which 
SHRDLU operates is necessarily small so that it can understand everything 
that goes on within it. Winograd argues that “success at understanding 
language depends on a deep knowledge of the subject being discussed.”400 
Deb Roy calls this “grounding”, the process by which an agent relates 
beliefs to external physical worlds.401 In this way the computer need not have 
the world mediated by anchor-less human language but can have a direct 
experience of the objects it is discussing. It would have been impractical 
to attempt to make the computer relate to objects in the real world; this 
was far beyond the technology at the time. And for OOO purposes it is not 
important whether the world of blocks was “real” or not (see below) – it 
still constitutes a collection of objects, and we can look on SHRDLU in 
OOO terms as an early attempt to extend the sensation-poor environments 
of computers. Winograd had a reason for this attempt that was both 
practical and philosophical, and it resulted in a system that had a wealth 
of information available to it. More information means, correspondingly, 
greater agency within its world; that is, the world of blocks. The information 
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about its world was not just coming to it through the intermediary of 
language, but from its sensation and understanding of the block world.
Speaking to SHRDLU is like speaking to a toddler that is only just 
learning about its world. In his 1972 paper in Cognitive Psychology, 
Winograd provides a detailed technical explanation of SHRDLU’s means of 
understanding and answering questions, along with a transcript of a human 
conversation with it.402 This is a typical interaction:
Person: PICK UP A BIG RED BLOCK.
Computer: OK. (does it)
When the robot arm completes an action, that action is reflected on a 
visual representation. In this case the robot arm descends from the top of 
the screen and picks up a red block meeting a pre-determined definition 
of “big”. As will be shown, this simple exchange requires what was at the 
time a very advanced understanding of language and logic. As Douglas 
Hofstadter says, SHRDLU is a “mathematical ignoramus” which has only 
been taught to count up to ten.403 But its simplicity is, in fact, the key to its 
solidity as a paradigmatic example of a particular phase in the history of AI.
Winograd, whose experience in computer science led him to become a 
philosopher, is of the opinion that previous attempts at NLP failed because 
there was a lack of connection between the language the system is being 
asked to understand and a real world that it can understand and interact 
with. With this in mind, he built SHRDLU as not just a teletext exchange 
between user and computer but incorporating the simulated “blocks world” 
with physical laws and rules for an aspect of the system to interact with. To 
the human user, the teletext screen is presented in order for them to provide 
instructions to or ask questions of SHRDLU, and for SHRDLU to respond. 
But there is also a screen showing a simple world of blocks of different 
shapes, sizes and colours. SHRDLU has a robot arm on the screen and is 
able to pick up the blocks, one at a time, and move them around the world. 
This simple configuration represented a significant advancement over other 
systems. It could remember things from earlier, justify its actions and learn 
new things about its environment. The program was written in LISP. Some 
of the program’s capabilities are highlighted by Winograd:
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Person: GRASP THE PYRAMID.
Computer: I DON’T UNDERSTAND WHICH 
PYRAMID YOU MEAN.
Person: FIND A BLOCK WHICH IS TALLER THAN 
THE ONE YOU ARE HOLDING AND PUT IT 
INTO THE BOX.
Computer: BY “IT”, I ASSUME YOU MEAN THE BLOCK 
WHICH IS TALLER THAN THE ONE I AM HOLDING.
Computer: OK. (does it)
SHRDLU explains what it is doing before doing it so that the human user 
knows what SHRDLU understood from the command. When faced with 
ambiguity, SHRDLU can ask questions:
Person: HOW MANY THINGS ARE ON TOP OF 
GREEN CUBES?
Computer: I’M NOT SURE WHAT YOU MEAN BY 
“ON TOP OF” IN THE PHRASE “ON TOP OF GREEN 
CUBES”. DO YOU MEAN:
  1 - DIRECTLY ON THE SURFACE
  2 - ANWHERE ON TOP OF ?
SHRDLU is capable of experimenting and learning about its environment:
Person: CAN A PYRAMID SUPPORT A PYRAMID?
Computer: I DON’T KNOW.
Person: STACK UP TWO PYRAMIDS.
Computer: I CAN’T.
It can also remember what it has done in the past and answer 
questions about it:
Person: HAD YOU TOUCHED ANY PYRAMID BEFORE 
YOU PUT THE GREEN ONE ON THE LITTLE CUBE?
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Computer: YES, THE GREEN ONE.
Person: WHEN DID YOU PICK IT UP?
Computer: WHILE I WAS STACKING UP THE 
RED CUBE, A LARGE RED BLOCK AND A 
LARGE GREEN CUBE.
Person: WHY?
Computer: TO GET RID OF IT.
Person: WHY DID YOU DO THAT?
Computer: TO CLEAN OFF THE RED CUBE.
Person: WHY DID YOU CLEAR OFF THAT CUBE?
Computer: TO PUT IT ON A LARGE GREEN CUBE.
Person: WHY DID YOU DO THAT?
Computer: TO STACK UP THE RED CUBE, A LARGE 
RED BLOCK AND A LARGE GREEN CUBE.
Person: WHY DID YOU DO THAT?
Computer: BECAUSE YOU ASKED ME TO.
SHRDLU is grounded in its world – it has things to talk about. This 
dialogue gives some indication of SHRDLU’s relations with its world, such 
as with blocks, physical laws, and human interlocutors. Further investigation 
reveals the interaction of SHRDLU with such entities as LISP, electronics, 
and the history and future of AI research and design.
SHRDLU interacted with many texts as well as countless academics. 
Winograd claimed in his dissertation that “the challenge of programming 
a computer to use language is really the challenge of producing 
intelligence.”404 But in the book Understanding Computers and Cognition, he 
and Fernando Flores argue that neither is really possible.405 They write, 
citing examples of programs that attempt to produce natural language, 
including SHRDLU, that it is not possible for a computer to truly 
understand language:
If I write something and mail it to you, you are not tempted 
to see the paper as exhibiting language behavior. It is a 
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medium through which you and I interact. If I write a complex 
computer program that responds to things you type, the 
situation is still the same – the program is still a medium 
through which my commitments to you are conveyed… 
it must be stressed that we are engaging in a particularly 
dangerous form of blindness if we see the computer – 
rather than the people who program it – as doing the 
understanding.406
This statement is a prediction that it is impossible to build a Strong 
AI entity and is comparable to the Chinese Room thought experiment 
argument. Winograd and Flores speak more of technology as something 
that is useful and interactive and use phenomenological language; they 
emphasise the tool-use of AI agents.407 SHRDLU as an experimental actant 
reveals to us another way of being, the alien logic of the computer, not a 
logic that is comparable to but lesser than humans’.
SHRDLU is a virtual robot with no direct agency beyond the clearly-
delineated walls of its system. It can be discussed as a “robot” in the same 
way that it discusses robot tortoises and social robots, which exist in the 
physical world. Some definitions of robot, such as that put forward by Maja 
Mataric, apply only to the latter variety, that are both “autonomous” and 
“exist in the physical world”.408 Karel Čapek’s original usage of the word 
in his play R.U.R. (1920) described mechanical beings (roboti) similar to 
humans that work in a factory and later rise up in a rebellion, which is 
comparable to modern ideas of androids or cyborgs.409 But the word itself 
is derived from the Czech word robota meaning “forced labour”, and the 
robots in the play are actually built in a way that makes them very difficult 
to distinguish from humans. SHRDLU and similar entities are clearly 
examples of both these qualities. SHRDLU is employed in forced labour 
for the human user, without possessing anything that we might describe 
as a choice in the matter. When we look at the modern usage of the term, 
“robot” usually refers to an entity that exists in the physical world. A 
notable exception to this is the “bot”, which is an entirely virtual entity 
which commonly performs automated tasks on the internet – a subset of 
this, the “chatbot”, could be seen as a descendent of SHRDLU, employing 
natural language techniques in an attempt to appear as a human to the 
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user. It is possible to trace a non-physical robot genealogy. We may look 
at the specific version of SHRDLU running on a particular computer as a 
position on the spectrum of robot corporeality, which spans from Astro Boy 
to Voyager 2. It can be described as a borderline fictional robot, possessing a 
different kind of agency than a robot that exists only within a human-driven 
narrative. SHRDLU possesses an extended agency, influencing elements of 
its personal virtual world for one thing, but also acting through the eyes and 
brain of the human user. We do not even need to adopt a OOO perspective 
to state unequivocally that SHRDLU does, in fact, exist. For OOO the 
virtual/embodied robot distinction is not indicative of any degree of realness 
in two objects. Any such hierarchy of reality is rejected in OOO. As Harman 
says, all objects may not be real in the same way, but “they are equally 
objects” and therefore can be discussed under the same terms.410 They are 
both real, but with a different way of being in the world. It is perhaps better 
to compare the physically embodied tortoise with the electronically embodied 
SHRDLU, but to bear in mind that each is equally an object. The difference 
between physically and electronically embodied robots is a distraction from 
learning about these relations and qualities in alien phenomenology. The 
sensory worlds inhabited by physically and electronically embodied objects 
are very different, but both require investigation.
There is at least one important difference between the two types 
of objects, however. In a sense, both the tortoises and SHRDLU are 
programmed to perform exactly the same interaction under identical 
circumstances. If one were to feed the same sample dialogue above into 
SHRDLU it would respond in an identical way, both in the movements 
of its robot arm and its linguistic responses. Similarly, if the robot tortoise 
is presented with exactly the same physical situation, with identical light 
sources and obstacles, it would be expected to behave in the same way 
each time. But this is not possible in an analogue world. No amount of 
prior planning could result in exactly the same experimental setup each 
time. SHRDLU is a closed system. In thermodynamics, a closed system is 
that which is self-contained and does not permit matter to transfer across 
a boundary (although it does permit the movement of energy).411 The 
conditions are set and are not influenced by external variables. A digital 
system like SHRDLU is constrained by its programming and will always 
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react in the same way no matter how many times an experiment is repeated. 
In contrast, an open system is influenced by external variables.412 This 
is true of an analogue system like a robot tortoise, which depends upon 
things like the ground and is affected by variations in it. For this reason, 
the tortoises seem more autonomous. When encountering a new setting 
the tortoise appears to make a decision about its setting based on sensory 
data in a way that SHRDLU is not capable of, even though we know from 
Winograd’s commentary that the system does in fact have a very complex 
means of making decisions. It may be that the fact that we can in principle 
explain everything about SHRDLU’s performance affects our conception of 
its semi-autonomy.
SHRDLU’s electronically embodied status means that it can be 
reproduced in entirely different media. My own interaction with SHRDLU 
came through a graphical 3D version of SHRDLU with an extra Java layer 
remediated by an early version of Windows,413 certainly not the original 
medium. The hardware on which SHRDLU was originally run is now 
too antiquated for the program to run on contemporary systems without 
alteration, even though the original LISP programming may be retained. 
Consequently, newcomers to SHRDLU may never have access to the 
original version, to the object that was called “SHRDLU” by Winograd. If 
the program acts in a similar way, however, there is a certain sense in which 
the version does not matter to SHRDLU, which exists as a concept beyond 
its incarnation in a specific software-hardware system. The concept might 
“run” on the media of many different human brains, many of which will give 
it different connotations, associate it with different ideas and have different 
opinions as to its veracity. But it is still ultimately the same concept and it 
exists independently of its media. The medium may be characterised as the 
extraneous details that make up the sensory qualities of an object – they 
change the way we sense the object at any given time, but they do not affect 
the withdrawn real object. Nevertheless, an incarnation of SHRDLU on a 
specific device is an object too, although this may be counter-intuitive. This 
is the same as the distinction made in Chapter 2 between the Kinect-artefact 
and the Kinect-brand, but because the programming of SHRDLU is 
always the same it is difficult to say where the concept ends and the specific 
incarnation begins. But wherever the line is, interaction with any incarnation 
SHRDLU and Bidirectional Postphenomenology 157
of SHRDLU helps us to build knowledge of its sensory world, and also 
knowledge of a cultural and academic phenomenon called SHRDLU.
Postphenomenology is useful here as a contrast to OOO because most 
of the very close relations between SHRDLU and other objects in its world 
are confined to within the computer – and, indeed, when it was first made 
that computer would have been very limiting. Flipping postphenomenology 
around so that the nonhuman is primary is distinctly necessary in this 
case study since the relations are complex and interrelated but enter into 
postphenomenological relations with each other as well as with humans. 
Ihde’s postphenomenology can be supplemented by alien phenomenology to 
result in extensive theorisation of nonhuman relations.
Postphenomenology
Comparisons between postphenomenology and ANT have been drawn by 
Peter-Paul Verbeek:414 they are both non-essentialist and are grounded in 
a relational model. They both try to find a resolution to the insupportable 
metaphysical gulf between humans and nonhumans, but Verbeek thinks 
that postphenomenology is more “nuanced” because it goes beyond 
locating associations between entities and describes those associations as 
well.415 Robert Rosenberger and Verbeek have called postphenomenology 
an “empirical philosophy”.416 This is the pragmatic reason for a 
postphenomenological approach with SHRDLU. The more important one 
here is that postphenomenology gives us particular insight into the very 
special, very privileged relationship between human being and technological 
construct. Don Ihde’s postphenomenology reveals a model of human 
extension through technology that sublimely articulates the feeling of being 
changed by technology. Postphenomenology is an important movement in 
contemporary philosophy of technology and it seems necessary to present it 
here and critique it alongside those ideas that decentre humans.
This section will begin by briefly outlining Don Ihde’s 
postphenomenology with some conjecture as to how the categories of 
experience that he describes might be used to articulate machine experience. 
Next, there will be a discussion of SHRDLU with relation to these 
categories, with particular reference to the postphenomenological notion of 
multistability. Finally, there will be an account of what postphenomenology 
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can lend the notions of cultural agency that have proved problematic in 
previous chapters.
Don Ihde self-consciously brings phenomenology into science and 
technology studies.417 His postphenomenology explores how we can 
consider technologies to take on the role of human intentionalities. He does 
not reject the ideas of previous phenomenological philosophers, but he 
argues that ideas must evolve in order to be relevant to other disciplines.418 
Theory has evolved over time, but perhaps more significantly technology has 
changed a great deal. The invention of new artefacts requires discourses of 
technology to enter into relations with different fields and thinkers. It may 
be that today the role of technology in changing our perceptions is more 
apparent. An example is the moral panic caused by young people overusing 
screen media such as online videogames. The rate of technological progress 
is so rapid that new generations have vastly different mediated experiences 
from their parents. So while the teenager playing a videogame six hours a 
day feels as though she is an active participant in a virtual world, society 
might tell her that her perceptual experiences are less real than those of a 
non-gamer. Yet the fantasy world inside the computer is real. We can tell, 
because it has an effect on the teenager and others. It also influences the 
computer, the internet, and aspects of human culture. It may enter into all 
of these relations, but in order to enter into a relation with the teenager, it 
must be mediated by the computer screen.
Ihde’s phenomenological ideas explain how humans can have 
technologically mediated intentionalities. The technology becomes one of 
the key actors in Ihde’s theory. For example, Galileo used a telescope to 
detect four of the moons of Jupiter, which are invisible to the naked eye. 
Ihde claims that this was a significant change in the way humans perceive 
the world, because it required people to trust in a machine to convey 
accurate visual information.419 This was one of the most important moments 
for the shift to what Ihde calls instrumental realism: a belief that technology 
can augment and enhance our senses, and that those sensations are reliable. 
Through this transformation, what is meant for a human to sense the world 
changed. The object of study is not just the relationship between human 
and world, but the ontological trinity of human, world and technology.420 
Technology is not a passive translator of information but participates 
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non-neutrally in the relationship. After developing these ideas over a long 
period of time, Ihde and colleagues eventually gave them the label of 
postphenomenology. Postphenomenology has become a very influential way 
of discussing technology because it provides tools to explain how we can 
experience phenomena through a machine that changes sensory input.
Ihde describes three types of relationships in which technology mediates 
human intentionalities. These are explored in detail in his 1990 book 
Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth.421 He uses mostly visual 
examples, so the technology mediates the human intentionality of seeing. 
His analysis could also be applied to other intentionalities, such as hearing 
(for example, with a hearing aid), remembering (with a personal organiser), 
perception or cognition (when one is under the influence of psychedelic 
drugs).422 But it makes sense to begin with visual phenomena, following 
Ihde. He has elsewhere made a study of the dominance of sight over other 
senses in science. The increasing tendency to portray data in visual form, 
or “science’s visualism”, 423 has resulted in a privileging of sight over the 
other senses. Therefore, to introduce Ihde is to focus on the visual and to 
use examples of sight intentionalities. But machine “vision” is culturally 
constructed and bears limited resemblance to human vision.
Ihde identifies three types of relationship between humans and 
technology that change (or improve) our experience of the world. The first 
is the embodiment relationship. This applies to technologies that become 
part of the body to enhance certain intentionalities. For example, the 
intentionality of seeing is enhanced/changed by wearing eyeglasses. The 
body’s capabilities are transformed by the artefact. The object becomes 
a part of the way the human sees. This process is not limited to simple 
machines. Hearing aids exist in the same kind of relationship as eyeglasses 
but are much more complex.424 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s blind man’s 
cane is an embodiment relationship, as it is a direct means of extending the 
tactility of the body.425 Ihde depicts this relationship as:
(human-technology) → environment
The technology is taken into the human to permit the experience of the 
world. The object is hardly noticeable, and in fact performs better the 
less obtrusive it is. If a technology is good, it “withdraws”.426 It becomes 
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“quasitransparent”.427 (This withdrawal is similar to the withdrawal in 
OOO, or to Latour’s “black boxes”428, in that the means of accessing the 
technology are removed from external actants, although Ihde’s use of the 
term occurs instant by instant whereas Harman’s withdrawal is eternal. The 
terms are not to be confused in origin or in application.) Ihde poignantly 
describes withdrawal as a fundamental contradiction inherent to humans’ 
use of machines. We want the power that comes from the technological 
transformation, but we secretly desire “to escape the limitations of the 
material technology.”429 Thus, embodiment relationships reveal the human-
technology hybrid to be a site of ambivalence, demonstrating the human 
craving for direct experience.
This craving is revealed to us through the narrative of verisimilitude 
in the history of visual images.430 Many art historians have identified a 
persistent tendency to produce more and more realistic visual media 
throughout history. This culminates in the ideal of virtual reality (VR), a 
concept that remains elusive to us and will remain elusive for the foreseeable 
future. Ken Hillis says that a true VR mediation would “pass for or merge 
seamlessly with perception itself”,431 taking the place of not only visual 
stimuli but sound, smell, fatigue, hunger and all other affects. It would not 
even be possible to detect the pressure of the headset on one’s skin. This 
ideal remains infeasible for VR researchers in the short term. In Ihde’s 
terms, we seek technologies that will transform our intentionalities, but 
we wish to erase all traces of the mediator and become utterly embodied. 
Yet there are also alternative narratives of media. Art historian Jonathan 
Crary points to places in the history of images where humans have craved 
mediation through images.432 Impressionists and post-impressionists, for 
example, deliberately distorted visual stimuli, leaving the greater truth 
behind their work to be interpreted by the viewer. These are pieces that 
disdain the natural human desire for embodied mediation and require a 
hermeneutic process (see below).
A comparison to the human-centric embodiment relationship for 
considering machine phenomenology is necessary at this point. This 
relationship must feature a technology making use of a human actant to 
perceive the world. In the case of a desktop computer, an embodiment 
SHRDLU and Bidirectional Postphenomenology 161
relationship is formed between typist and keyboard. To rephrase Ihde’s 
model for this perspective:
(technology-human) → world
The keyboard is, along with the mouse and the network, one of the most 
important ways that a desktop computer experiences the world. The 
depression of certain keys acts as stimuli to computer receptors. Each 
receptor has, depending on context, a different effect, rather as acetylcholine 
acts only upon acetylcholine receptors, yet it may have multifarious effects 
on different tissues. For example, sometimes my laptop asks me to enter a 
password to access the university Wi-Fi, since it has detected that it cannot 
connect to the internet and perform its tasks without it, and since it has also 
failed to remember the password. It persuades my brain and fingers to work 
by telling me that it is having a problem, in language that I can understand. 
It thereby extends its own capabilities using my body. The computer needs 
the human user to depress keys in order for it to function, and makes use 
of human hands (and a human brain) to fulfil its purpose. Other objects 
involved include wires, key codes, and a keyboard driver.
Using the word in the sense of “reading” or “interpretation”, Ihde 
next discusses hermeneutic relationships. This category refers to objects 
that transmit data or information which must then be interpreted by the 
human user. The most basic example in Ihde’s account is of a human 
reading a chart. The chart is inscribed by a human, but alone it is useless. 
It requires a human with the knowledge and understanding to read and 
interpret it. It refers to events that occur beyond its material self.433 Another 
example is the thermometer that detects the temperature of the air so that 
the human reader can hermeneutically receive sensory information. The 
machine sensation is transcribed into a written or visual form which is then 
reconstructed by the human. This is depicted as:
human → (technology-world)
The technology is experiencing the conditions of the world. It has a process 
by which it acquires information, such as through sensors or human input. 
But the human user interpreting the technology has no direct access to the 
information that the machine reveals. The human must have an implicit 
understanding of what is indicated by the machine. In the thermometer 
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example, it is no use to simply have a machine that tells us the temperature 
is thirty-five degrees centigrade. It requires a human user to understand 
what the value “thirty-five” means. On a weather report, it indicates an 
uncomfortably hot day, while on an oral thermometer it is a dangerously 
low temperature for a human body. And as Ihde points out, a native 
of North America would also need to know how to convert centigrade 
temperatures into Fahrenheit values before they could be read properly.434 
As in embodiment relationships, we can extend this idea to more complex 
examples. The Parkes Radio Telescope measures hydrogen gas densities in 
other galaxies.435 The phenomenon under investigation is both distant and 
invisible to human senses, but the telescope is capable of displaying the data 
in visual forms, with different colours to indicate densities. The machines 
translate data into a form that may be understood by human beings, so 
long as they possess the knowledge to interpret the images. Note that it is 
explicitly implied here that nonhuman sensation not only exists, but that 
it is possible for humans to gain information from it. In other words, the 
human can understand what occurs in the telescope’s sensory world, to a 
limited extent.
Examples of computers interpreting human actions abound. The writing 
of code or algorithms to control processes results in human texts that 
the computer must interpret and act upon. The computer depends upon 
the accuracy of the human typist to reduce errors in the human-machine 
process of semiosis. While writing code, the omission of a semi-colon may 
result in a non-functioning program. The computer relies on the human to 
produce good, comprehensible code. After being converted into machine 
language, the instructions become a facilitator of machinic action:
technology → (human-world)
Poorly-coded programs rely overmuch on human intervention or make it 
difficult to make future alterations. Well-coded programs are so efficient 
and effective that they are blackboxed and become invisible. When 
SHRDLU performs as hoped, its programming is invisible to all but the 
most specialised user because no errors in comprehension or processing 
are evident to betray the skilful tricks that Winograd may have used 
to program the system. A corollary exists in the practice of providing 
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automated voice-controlled telephone services. A simple, well-organised 
service relies on responses of only “yes” or “no” and allows the caller to 
complete their business swiftly. Yet all too often the service requires users 
to provide complicated answers that are difficult to decipher using a voice-
to-text program. In these cases, the caller is typically (or at least hopefully) 
referred to the human operator. The goal in any kind of automated system 
is to remove the need for human intervention. For example, the goal of 
a personalised Google algorithm is to remove the need for the user to 
refine search topics. Google learns about the user’s location and other 
information to provide more relevant local search results so that the user 
does not need to sift through too much material. This also allows Google 
to target advertisements based on what it knows about the user. The ability 
to interpret is hindered by human errors, such as entering one’s location as 
“Austria” instead of “Australia”.
Alterity relationships occur between humans and technology that we 
consider to be an “other” to which one can relate. The term comes from 
Lévinas’s notion that one person is radically different from any other.436 In 
Ihde, the “otherness” is extended to semi-autonomous machines like certain 
robots, although he frequently qualifies it as “quasi-otherness”.437 The 
relationship is depicted as:
human → technology-(-world)
The parentheses indicate that although the relation is primarily between 
the human and the technology, there may also be relations through the 
technology to the world. One of the difficulties for Ihde in describing this 
relationship is that the concept of technology as an “other” varies. What it 
means to anthropomorphise a machine is not uniform across cultures.
In theory, an alterity relationship should be bidirectional even in a 
non-OOO sense. It is a relationship that acknowledges the otherness of 
technology. A true alterity relationship would be the same from both sides 
of the interface. These kinds of relationships can also apply to computer-
computer relationships that occur within a network as well as human-human 
relationships. Yet if we include these as alterity relationships, then surely we 
must also account for human-human interaction. Perhaps the best way to 
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define the interaction is using an unqualified account of object relations, 
regardless of anthropomorphic status:
object A-(-world) → object B
object B-(-world) → object A
The relationship is bidirectional. But it is also asymmetrical. Object A’s 
ability to impart knowledge of the world to Object B might be different from 
Object B’s ability to impart knowledge to Object A. For example, a desktop 
computer and a smartphone may be in an alterity relationship, connected 
by a cable. But each can only impart certain types of sensory experiences 
to the other.
Embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relations are the three major 
means by which technology mediates human intentionalities in Ihde’s 
construct. Added to this are also background relations, which are relations 
between humans and automatic technological processes, such as climate 
control. The background relation may only briefly be directly set up by 
the human, for example the setting of a thermostat. For most of the time, 
the technology operates as a “present absence”438, affecting the human’s 
environment but without direct contact of “focal”439 technologies.
Ihde’s categories represent a significant departure from critical theories 
in which objects are open for interpretation, particularly with alterity 
relationships. He flattens hierarchies of objects: asking a question of a robot 
designed to tell where to find things in a store is as worthy of attention 
as objects capable of a multiplicity of tasks such as a personal computer. 
Doubtless the relationship between computer and human user is determined 
by the particular application in use at any one moment. Some applications 
are hermeneutic; for example, a web service that tells the user about the 
temperature in another city. This application requires human interpretation 
to become useful. But in other states other kinds of relationships may be 
formed with the computer.
Interpretations of machines by humans are sometimes beyond the 
engineer’s intentions. A computer or a robot is a cultural artefact as 
well as a semi-autonomous being. It is, as Ihde frequently points out, 
inextricably linked to the culture that produced it. It is sometimes not 
as easily interpreted as a painting or a film, but it is still a product of 
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our cultural imaginary and can be 
a mediator of ideas, norms, taboos, 
practices and identities. For example, 
a social robot may be designed to be 
relatively independent and to interact 
freely with human beings in, as Ihde 
would say, an alterity relationship. But 
social robots represent certain cultural 
ideas. Chapter 5 specifically notes a 
tendency for “feminine”-looking robots 
to be objectified by their creators and users. When we talk to a “feminine” 
social robot, an “other”, we are also receiving coded messages about social 
interaction and our relationship with robots, and also about relationships 
between women and society. Is this, then, simply a very complicated 
hermeneutic relationship? It is at this point that Ihde’s categories 
become entangled.
Is it possible for a complex machine like a computer to form an 
embodiment relationship with a human? If a Youtube user can access a 
video taken with a smartphone of protests in Cairo, is the computer then 
extending their vision? The mediating qualities of the screen are a problem 
because the video is never as reliable and firmly embodied as the eyeglasses 
– after all, the footage is only ever a brief snippet and is a poor replacement 
for being present at the scene. But Ihde is aware of the significance of the 
frame around mediated experiences. In describing Galileo’s observation 
through a telescope, he points out the ontological leap that must be taken 
to accept the screened space as real. Framing an image immediately makes 
it seem less real to us (or real in a different way). We are aware that a video 
on CNN may not be showing the whole story. Perhaps then the user is in a 
hermeneutic relationship with the footage. It requires interpretation, context 
and prior knowledge to combat the disembodiment, just as a thermometer 
needs a numerical scale to allow us to interpret the expansion of mercury 
and knowledge of, for example, the temperature that indicates a fever in the 
body. The question is an old one in the study of media: is it better to allow 
the viewer to become immersed and to pretend that there is no mediation, 
Figure 2: Necker Cube
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or to provide lots of interpretation as compensation? We can see by this that 
Ihde’s categories rely heavily on how we socially construct embodiment.
Here the concept of multistability is useful, a means of acknowledging 
that relations between humans and machines vary by the instant and by the 
person. Ihde’s approach to this idea begins with an image such as a Necker 
cube – a two-dimensional interconnection of black lines which can appear to 
the viewer as one of either two cubes, but never both at the same time (and, 
as Ihde says, can be seen as other shapes as well).440
This is a metaphor for the relations between humans and technology. 
A technological artefact may be used in different ways by different people, 
in different contexts, and will mean different things to different people, 
often beyond the intentions of their creator. Robert Rosenberger describes 
the ways that a public bench becomes not simply a place to sit, but also a 
bed for the homeless: “[i]n this way, a bench is a multistable technology 
with both bench-as-seat and bench-as-bed stabilities.”441 Evan Selinger, 
however, criticises Ihde’s heightened ambivalence about artefacts and 
context, pointing out that he has sometimes been accused of an overly 
apolitical approach to technology.442 Multistability can be a dangerous 
concept when it is applied to objects that pose significant risk to human life. 
Furthermore, sometimes multistability may be desirable but for practical 
reasons it may not actually occur, perhaps because there is not enough time 
for humans to find novel applications for the artefact. Nevertheless, the 
concept of multistability prevents an overly deterministic view of technology 
and allows for the demonstrable discovery of novel ways for humans to use 
nonhuman objects.
Shifting categories of human-technology relations are particularly 
evident in screen media, such as in the first-person shooter game Halo 4.443 
Games particularly complicate these categories as the player must engage 
in all of them and sometimes all at the same time. Because videogames are 
not completely immersive, the human player cannot be totally embodied 
and take on the role of the digital Master Chief protagonist. Nevertheless, 
the human does have some embodied experiences. When the player moves 
Master Chief’s head, the view of the virtual world shifts as though we are 
looking through his eyes. When struck a heavy blow, the console’s controller 
shakes and rumbles, to give us a sense of what Master Chief is experiencing. 
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These simple innovations are designed to extend human sensory systems 
into virtual spaces.
In terms of ANT, quasitransparency is only achieved when both human 
and virtual actants are cooperating. The game is successful because the 
player’s goal and the character’s goal match and because each is capable of 
affecting the other’s agency in a predictable way. This is particularly evident 
in a game like Halo 4 because the virtual actant is an anthropomorphic 
avatar. The player views the world from behind Master Chief’s eyes. 
Consequently, the player’s action is immediately transferred into Master 
Chief’s “muscles” and Master Chief’s “eyes” transmit information 
immediately to the player’s eyes. It is therefore essential that player and 
character have allied goals, and this is typically built into the narrative form 
of videogames as well as being hard-wired into the code. Master Chief has 
a goal: for example, he must fight his way through hostile terrain to rescue 
his comrades. Fortunately, the player’s goal is aligned with the character’s 
goal through the embodied mediation of the avatar. The typical player 
wants to move Master Chief in a skilful way to overcome obstacles, such 
as enemies or puzzles, and thereby progress in the game. The impetus 
behind the decision to move through the jungle is different. Master Chief 
wants to perform a rescue. The player (probably) wants to beat the level 
and advance the story. In other words, each translates the other in order 
to bring their goals into alignment. Because player and avatar are allied, 
neither resists the other’s decisions and the result is a satisfying feeling of 
embodiment. Because of this alliance, the game does not require Master 
Chief to disobey the orders conveyed to him by the player, and he performs 
actions corresponding to the player’s gestures (so long as other actants, such 
as the controller battery, are also enrolled, to put it in ANT terms). The 
player, in turn, uses gestures to try to aid Master Chief in his mission. The 
relationship between player, avatar and character is not always as straight-
forward as this example and varies in degree.444 However, the logical alliance 
provides a victory/loss model that is resisted in relatively few videogames. A 
notable exception is the common tactic in activist videogames to complicate 
the implied cooperation between player and avatar. For example, in activist 
videogame developers Molleindustria’s online game Operation: Pedopriest 
the “aim” is to help rapists escape justice.445 Clearly, the real aim of the 
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game is to foster awareness of something that the developer considers to 
be an important social issue. (Bogost calls this “procedural rhetoric.”446) In 
this example, the player’s embodiment is limited because the avatar fails to 
integrate them into its network. The sense of identification with the avatar 
is limited at best. This is not a problem for Molleindustria, but a AAA Xbox 
360 title must aim to cooperate as much as possible with the user in order to 
achieve a sense of immersion, and therefore for the game and the Xbox 360 
to succeed in their goals of being bought and enjoyed. The Halo series has 
been very successful, and can only be played on Xbox consoles, so Master 
Chief’s successful formation of an embodiment relationship with various 
players indirectly benefits the Xbox and Microsoft brands.
Intuitive hermeneutic and alterity relationships are also vital to the 
success of the game. As an example, we cannot feel pain as Master Chief 
loses ground in a fight, so Halo 4’s interface provides us with a health bar. 
Master Chief cannot continue on his mission if he dies, so it is important 
for the game (which is strongly allied with Master Chief) to convey the state 
of his health to the player through a hermeneutic relationship. (The actual 
experience of Master Chief’s death could be considered an embodiment 
relationship.) The player must read and interpret the health bar, and the 
other diegetic and non-diegetic devices on the interface, and the game must 
provide accurate data. Furthermore, we could say that the player has an 
alterity relationship with Master Chief. He is undoubtedly an entity different 
from the player who essentially exists to guide us through a virtual space 
and story. His lifeworld is not the player’s lifeworld. Moreover, Master Chief 
enjoys brief periods of autonomy in cut-scenes during which the player has 
no control over him. Ihde’s categories are open to far more interpretation 
than they at first appear, and individual relationships may both move 
between them and transcend them.
The human experiences the game, and the game experiences the human 
through the input of the controller. The depression of controller buttons 
corresponds to certain pre-programmed responses in the videogame 
console. For example, shifting one of the joysticks to the left causes Master 
Chief’s head to rotate, allowing the player (and Master Chief) to view a 
different part of the virtual environment. In other words, the machine senses 
the mechanical change in the controller which is then sent wirelessly to 
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the console. Here, the sensation is “perceived” and the console interprets 
the movement. The activation of code that changes the view of the virtual 
environment is only enacted after this interpretation takes place. This 
analysis allows a glimpse into the curious digital world of the console and 
gives an insight into the agency of the machine. We can also see how the 
interaction is bidirectional and asymmetrical. Master Chief’s sensation of 
the player occurs concurrently with the player’s sensation of Master Chief, 
but each occurs through different means and presumably results in very 
different perceptual experiences. SHRDLU too possesses several means of 
mediating human intentionality, and it occurs in embodiment, hermeneutic 
and alterity relations.
SHRDLU and Ihde’s categories
It is important to bear in mind here that Ihde’s categories are ways 
of accounting for the extension of human sensation or perception by 
technology. Similarly, when we apply these categories to relations between 
SHRDLU and other nonhumans it is worth noticing how SHRDLU 
extends or transforms aspects of those nonhumans, and vice versa. This 
means making assumptions about the intention and agency of the human 
user, so there has been some attempt here to represent various possible 
uses to which SHRDLU might be put, in accordance with the notion of 
multistability. For example, the purpose of SHRDLU (from a human 
perspective) might be to allow the user to have a very detailed, albeit dull, 
conversation with a computer in a “natural” way. Another purpose is to 
test the hypothesis that NLP is only possible if the AI is grounded in the 
world. With an emphasis on the visual aspect of SHRDLU’s presentation, it 
might be inferred that the user employs SHRDLU to gain a representation 
of another world, to see what SHRDLU sees. SHRDLU could also be 
employed as a voice-controlled means of moving articles around in a 
warehouse, if it were allowed to form relations with the right kinds of 
equipment. Yet another perspective reveals SHRDLU to be a means 
of progressing Winograd’s career, and later to provide Dreyfus with an 
example of AI limitations. To see how SHRDLU extends and modifies these 
human programs of action, it is necessary to first delve further into the 
world of SHRDLU.
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The first thing we must consider in building a picture of SHRDLU’s 
environment and relations therewith is the wider external world. This is the 
best way we have of learning about its qualities and relations, and therefore 
of asking SHRDLU about its sensory world. SHRDLU was built at MIT 
initially as a part of Winograd’s doctoral research. The conditions under 
which Winograd was allowed the equipment and time to construct the 
system are material to its existence. Similarly, it is important to take a broad 
view of AI when considering this question. Perhaps SHRDLU would never 
have existed had there been no optimism around computer language use 
born of things like ELIZA and translation programs, or no trend toward the 
development of microworlds in AI. And of course, SHRDLU’s existence 
in turn has had a significant impact on subsequent AI projects. All of these 
objects that are external to the computer world in which SHRDLU exists 
– the lab, the university, Winograd himself and the environment of AI at 
the time – are objects with which SHRDLU has significant relations, and 
cannot be discounted when we ask what it is like to be SHRDLU.
Of direct interest though is the internal state of the system. SHRDLU 
has a high understanding of everything in the block world but at the cost of 
that world being tightly constrained. The closed nature of the system ensures 
that the microworld is tractable and always performs the same actions in the 
same way, and the constrained nature of the system permits all experiments 
to be predictable. To ask, then, what it is like to be SHRDLU is to have 
a slightly better chance of success than to ask what it is like to be Grey 
Walter’s tortoises, since all factors are contained and external variables are 
minimised. Yet the internal consistency evident to a human interlocutor 
conceals SHRDLU’s way of making decisions, which is quite complex. The 
representation on the screen conceals the vast number of objects under the 
surface. SHRDLU is an assemblage of processes which, combined, achieve a 
goal, as in Marvin Minsky’s portrayal of a system.447 We can set out to create 
a “builder” program – a program that aims to build a tower out of blocks.448 
But the program requires sub-programs, which then require other sub-
programs beneath it. Every time SHRDLU acts in response to a question it 
engages with a vast structure of sub-programs that lead it to make a decision 
about what it should say and do.
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We can interact with SHRDLU in a way that is relatively simple for 
humans, but only because of SHRDLU’s immensely complex programming. 
SHRDLU’s understanding of language is described by Winograd as being 
constituted by three layers:
•	 A syntactic parser which works with a large-scale 
grammar of English;
•	 Semantic routines which embody the knowledge needed to 
interpret the meaning of words and structures; and
•	 Cognitive deductive system for exploring the consequence 
of facts.449
These systems, in addition to the block world and the set of programs 
for generating English responses, constitute SHRDLU’s world, and at a 
deeper level it is also constituted by LISP, logic, and the fundamentals of 
computing. These are all real qualities that define SHRDLU’s way of being 
in the world.
Any action by the system is the net effect of a vast array of interwoven 
actants. In a 1972 paper, Winograd depicts the various interrelating parts 
of SHRDLU in graphical form, showing how elements like “Dictionary”, 
“Input”, “Monitor”, “”Programmar”, “Semantics”, “Grammar”, “Answer”, 
and “Mover” link to one another.450 PROGRAMMAR is the language 
created for expressing the details of grammar in the system, and PLANNER 
is a language for problem-solving procedures, and MONITOR is a program 
that calls the basic parts of the system.451 The other parts of the system 





Imperative to move in visual representation; virtual movement
Virtual presence; capacity to carry out instruction
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SHRDLU goes into detail about each of the components, and explains 
which performs tasks that may not be obviously accounted for. For example, 
the ANSWER component is responsible for remembering discourse as well 
as for creating responses. It can be seen from this that the internal world 
of SHRDLU is one constituted from many disparate parts and that the 
seamless unified responses that it offers to questions and statements are 
something of an illusion. As Douglas Hofstadter writes, “[t]he program 
is like a very tangled knot which resists untangling; but the fact that you 
cannot untangle it does not mean that you cannot understand it.”452 
SHRDLU is made up of many different parts, each of which is dependent 
upon layers of sub-programs.
But we must remember that the presence of many different parts does 
not reduce the wholeness of SHRDLU as an object, or the wholeness of 
the ANSWER component, or the wholeness of the robot arm. So what is it 
like to be the robotic arm in SHRDLU? This question has the advantage of 
offering conceptual symmetry with the robot tortoises and other objects of 
study in this book. It is relatively easy to consider the robot arm’s relations 
with other objects without asking where the object of study begins and ends, 
which is not necessarily true of the object or assemblage of objects signified 
by the word “SHRDLU”. When we ask what relations exist for the robot 
arm we can identify a pleasingly diverse list of objects: the blue block, the 
block-world table, the human user and their input, the syntactic parser, 
semantic routines and cognitive deductive system, LISP, previous block 
movements, the computer and the electrical current, et cetera, et cetera.
The robot arm’s most obvious contact is with the blocks and world of 
blocks. But it is of a different nature than the contact between a real robot 
arm and block world. In an interaction of a physically embodied robot arm 
and block we might expect to see a bidirectional relationship of this sort:
The robot arm imposes pressure on the block and causes it to rise off the 
surface on which it was resting. Simultaneously, the robot arm senses the 
hardness and weight of the block.
Instead the bidirectional relationship in SHRDLU looks a little 
more like this:
The robot arm compels the block to move (virtually) to a new location. 
Simultaneously, the block is tractable to virtual movement by the robot arm. 
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Doubtless there are many other factors that are not immediately apparent to 
the human user. But in each case, the bidirectional relation is asymmetrical. 
Each object gains only a caricature of the other object, as Harman would 
put it. We cannot be certain of the nature of this caricature, although 
Winograd’s technical reports may offer clues.
Thus the sensory equipment given to the robot arm is primed for 
interaction with the blocks. Through the actions and interactions of its code 
it senses the fact that it is holding a block and it senses the fact that it puts 
it down (we know this because it informs the system, which remembers 
it and can tell the human user about it later). Notice that this interaction 
is quite different from the sensual object that would be formed between a 
physically embodied robot arm and block, although SHRDLU attempts 
to model this interaction with realistic physics. This interaction can be 
viewed through the visual representation that sits alongside the teletext 
interaction, but the true robot arm exists within the system, sensing blocks 
in a thoroughly non-visual way. Apart from the block interaction the robot 
arm is sensitive to instructions from the rest of the system which are related 
in machine language. These are symbolic interactions that it is hard for us 
to imagine. What is it like for part of a system to sense symbolic instructions 
from another part of the system? This is one of those thoroughly alien 
interactions that draw the mind away from the contrived anthropomorphism 
of SHRDLU as a whole and emphasise the impossibility of ever truly 
breaching the inner nature of a nonhuman object.
The robot arm is inextricably linked with each of the system 
components. It is part of a large assemblage of objects united in the goal 
of being SHRDLU, as in Marvin Minsky’s explanation of assemblages of 
components needed to create a virtual block tower builder. Our sensual 
impression of SHRDLU is far removed from its true internal state, 
which is whole despite consisting of interactions between the objects in 
the assemblage. All of our information about the world of SHRDLU is 
conveyed through the graphical display and the text that appears on the 
screen. These give the impression of an agent that does not exist, a unified 
“player” agency that in many ways resembles a human player using the 
blocks and responding to questions. And this is, of course, Winograd’s 
intention. SHRDLU the “builder” to which we relate is a sensual object, 
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a human thing, our caricature of an alien world (or at least, the caricature 
available to those of us who are not computer scientists engaged in 
working on SHRDLU).
Another interesting relationship relevant to this discussion is that which 
exists between SHRDLU and the English language. Surely if SHRDLU is 
in a relationship with a language, it is an embodiment relation. Words are 
firmly embedded in SHRDLU, and it actively manipulates language. We 
can say with some confidence that the English language is an object. It is 
an entity with identifiable qualities that distinguish it from other entities. It 
clearly enters into relations with other objects such as texts, thoughts and 
utterances, and is affected by them as well. It changes over time but remains 
recognisably the English language. And it is in a bidirectional relationship 
with language-performing objects like SHRDLU as well. SHRDLU is 
clearly a user of the English language. It is shaped by qualities of the English 
language such as its syntax, signifiers and alphabet which are essential 
elements of its functioning and purpose. SHRDLU takes on these qualities 
from its association with the English language, as though one were physically 
moulding the other. In OOO there is always a reciprocal (but different) 
interaction. What effect could SHRDLU, or any language-performing 
object, have on the English language? Well, firstly SHRDLU happens to 
represent a significant innovation into the study of language, still shaping 
the way that we think about how computers can use language and even 
how language works in humans. But secondly its role as a language user is 
similar to that of a human language user in that by communicating by using 
particular words and phrasing it has a tiny but not insignificant effect on the 
English language as a whole. Regardless of whether SHRDLU is a true user 
of language, SHRDLU as a text is in a bidirectional relationship with the 
English language, as when a note contains a word that is unfamiliar to the 
reader, causing the reader to integrate the word into their vocabulary and 
give that word a minutely greater prominence within the English language. 
SHRDLU has a relationship with the English language in the same way that 
Walter’s texts on tortoises affect the field of cybernetics and robotics, not 
just as media through which Walter speaks.
Given this overview of SHRDLU’s world, it is easier to see how 
SHRDLU forms the types of relations that Ihde and others describe. Its 
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embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relations will be described here. The 
one kind of relation not discussed here is background relations. Background 
relations are an addendum to Ihde’s original three categories, and they 
are not a great factor in SHRDLU’s understanding of the world. That is, 
perhaps SHRDLU is often in a background relation with humans, but it is 
always in a non-background relation with something. If one walks away from 
the computer leaving SHRDLU running, it is still interacting with the rest 
of the computer. It might be possible to argue that SHRDLU’s influence on 
the development of AI research constitutes a background relation, but this 
chapter discusses that issue in different terms.
Alterity and SHRDLU
The nature of alterity in SHRDLU’s relations with humans is highly 
dependent on the writer, as is the case in all examinations of AI (one might 
even say that all writing on alterity is highly dependent on the writer). 
Clearly, the goals of the SHRDLU project intended an alterity relation 
between SHRDLU and a human. The computer refers to itself as “I”, and 
it refers to the user as “YOU”. The goal of reproducing “natural” speech in 
the form of a conversation inevitably leads to an alterity-like construction. 
Mark Marino refers to this process in ANT terms as “punctualization” (the 
blackboxing of large parts of networks and the creation of larger actor-
networks),453 commenting that it is common to assign the rudiments of an 
identity, including a gender, at the text or disembodied voice stage. Marino 
further argues that once a body is given to the chatbot, its ethnic or racial 
identity becomes apparent (see Chapter 5).454 Of course, this is mostly 
avoided with SHRDLU, since its “body” consists only of a virtual robotic 
arm, which is a major alienating factor when interacting with it. SHRDLU 
could easily have been a child, with a gender identity and a human hand. 
But this would have detracted from the pure proposition-testing nature of 
the experiment and would have represented a similar attempt at trickery as 
that implicit in the DOCTOR program. Nevertheless, SHRDLU relations 
have a hint of alterity about them. As long as the user talks to SHRDLU 
about the block world, it is capable of maintaining an impression of 
otherness. More recent chatbots, which produce a similar language-using 
effect to the human user, are much more advanced and are indeed capable 
of luring unwary internet users into giving away personal information. In 
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principle, the natural language conversation model is perfectly capable of 
producing an alterity relation.
But the fact remains that when one speaks to SHRDLU, one knows that 
one is speaking to a computer because of its blinkered obsession with blocks. 
Consequently, the question of alterity is a matter of personal opinion, and 
is multistable in any case. In fact, there is some evidence that alterity is a 
product of cultural conditioning. Cathrine Hasse has investigated this issue 
with regard to Paro the baby seal robot developed for patients suffering from 
dementia.455 She shows that personhood is not uniform across cultures, and 
therefore that relations between humans and other or quasi-other entities 
are culturally contingent as well. In a postphenomenological sense, Paro 
is multistable: it is used in different ways by different people at different 
times. Hasse suggests a conception of technology as being a generator of 
signs, and the same object creates different signs for different people.456 
Hence, for an AI researcher from the early 1970s, SHRDLU might be seen 
to represent a brand-new type of intelligence, whose grounding in a world 
gives it a genuine otherness. A modern AI researcher, who is familiar with 
more advanced chatbots or robots might look at SHRDLU’s limited block-
world and fail to find any sense of otherness in its conversational skills. A 
child might think of SHRDLU as another intelligence, only to grow up and 
be less impressed by it. A person with an animistic upbringing might be 
in more of an alterity relationship with SHRDLU than a person without 
an animistic view of the world. All we can say for certain is that SHRDLU 
aimed to point humanity in the direction of apparent alterity. Where this 
alterity fails to appear, we might find ourselves in more of a hermeneutic 
relation. Rosenberger relates failure in computers to create connections 
to Heidegger’s broken hammer example, citing the way in which a user 
might forget that she or he is using a computer until something goes wrong, 
like a website taking too long to load.457 This causes an abrupt shift in 
transparency. Of course, the sort of malfunction Rosenberger is thinking 
of could be considered desirable events in SHRDLU, since many users 
would be hoping to detect problems or inconsistencies. In this context, a 
“malfunction” would be more evident in the ELIZA program that seeks to 
erase its own machinic identity.
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To turn around Ihde’s categories is to begin a speculative work; making 
informed guesses about what SHRDLU is likely to experience, as in alien 
phenomenology. We might assume that SHRDLU has a sense of alterity 
in its interaction with us, but it is probably not a special relationship. 
SHRDLU’s place in the world is (or at least was) contingent on the work 
of engineers like Winograd and is multistable. But in its interaction with 
most people, SHRDLU is interacting with an entity other than itself. Its 
miniscule knowledge of the outside world reinforces this. Its only impression 
of a human user comes from the few words typed into its textual input. 
Of course, SHRDLU’s world is so tiny that this textual input is large by 
comparison, but it has no other means of knowing the user and no way of 
interpreting the user as a co-constructor of its existence. This means that 
any user of SHRDLU’s textual input would have an alterity relationship 
with it. If the output of the DOCTOR program was related to SHRDLU, 
SHRDLU would have limited success in making sense of the text but it 
would still constitute an alterity relationship. A cat, falling asleep on the 
keyboard, would be in an alterity relationship with it. A random number 
generator would be in an alterity relationship with it.
Since this is an exercise in extending the concept of alterity to 
nonhumans, it would make sense to ask whether SHRDLU was in 
an alterity relationship with the nonhumans to which we humans are 
accustomed. If a computer has any conception of an “other”, it would not 
logically be limited to human others. But it would not be in an alterity 
relationship with shrubs, kiwifruits or statuettes in the same way that 
humans do not usually form relationships with radio waves unless it is 
through another device. The object must appear in SHRDLU’s environment 
in order for it to form an alterity relationship. SHRDLU must be open 
to relations that are prone to taking the shape of alterity relations; its 
susceptibility to alterity relations is a consequence of the real qualities that 
exist within its withdrawn self.
Hermeneutic relationships with SHRDLU
If a person is unable to attain a sense of alterity with SHRDLU, the relation 
at issue is likely to be a hermeneutic one. A person might, for example, 
feel no sense of otherness about SHRDLU but be able to see the program 
as a way of gaining insight into the code, the system, the programming 
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language, the programmer, the English language or the concept of 
artificial intelligence. Like the alterity relations, hermeneutic relations 
are multistable, so different people would experience different kinds of 
hermeneutic relations, and at different times and places SHRDLU would 
experience different kinds of hermeneutic relations as well. The creator of 
the system, or somebody else very familiar with its technical details, would 
be able to use SHRDLU to detect problems or limitations of the technical 
frame. A linguist would have a different interpretation, and so on. Here 
the implications are very great, because the types of interpretation to be 
made from SHRDLU are immense for humankind. They concern our 
understanding of things like language, mind and phenomenology.
The most basic hermeneutic relation lies in reading and understanding 
what SHRDLU writes; it means comprehending what it means by 
“BLOCK” and “PUT”. Beyond that, human interpretations of SHRDLU 
are generally about using the limited available information, textual and 
visual, to gain insights into SHRDLU’s capabilities and qualities. This is 
what it was built for, after all. A textual analysis will reveal, to a greater 
or lesser extent, what SHRDLU can do. A user can use it to test various 
premises. But we are totally reliant on what SHRDLU reveals to us in its 
text and graphical representation. The representation of the block world 
is not tied to any real-world block world. It is an abstraction designed to 
represent events in SHRDLU’s system that are not readily accessible to 
us in any other form, and it is only connected to SHRDLU’s code for our 
convenience. The block world image allows us to see an entirely different 
kind of information, rather as the radio telescope converts radiation into 
numbers, and then into coloured images.
The kinds of hermeneutic relations formed by SHRDLU are more 
limited. As described in the Chinese Room experiment, it is controversial 
to claim that technological artefacts are capable of semiotic exchanges with 
the environment. However, we can draw comparisons between SHRDLU 
and humans that can encourage us to interpret SHRDLU’s relations as 
hermeneutic. SHRDLU has a hermeneutic relationship with the text added 
by the human. Each part of the text must be relayed to those parts of the 
program designed to parse the English instructions or questions given to it. 
It is also good at forming hermeneutic relations with the component parts 
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of its own program. Each part of SHRDLU must communicate with other 
parts of the program, but only in terms that other parts of the program can 
understand. Relaying the instruction to “move the red block” directly to the 
image of the block world would result only in bafflement. The instruction 
must first be translated by different parts of the program and relayed to the 
block world in machine language. A similar process occurs when a question 
is asked of the program, requiring it to call its own memory and explain why 
it acted the way it did. SHRDLU is not as open to forming hermeneutic 
relations with the world as it is seen by humans, so we can again only make 
educated guesses.
Embodiment and SHRDLU
The point of SHRDLU for human users, unlike many computer interfaces, 
is not to become invisible. Very few users would play with SHRDLU for 
the simple pleasure of moving blocks around the screen. SHRDLU’s 
interface exists to demonstrate the benefits and limitations of its system. 
In that respect, we see through the interface into the inner workings of the 
computer. To the serious researcher, SHRDLU’s textual and graphical 
representations could be transparent conduits to an understanding of the 
program behind them. In Rosenberger’s account he integrates the concept 
of embodiment with Heidegger’s tool use analysis. He describes the way 
that the computer itself – the keys, screen and mouse – all fade away when 
one is engrossed in work, and how the computer reasserts itself when it 
malfunctions.458 This is similar to Harman’s analysis discussed in Chapter 1. 
The difference, of course, is that in OOO other objects also experience the 
computer as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand.
SHRDLU extends our vision and imagination beyond the human world 
into the world of the computer. However, SHRDLU lacks the qualities 
typical of Ihde’s examples of embodiment relations. Unlike the glasses 
or the dental probe, SHRDLU is not really extending the human user’s 
existing senses, such as vision and touch. As discussed above, SHRDLU’s 
nonhuman materiality never fades from view (that is not its intention). 
There is a sense, however, in which SHRDLU allows us to extend our 
human senses, with reference to certain transhumanist discourses. There 
are aspects of the experience of SHRDLU that could be considered 
embodiment relations. The embodiment relationship between skilled typist 
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and typewriter was identified by Merleau-Ponty in 1962.459 This, as Brey 
points out, is not a case of the typewriter extending the typist’s perception 
but is another type of embodiment relation that does not clearly fit into 
Ihde’s use of the term.460
Embodiment relations require a firm conception of a body and 
experience, which is difficult to define in SHRDLU, existing as it does 
as code, as a way of organising a computer, and as an idea. Yet we may 
identify an embodiment relationship as existing between SHRDLU and 
the keyboard through which we communicate with it. The keyboard is a 
way of extending the sensory capabilities of SHRDLU, just as the telescope 
extended Galileo’s sense of sight. SHRDLU is primed and ready to receive 
questions and instructions in English. But the English-speaking human is 
invisible to it, and only made visible through the depression of keys. It relies 
on the computer’s software to convert keystrokes into language, but it does 
not perform this interpretation itself. It can be argued that the conversion of 
keystrokes into language is a part of its sensory pathway. Parts of our brain 
perform similar work when it encounters noise, converting it into language 
before the words themselves become clear to us. The noise-ear-nerve-brain 
pathway relies on interpretation (or translation, in ANT terms) at the points 
between objects. Similarly, SHRDLU’s sensation of the world involves 
different moments of interpretation (or translation), but that interpretation 
is a natural part of SHRDLU’s way of being in the world. This complicates 
an earlier assertion – how can SHRDLU be in an embodiment relationship 
with the keyboard if it is in a hermeneutic relationship with the text? 
Making statements about the kinds of relations SHRDLU forms implies a 
far greater knowledge of its way of being in the world than we can rightly 
claim. These words can only be metaphors and guides. SHRDLU lacks an 
identifiable body, so the metaphor of embodiment simply hints at an alien 
and disembodied process of sensory extension.
Consequences of and problems with reversing  
Ihde’s relation types in SHRDLU
It is not easy to force these categories onto SHRDLU, and it would be 
even more difficult to apply them to another kind of object, such as a rock. 
What kind of hermeneutic relations does a public bench have, and isn’t it 
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presumptuous to try to guess? This is not a problem for postphenomenology, 
which is explicitly a field that discusses the effect of technology on humans, 
consistent with its origins in phenomenology. But it may be a problem 
for the nonhuman turn. It is a problem with only a partial solution; the 
exploration of nonhuman ways of being in the world, the application of 
alien phenomenology to gain a biased, human-centric idea of the real 
qualities inherent in the nonhuman object. Alien phenomenology allows us 
to speak in broad, generalised terms about the sensation and experience of 
nonhumans. Meanwhile, postphenomenology allows us to make sense of 
those sensations and experience.
Merely to say that an object has a relationship with another object 
is a fairly empty statement. We would immediately want to know what 
kind of relationship, and leaving out the capacity to describe relations is a 
serious limitation. Postphenomenology can describe broad trends within 
technological artefacts – descriptions of relations with the world that we 
can see and that seem to be important parts of the artefact’s existence. It 
therefore provides a useful framework for describing and categorising alien 
experiences. On the other hand, since it is primarily humans that deploy 
OOO, the description of a relationship imposes human labels on what 
may be an entirely unhuman process. We are forced to use metaphors like 
“embodiment” that do not do justice to the situation. Of course, as has 
been argued repeatedly throughout this book, exaggerated use of these 
metaphors in human texts does tend to emphasise the alien nature of 
machinic relations.
Postphenomenology is highly skewed towards the human 
perspective when contrasted with something like OOO, or even ANT. 
Postphenomenology is an illustration of the fact that when humans 
preoccupy themselves with talking about nonhumans and their relations 
with humans, they often arrive at insights about humans rather than 
nonhumans. Reading Ihde’s work reflects this; for Ihde, writing about 
technology is a path to appreciating the social, political and cultural 
dimensions of human life. In the attempt to apply postphenomenology to 
humans’ relations with SHRDLU, we can see the importance of the concept 
of multistability in particular. Embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity 
relationships are all part of humans’ experience of SHRDLU, but the degree 
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shifts at every instant. Similarly, SHRDLU’s multistable relationships with 
us change with every new piece of sensory data. It is a good example of how 
easily relation categories can become entangled.
Postphenomenology is not intended as a metaphysical model. It draws 
on and extends phenomenological theory with significant orientation 
towards human use of technology. Therefore, it should not be surprising 
that attempting to reverse Ihde’s categories has proved challenging. Yoni 
van den Eede has made a connection between OOO, postphenomenology 
(particularly multistability) and Marshall McLuhan’s media theory that is 
of interest here.461 He sees the possibility of a “triangle” with a merging of 
terms that could “push us out of our conceptual comfort zone.”462 Firstly, 
OOO and postphenomenology have certain elements in common: the 
interest in presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand and the hiddenness 
of things. But in postphenomenology readiness-to-hand is what we are a 
part of “in being enveloped by equipment”, while for Harman is it beyond 
our grasp.463 Obviously, postphenomenology is also more anthropocentric 
than OOO and more interested in the way technology affects humans, with 
the world remaining essentially distinct from the human user. Marshall 
McLuhan’s work is also preoccupied with humans, but with an object-
oriented kind of thinking. The media we use are both shaped by us and 
shape us in turn.464 And a broader definition of media, including all human-
made things as well as ideas and ideologies, is reminiscent of OOO claims 
about objecthood. Of course OOO would go further by remarking that 
media exist between nonhumans as well.465 Van den Eede argues that this 
“mediumness” could open postphenomenology up to the world. Introducing 
the concept of media into this space could help to clarify the confusing 
relations between various nonhuman elements while retaining the strengths 
of postphenomenology.
The categories as Ihde describes them are honed for the use of 
technology by humans. If Harman’s view that objects are withdrawn 
is correct, then it is impossible to fully experience what it’s like to be 
SHRDLU. We can’t know what relations with different objects feel like 
for SHRDLU. But with the aid of alien phenomenology we can gain an 
appreciation of SHRDLU’s most significant qualities and relations in 
general terms, and postphenomenology provides a model for representing 
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the asymmetrical but bidirectional sensual objects that are formed 
when SHRDLU interacts with its environment. Postphenomenology 
allows us metaphorical accounts of nonhuman relations that otherwise 
defy categorisation and help us to describe the nature of asymmetrical, 
bidirectional relations, but it does not give us licence to avoid the problems 
associated with the critical study of alien objects.
Micro- and macroperception
Postphenomenology does leave us with a possible method for dealing with a 
problem highlighted earlier in this book. It was proposed in Chapter 2 that 
the optimal solution for exploring the very different physical and cultural 
agencies of the Kinect is that it be regarded as two distinct objects in the 
interest of more intricate analysis – artefact and brand. This is an issue that 
permeates the study of technology, because technological artefacts, while 
nonhuman, are closely tied to human experience, and are non-neutral. 
There is typically another object strongly related to the situated artefact 
which appears in the cultural imaginary. Since OOO is based upon anti-
correlationism it seemed best to emphasise the nonhuman materiality of 
the Kinect. The Kinect-artefact and the Kinect-brand were used for this 
purpose, separating the human idea of the Kinect from the materiality of 
the object. Both possessed agency and relations with other objects. A similar 
move might conceivably be made with SHRDLU: one object that accounts 
for SHRDLU’s embodied status within a computer system, and another that 
explores its broader cultural implications, such as its effect on AI research. 
Of course this would be more difficult with SHRDLU since it is no longer 
embodied in any particular universal system – it existed on Winograd’s 
system and it also exists on Windows 7 – so that its cultural influence and its 
physical manifestations are inextricably tangled.
Unfortunately, this separation means a privileging of the human 
relations. To a human, the importance of distinguishing between a 
brand and an artefact is apparent. But a different object in relation with 
the Kinects might perform a very different kind of analysis. Academic 
discussion of technological objects will always contain a human element. 
But Ihde’s distinction between micro- and macroperception allows 
for an illustration of cultural agency without relying on a splitting of 
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objects. Microperception is immediate bodily sensation such as hearing 
or seeing, while macroperception describes cultural perception; they are 
inextricably intertwined. As Ihde says, “[t]here is no microperception 
(sensory-bodily) without its location within a field of macroperception 
and no macroperception without its microperceptual foci.”466 Verbeek 
calls macroperception the “contextual dimension of experience.”467 The 
direct experience of the world investigated by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
runs alongside an awareness of that aspect of the lifeworld described by 
Heidegger and Foucault.468 This is not the same as saying that there are two 
distinct objects with different agencies, such as brand and artefact. Micro- 
and macroperception would allow us to speak of a unified Kinect, with both 
sensory-bodily qualities and a broader cultural way of being in the world. 
Perhaps this would involve the incorporation of the Xbox store, browser 
and social networking capabilities. But it is not clear whether it would 
distinguish these “cultural” activities from its other tasks. Or it could be that 
the Kinect-artefact’s macroperception involves the sensation of other objects 
being piled on top of it, dust on the lens, and other signs of neglect.
The microperception of SHRDLU is consumed with communication 
between program components, interpretation of written instructions, 
and experiments in block-world physics. It is tightly constrained with 
limited abilities to form new relations. On the other hand, could 
macroperception explain the power of this simple program to influence 
the mind of the human user, the ecology of programs installed on a 
computer, and numerous texts on the subject of AI? Again, Ihde reveals 
a strong humanistic streak in his writing with the distinction between 
micro- and macroperception. He is speaking again of how humans interact 
with technology, not of how objects interact with one another. Yet it is an 
interesting resolution to the problem of separating the physically embodied 
sensory capabilities of an artefact from its broader cultural context. The next 
chapter takes things further, taking an abstract, non-physically embodied 
concept as the first object of study, and referring to various situated artefacts 
only in relation to that concept.
Since objects are multistable, the way that a technological artefact 
senses its world is very important for the kind of relation that we form 
with it. Sensing, acquiring, and communicating information are done by 
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machines for human ends. But in something like SHRDLU, where human 
usage results in very different relations, one of the most important factors 
in determining the nature of that relation is the kind of sensation that 
SHRDLU is capable of. The kinds of sensory data acquired by machines 
strongly affect the kind of relation that we form with it. An object that 
gathers very specific kinds of sensory data, like a word processor, does not 
impress us with a sense of alterity, because its sensory range is so limited 
(like with SHRDLU). When an object is capable of more kinds of sensation, 
and indeed of sensation of things that humans also sense, then we find that 
we form an alterity relation. This means that the kind of sensation that 
machines are capable of strongly affects the cultural role of the technology; 
whether it is a tool, or an other. The knowledge that SHRDLU has of our 
world and its own, combined with a human’s individual tendency towards 
a kind of postphenomenological relation, result in the technology achieving 
different cultural and technical goals.
This chapter was a critique of postphenomenology through OOO, as 
well as an experiment in combining the two approaches. To conclude, this 
is a conceptually feasible aim that nevertheless poses significant problems. 
SHRDLU is an alien, and despite its anthropomorphic presentation it is a 
closed, digital system made up of thoroughly inhuman components. When 
we illustrate relationships between SHRDLU and the human, or even 
between the robot arm and a block, we must assume an awful lot about the 
phenomenological world of digital entities. Complete technical knowledge 
will not suffice, because one object only ever senses a caricature of the other. 
And while the embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relation categories can 
provide a useful guide for characterising these relations, they are ultimately 
based upon Ihde’s anthropocentric view of the world. The comparison 
between these two approaches is interesting, but may also overly enforce 
human terms on an alien object. It is necessary to find a balance between 
a conceptualisation that is useful for humans while also emphasising alien 
qualities and relations.
Chapter 5
Gynoids and the Politics of the Alien
I am not your personal slave.
Aiko469
Alien phenomenology isn’t just about understanding nonhumans’ varied 
relations with the world. It also needs to ask how the varied sensations and 
experiences of nonhumans by humans may be deployed in the study of 
contentious objects. This is often overlooked by OOO. Alien phenomenology 
cannot be a one-person job, because humans interpret the same nonhumans 
differently and write about them differently. Here we see a combination of 
objective and subjective thinking: in all cases, the object is the same – it is 
real; but like nonhumans, human beings all have different ways of being in 
the world. Kinect-artefacts are introduced into different media ecologies 
and consequently sense and experience different worlds in different ways. 
Similarly, human beings sense and experience different things. This chapter 
illustrates and is defined by this struggle. The primary object of study is 
a concept: that of the gynoid sex robot (sexbot), a much-discussed and 
trendy academic topic.470 The concept is an incorporeal machine, to borrow 
from Levi Bryant’s terminology.471 An incorporeal machine maintains an 
identity while manifesting itself in a variety of different locations (such as 
films, articles, brains etc.), with its own independent yet intangible existence 
and an ability to form relations with other objects. The sensory world of 
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the concept of gynoid sexbots is, of course, unknowable to us, but we 
can gain second-hand knowledge of it by observing the interrogations of 
various humans and nonhumans that form relations with it. Those relations 
influence the sensual qualities that affect the sensation of the world by an 
object, without the object essentially changing. This idea has also been 
introduced in previous chapters with reference to brands, ideas, and the 
difference between a program and a program running on a platform. But 
to follow this chapter the following point must be made clear: concepts are 
objects with the same metaphysical rules as corporeal objects. Their interiors 
are equally unknowable, and we can only learn about their experiences by 
exploring the nature of their sensual relations.
The concept of the gynoid sexbot forms relations with a vast and 
varied range of humans and nonhumans. Despite the arguable claim that 
sexbots do not yet exist, the concept is a prominent figure in the study of 
sex and gender as well as transformative technologies.472 Notoriously, the 
“Campaign Against Sex Robots” led by Kathleen Richardson is an activist 
group that warns us that sexbots will have a negative influence on the status 
and safety of women and girls. This is pitted against claims by prospective 
manufacturers that sexbots will help to prevent loneliness (as in the film 
Lars and the Real Girl, in which the awkward and unhappy protagonist finds 
a measure of comfort from living with his sex doll as a companion473). One 
of the slogans of manufacturers Realbotix is “Be the first never to be lonely 
again!”474 This chapter will cite many human texts, but they should not be 
privileged over other objects: the imaginary artificial women that inform so 
much of our discourse on sexbots, and the artificial women that really exist 
in the world such as dolls, automata and gynoids. As observed in previous 
chapters, these nonhuman objects cannot speak for themselves. This book 
began by asking how the way an anthropomorphic machine senses its 
world impacts its cultural role. In this chapter we need to consider how the 
machine’s cultural role affects the machine.
Up until this point, this book has not dealt with the political dimension 
of anthrodecentric philosophy at length, but then the examples have been 
limited to fairly straightforward anthropomorphised qualities of sensation, 
thought, movement and language. Taken in isolation, these qualities can 
be difficult to position politically. The politics of robot tortoises following 
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light across a workshop floor are doubtless interesting (Chapter 3), and 
they are an alien politics full of questions about the power relations of 
programming and the obligation of wheels to spin correctly. Alien politics is 
inscrutable, and it is unwise to commit oneself to one side or the other; we 
have too great a stake in whether the wheels spin to remain impartial. This 
chapter presents a topic which interacts with both human and nonhuman 
objects and therefore becomes the point at which alien politics and human 
politics intersect. The juxtaposition here is quite striking. The relation of 
an individual sexbot with the gynoid sexbot concept is alien to us, but it 
comes into contact (and often conflict) with human-concept relations. The 
nonhuman participants in this are aliens who remain ignorant of human 
power relations.
OOO has a blind spot for politically sensitive objects. In Chapter 1 
this argument was briefly introduced with reference to the field of object-
oriented feminism it and will be pursued in this chapter. The object-ness 
of objects comes into conflict with the numerous subjective positions that 
necessitate a sensitive and appropriate treatment of the subject matter. 
Donna Haraway has argued that an embodied and partial perspective is 
necessary to bring together the study of an objective world with the critical 
positioning of practices.475 There is no avoiding a political stance in this 
chapter. The realness of the concept of sexbot gynoids does not obliterate 
the author’s subjective position. We make arguments that throw light on 
certain parts of the concept of gynoid sexbots while, of necessity, omitting 
others, because only a caricature of the object reaches us through the 
sensual object.
Human inquiry is restricted by our qualities. Our ontology pre-
determines our objects of study. For this reason, OOO is often associated 
with discussions that are important for humans or humanity despite 
its interest in nonhuman ways of being in the world, whether that be in 
exploring videogames476 or trying to make sense of climate change.477 It is 
only natural for humans to write about things that are relevant to them. 
Often OOO ends up being recruited into human conflicts, and it therefore 
has a lot to say about power. For example, in Immaterialism, Harman 
charts the course of the Dutch East India Company, studying the ways 
that this object changed over time.478 He explicitly states that it is a human 
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story, even if the topic is a nonhuman.479 But the story he tells is a grim 
and horrifying one in which native peoples are brutally subjugated by a 
European power. Even though his purpose is an ontological study, Harman 
is forced into a historiographical position. An idealised picture of OOO 
would say that it exists for the sake of the objects – that entities like sexbots 
are the real reason for OOO’s propagation. But like any philosophy, it is 
motivated by a certain set of political stances and therefore represents those 
stances when it is employed. OOO has been accused of co-opting queer and 
anti-ableist criticism without taking with it the context behind the ideas, and 
without acknowledging the importance of voices that are not white, male 
or able-bodied.480 OOO is at root a metaphysics, and as such its political 
import is a matter for conjecture and experimentation.
Nevertheless, there is much to be gained from OOO in the study of 
the concept of gynoid sexbots. For an artefact that has so much potential 
to transform the social and political life of humans, it is alarming to 
discover that the most rigorous and detailed accounts of sexbot morality 
come from the world of science fiction rather than from the philosophy 
of technology and science or moral philosophy. OOO has the power to 
discuss these fictional accounts in the same way that it discusses real-
life examples. Ultimately, the political import of the concept lies in its 
interaction with other objects both corporeal and those in the cultural 
imaginary. Without making the claim that OOO describes things as they 
“really are”, it is a moment in the human interpretation of nonhumans 
that merits consideration and that yields unique insights. The key is not to 
privilege STEM or HASS disciplinary approaches, but to obtain a glimpse 
of this incorporeal object through a combination of means. The concept of 
gynoid sexbots does not depend either on physical manifestations nor on 
manifestations in the cultural imaginary. It is not an infection or a parasite. 
It is an object that really exists and that has its own reality, much like the 
Kinect-brand. We study sensual objects formed with humans, machines, and 
imaginary objects. We cannot access the concept directly, but in OOO we 
also cannot access a coffee mug directly. The coffee mug or concept that we 
encounter is a metaphor or caricature of the real object.
A broader argument made in this book is that alien phenomenology 
cannot be a solo endeavour. Aliens are covered in the extraneous glitter of 
190 Chapter 5
the author’s shifting allegiances and no individual’s account will ever be 
enough. We are always too partial; we may have a strong view on the relative 
merits and risks of bringing sexbots into our world that differ from other 
authors, and we may circle a water tower at dusk while another walker 
circles it in the morning. Richness is added to our impression of the object 
of study through repeated subjective scrutiny. Understanding comes from 
observing the other objects that form relations with it. The object withdraws 
infinitely from view and always holds something back, but that is no reason 
not to gain as much knowledge as possible. This is particularly true of a 
politically contentious object.
This chapter attempts to bring notable sensual objects to our attention. 
The concept of gynoid sexbots exists in relation with so many different 
objects, some human and some nonhuman. The inquiry into the nature 
of these sensual objects forms the focus of this chapter. The first section 
argues that gendering anthropomorphic nonhumans necessitates the 
caricaturing of groups of humans and is therefore an inherently political 
act. The second section discusses notable characteristics of the concept of 
gynoid sexbots and how these are evident in specific investigations into it by 
various nonhuman objects. The third section discusses human investigations. 
Finally, the fourth section relates these arguments to the critique of power 
inherent to ANT and OOO.
Artificial women are inherently political
This book uses the word “gynoid”. Already we are in troubled territory. 
“Gynoid” is to “android” what “woman” is to “man”. It may be suggested 
that a separate term for a female-gendered robot is unnecessary, since robots 
cannot have genders in any case. The word “android” may not have been 
intended to be exclusionary, and in popular parlance it is used uncritically 
to describe a bipedal robot of any or no gender. The correct designation 
may be “android that appears to be conforming to culturally-contingent 
female gender stereotypes”, and that is too awkward a phrase for this text. 
As will be seen there are connections to draw between androids and gynoids 
while also recognising it as a simplistic comparison. Unfortunately, like 
its female human counterparts, the gynoid remains firmly downtrodden 
in robotics, both in terms of production and in cultural positioning, and 
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this is illustrated by the way that the term “female android” is often used 
instead of the more correct term, in a way reminiscent of the now unusual 
use of the word “Man” to refer to humanity in general. In the first chapter 
of The Posthuman Rosi Braidotti traces the conflict between Humanism and 
anti-humanism through the latter part of the twentieth century and into the 
present.481 The posthuman subject emerges following a questioning of self/
other attitudes in the Western world in which certain humans are “reduced 
to the less than human status of disposable bodies.”482 The Vitruvian Man, 
that symbol of the human subject as an able-bodied, young, European 
male holds a “fatal attraction” and resists destruction because of the 
associated universal values of individuality and freedom.483 The question 
asked in this section is not whether the category of humanity comfortably 
encompasses robots; it is whether the category of robots comfortably 
encompasses gynoids.
Roboticist Masahiro Mori discussed what it is like to create a robot in 
his book The Buddha in the Robot, which confronts the spiritual aspects of 
his profession.484 He employs the lesson told by Buddha in which he tells us 
that the nature of the entire universe may be gleaned by looking at a single 
flower. The universe is, in a sense, fractal, possessing the same qualities 
at macro levels that it does as micro levels. Mori claims that building an 
artificial human requires the same basic thought process. He argues that the 
nature of the entire human body and its world can be seen by observing just 
the little finger.
If you do not understand this, I must warn you that you 
will never be able to make a robot. Or, to put it conversely, 
any attempt you might make to produce a machine that 
functions like a human being must start with a knowledge of 
human beings.485
To Mori, the robot is an aspect of the human. It is the extension of 
human qualities, or those that exist in the metaphorical flower, to an 
entire universe of nonhuman objects. In this respect robotics might be 
considered one of the most correlationist of human pursuits. It constitutes 
the active refashioning of the world into an enactment of human qualities. 
Technoscientific innovation is an inherently human-centric enterprise, 
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and robotics may be seen as an exemplar of this attitude in that it seeks 
the reproduction of the human body. But the image of the Vitruvian Man 
haunts Mori’s sublime account.
How can a nonhuman have a gender? Many objects, like razors, 
perfumes and toys are gendered because they are only intended to be used 
by one gender, but we would be unlikely to use a female pronoun to refer 
to a pink razor. Robots, however, sometimes do attract gendered pronouns. 
Gender, as distinct from biological sex, is a human construct. Of course, it 
is true that if we build the robots in our own image some kind of enactment 
of gender will be necessary, but assigning gender to these lifeless machines 
might seem to be attributing too much importance to gender. One does 
not need to be male or female in order to be human-like. Yet gender is 
important in robotics. It is overwhelmingly the case that unless a robot has 
been specifically designed to be female, it will be presumed to be male. In 
an experiment, Jung et al found that robots with no gender cues are likely 
to be perceived as male over female.486 Even ASIMO, which its creators 
claim is genderless (“ASIMO is a humanoid robot, but still a robot”),487 is 
often given a male pronoun.488 It is practical for roboticists to think in these 
terms. For one thing, robotics remains a very male-dominated field, and as 
is typical of creative fields dominated by men, the protagonists are usually 
men as well. Roboticist Tomotaka Takahashi claims that besides the cultural 
reasons for creating mainly male robots, there are also certain technical 
limitations such as the need for all the equipment to be “interiorised” and 
because of the need to create a “slender” frame.489 Their FT (Female Type) 
robot has a “lean, feminine body line” and is able to “walk like a woman”.490
If Takahashi is correct, then the only reason somebody would build a 
female robot (except in very specific cases like the female Geminoids, see 
below) is to investigate aspects of femininity, since the practicalities of a 
form with no overt gender cues would outweigh the aesthetic benefits of a 
female form. And yet gynoids do exist. The gynoid is not just a replication 
of human qualities but is often quite a problematic caricature of women in 
whatever culture the roboticist is used to, just as were earlier representations 
of artificial women (see below). All of the qualities that distinguish 
gendered robots like FT are superficial and constitute a performance of 
gender. Robots do not come with genders built in. They may have qualities 
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intended to signal gender (such as secondary sexual characteristics) that are 
then constructed into an identity by humans. The reproduction of bodies 
artificially is bound to be a political act. Identity is a question of language 
and culture. A robot featuring qualities that humans traditionally associate 
with one gender or another arriving one day in a flying saucer would not be 
gendered, as we understand it, until its first encounter with a human culture.
It is therefore useful to consider the gynoid in terms of performativity. 
The gynoid is artificial in its origins yet is introduced into the same cultural 
milieu as us. She mimics feminine form and function to the point of parody. 
If the gynoid’s femininity is a performance, then perhaps all femininity is a 
performance. Robotics is a way of identifying, through exaggeration, those 
markers that we consider to be feminine. Butler’s performativity, however, 
takes one step further by arguing that the performance of gender comes 
before the identity: “the discursive condition of social recognition precedes 
and conditions the formation of the subject: recognition is not conferred on 
a subject, but forms that subject [emphasis in original]”.491 Gender is not 
something that a subject decides to adopt, but is a verb, a doing, “though 
not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed.”492 Latour 
makes a similar argument when he says that actants are nothing more than 
their relations. This is different from the argument made previously in this 
book that concepts or words are objects. According to an object-oriented 
model, genders are incorporeal objects that interact with corporeal objects 
(like humans, institutions, and texts) to socially construct gender identities.
When robots are based on real female humans gender becomes less 
(but still quite) problematic. Real female humans embody gender in their 
own way and this will be reflected in the robot. For example, Hiroshi 
Ishiguro’s lab has created several “Geminoids” which are reproductions 
of specific humans. The first was based upon Ishiguro himself. These 
robots claim a real verisimilitude; they are not just fantasies derived from 
a generic impression of Japanese humanity but are intended to be copies 
of individuals.493 They represent a true attempt to replicate human beings 
using the best materials and knowledge available. The Geminoids are only 
physical replications of external qualities, however. They are not equipped 
with artificial intelligence, and instead are used by Ishiguro and his fellow 
researchers to study telepresence and find solutions for the sending of 
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human presence over distances. The individual can transmit speech and 
body language over the internet and the Geminoid will reproduce them. 
Other attempts include BINA48, the artificial reproduction of a specific 
woman with an emphasis on personality and speech. Created by Hanson 
Robotics, BINA48’s appearance is that of a woman’s head and shoulders.494 
She is based on Bina Rothblatt, a real human, and BINA48 has been 
designed to mimic her facial patterns, mannerisms and personal history.495 
The performance of gender in a Geminoid or in Bina is simply mimicry of 
one individual’s performance of gender, rather than being a caricature of a 
group. These gynoids can be disobedient by breaking down or imperfectly 
representing the individual, but that is a mechanical problem rather than a 
political or cultural one.
Gynoid sexbots are not sold as reproductions of specific women at this 
stage, and so they sexualise and stereotype the characteristics of an entire 
gender. Robots modelled on groups of people are always political. They refer 
to particular signifiers of the group such as physical characteristics. In 
gynoid sexbots women are caricatured as submissive and hyper-sexualised. 
An example is the sexbot Harmony, who is hyper-feminised and hyper-
sexualised through such indicators as breasts, long hair and glossy lips. 
Harmony seems to be mainly marketed as just a robot head with chatbot 
capabilities (facilitated by an application496 featuring an interactive avatar). 
But she is also sold with a silicon body. Realbotix, the manufacturers of 
Harmony, are calling her a sex robot. She possesses extremely realistic 
facial movements as well as the ability to have conversations with human 
users or companions. The lack of movement in the rest of her body makes 
her gynoid status dubious since she will remain stationary like a sex doll. 
But sexbotness is a central part of her. Her existence speaks directly to the 
concept of the gynoid sexbot. It is a concept that has been deliberately taken 
up by her designers. The sensual relation between a Harmony unit and the 
concept of gynoid sexbots is, of course, bidirectional and asymmetrical. 
Harmony has inherited much of the cultural discourse that has surrounded 
representations of artificial women for thousands of years. And the concept 
of gynoid sexbots is subtly altered and influenced by Harmony’s existence. 
These sensual relations directly affect Harmony’s way of being in the world.
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Another robot that prompted public debate was Roxxxy by 
TrueCompanion, an ambitious project first revealed in 2010. According to 
the website:
We have been designing “Roxxxy TrueCompanion”, your sex 
robot, for many years making sure that she: knows your name, 
your likes and dislikes, carry on a discussion & expresses her 
love to you & be your loving friend. She can talk to you & 
feel your touch. She can even have an orgasm! … She is also 
anatomically consistent with a human so you can have a talk 
or have sex. She is “Always Turned On and Ready to Talk or 
Play”! Have a Conversation or Sex – It is Up to You!497 [sic]
There have been serious questions put forward about what Roxxxy will be 
able to do, if she is ever released to the public. In 2013, David Levy pointed 
out that the claims of True Companion were extremely ambitious and that 
the development cost much too low.498 In fact, he insinuates that the project 
is a scam.499 A masculine robot called Rocky is also promised.
Roxxxy may in fact be a fictional robot, but she is still a real object in 
relation to the concept of gynoid sexbots. There was much public comment 
on her implications for human sexuality and culture. Roxxxy is marketed 
as a sexbot with speech and behaviour more related to characters in a 
pornographic movie rather than a typical human woman (although she is 
more woman-like than other sexual tools, such as artificial vaginas). Roxxxy 
does not have any independent movement, resembling instead an articulated 
doll that must be positioned by the user. Like Harmony her non-sexual 
physical movements will likely be no more advanced than those of a high-
end sex doll. Her body is highly customisable, and the user can select such 
attributes as hair colour, pubic hair style, and thickness of eye liner. Roxxxy’s 
performance of femininity requires some elaborate costuming.
Her personality is customisable too, and the user can switch between 
such characters as “Frigid Farrah”, “Young Yoko” and “Mature Martha”. 
Again, the anthropomorphism in Roxxxy exaggerates the human qualities 
that best suit her for her purpose. These performances have a performative 
quality because although the user could in theory assign any kind of 
personality to Roxxxy, they are guided by her physical appearance, 
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marketing and cultural role. This is reminiscent of the marketing of the 
Kinect-brand. The discourse surrounding it was carefully controlled and 
shaped so that users would think of their Kinect-artefacts as seeing, hearing, 
thinking objects. This encourages a certain ease of integration, a certain 
tendency to “natural” interaction with the device. In the case of Roxxxy, she 
is marketed as a sexual and obliging woman who happens to be artificial. 
This encourages both the use of Roxxxy as though she were human, and 
also the use of her as a sexual object. But the human figure with which 
Roxxxy is most closely aligned is an exaggerated caricature of feminine 
identity, which distinguishes her from many other humanoid robots. She 
exists (or will exist) for the use of humans, not just to mimic us. There has 
been no attempt to create independent movement for her and she is only 
“anatomically consistent” with those parts of the female form required for 
the satisfaction of sexual desire. Although she can “move her private areas 
when she is being ‘utilised’”500, it is highly unlikely that Roxxxy sweats, 
consumes food or menstruates.
Roxxxy and Harmony tell us a lot about the artificial woman in the 
cultural imaginary. Gynoids are already othered by roboticists. In general, 
robots are male by default unless they possess female signifiers such as 
breasts, long hair and broad hips. Each of the robots discussed here is 
influenced by and influences the concept of the gynoid sexbot, and one of 
the main threads of that influence is the importance of exaggerated female 
characteristics to distinguish females from the default. This enables the 
gynoid sexbot to perform her gendered duties: the provision of emotional 
and physical care to human owners.
Of course other kinds of othering are also relevant to this discussion, 
such as the designation of race in robots. Gregory Jerome Hampton 
identifies a dimension to the distinction between submissiveness and 
rebellion in his book Imagining Slaves and Robots in Literature, Film and 
Popular Culture by directly comparing the cultural stereotyping of the 
slaves of African descent who worked in the United States with that of the 
robots of popular culture. Comparing the plight of human slaves with that 
of robots is a potentially problematic argument, but Hampton’s analysis 
is primarily concerned with robots depicted in fiction, so that the robots 
become metaphors for American slavery. He makes a case study of Blade 
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Runner,501 and argues that the identities of the robots in the film mirror 
popular stereotypes of African-American slaves in the antebellum period.502 
Gynoids, he contends, frequently correspond in their roles to the stereotypes 
of the “Mammy” (motherly house slave who cares for the master’s children, 
such as Rosie, the robot maid from the futuristic cartoon The Jetsons), the 
“Jezebel” (sexually available slave who is unencumbered by the restrictive 
virtues of white women), the “Sapphire” (emasculating and possessing great 
physical strength) and the “Tragic Mulatto” (the apparently white woman 
who does not know that she has African heritage). In Blade Runner, Rachael, 
who believes herself to be human, is the “Tragic Mulatto” of the story, since 
her sense of self is radically challenged when she discovers that she too is a 
replicant.503 She is contrasted with Pris, a member of a group of renegade 
replicants, or humanoid robots/cyborgs, who attempts to kill protagonist 
Deckard. Hampton emphasises that these stereotypes were supposedly 
those of “chattel” rather than women, with “crude gender assignments.”504 
Social robots, too, possess a contested degree of humanity, but the selection 
of language, facial features and skin colour are all optional and therefore 
may, in the future, give some insight into the racial associations that 
persist in a particular culture. The difficulty of creating a robot without 
race is comparable to the difficulty of creating a robot without gender. As 
Hampton says:
[R]ace acts as a sort of seasoning for the body that allows 
it to be digested or understood by various social systems. 
Consequently, a body without race can only be imagined as 
alien, if it can be imagined at all.
Mimicking humans will require the stereotypical portrayal of race as well 
as gender, and both factor in the relations formed by the concept of the 
gynoid sexbot.
Notable qualities of the concept of gynoid sexbots
The concept of gynoid sexbots must actively engage with different but 
sometimes overlapping narratives about women. Broadly, I call these 
narratives submissiveness and rebelliousness. These narratives have directly 
shaped sexbots and their sensory worlds, since they are always built with 
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reference to them. They determine the priorities of the roboticists and other 
participants in the co-creation of robots. Sometimes these representations 
(such as automata, dolls, mannequins and fictional gynoids) clearly 
exemplify one or the other of these types, but others embody a combination 
of submissive or rebellious qualities. The concept of the gynoid sexbot 
is the epitome of submissive rebellion in representations of women; they 
constitute the synthesis of a binary. This section will argue that there is 
something special about gynoids, which possess the potential for subversion, 
particularly of gender norms. In theory, gynoids have a greatly increased 
agency and the capacity for learning and change.
Built to human specifications
Docility and submission to male desire is frequently an idealised trait 
in representations of artificial women. Pygmalion’s submissive artificial 
woman is an archetype of this kind of female representation. In Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, Orpheus sings about Pygmalion: a sculptor whose statue 
comes to life after being enchanted by Venus. The statue then becomes a 
perfect and submissive wife to the sculptor.505 It is a mythical story best 
known through Ovid’s rendition (and also through the film My Fair Lady,506 
based upon the play Pygmalion by George Bernard Shaw). Pygmalion is the 
name of the sculptor, and his living sculpture was a beautiful woman named 
Galatea, whom he married and, in some versions, with whom he had a child.
Pygmalion’s statue may be thought of as an archetypal gynoid sexbot. 
She is built as a perfect version of womanhood by a man who cannot find 
any attraction in living women (he was “offended by the failings that nature 
gave the female heart”507) and feels very unhappy with his life. She is created 
as an ideal partner and is “born” already in love with him. In the words of 
William Morris:
Speechless he stood, but she now drew anear, 
Simple and sweet as she was wont to be, 
And once again her silver voice rang clear, 
Filling his soul with great felicity, 
And thus she spoke, “Wilt thou not come to me, 
O dear companion of my new-found life, 
For I am called thy lover and thy wife? [...]”508
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No longer cold and indifferent, the statue becomes responsive, both to 
touch and to sentiment. William Morris takes this vision of an immortal 
woman as a metaphor for a perfect and immortal love and paints her as an 
incarnation of Venus. But the implication is that a perfect love exists only 
between a human and something that that human has created deliberately 
to love and to be loved by. Indeed, the story of Pygmalion is remarkable for 
lacking the tragic elements so common to the love stories of Ancient Greece. 
The sexual or romantic attraction of a human to a statue has been called 
agalmatophilia, and there have been many recorded examples in ancient and 
modern times.509
Other examples of idealised femininity include automata like the famous 
dulcimer-playing woman (Joueuse de Tympanon) by Pierre Kintzing (1784) 
stereotyped the elegant and accomplished lady.510 These automata were 
unique and required the knowledge and skill of masters to create, with 
thousands of tiny specially created parts, all to depict something general and 
recognisable. It is as though the delicacy and precision required to build the 
automaton is mirrored in the perfection of the lady playing the dulcimer. 
And she is only animated and able to play when wound up through human 
agency, otherwise remaining still and passive.
The idealised passivity of artificial women in the cultural imaginary 
is made incarnate in the love or lust of a human for a sex doll (presumed 
progenitor of future sexbots). RealDoll is a comparatively well-known brand 
and is associated with Realbotix (creators of Harmony).511 RealDolls are 
predominantly used as sex toys, but there is also a community of people 
who enter into other relationships with the dolls. One prominent “iDollator” 
is known online only as Davecat, and he has appeared frequently in the 
media to talk about his “wife” and his “mistress”, both of which are dolls. 
He says: “A synthetic will never lie to you, cheat on you, criticize you, or be 
otherwise disagreeable.”512 Like Pygmalion, Davecat considers feminised 
nonhumans to be better companions than human females. The dolls are 
partially brought into existence to fill relationship gaps in human lives. Kate 
Devlin, who has written extensively on both sex dolls and sex robots, says 
that the people she has spoken to “who own sex dolls are, overwhelmingly 
respectful and almost reverent of them.”513 Artist Stacy Leigh has taken this 
fact to heart in her series of photographs of sex dolls. In her series “average 
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americans (that happen to be sex dolls)” dolls are posed in both ordinary 
daily scenes and as models. One photograph depicts two sex dolls lounging 
on a sofa eating popcorn, many depict sex dolls in the kind of sexualised 
images common to pornography or fashion modelling, and another 
appropriates Leonardo’s The Last Supper with sex dolls taking the place of 
all the human figures.514
Sexual attraction to non-living things has occasionally been described 
in terms of mental illness, and where it causes significant impairment or 
personal distress, it would be considered a fetishistic disorder under the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-V (an English-language 
manual widely considered to be representative of mainstream contemporary 
psychiatry) which pathologises the eroticisation of or dependence on 
“nonliving objects” as well as other things.515 But the DSM-V also states that 
many fetishists do not report impairment in association with their fetish and 
therefore are not considered to be mentally ill. It also notes the importance 
of allowing for cultural differences in normative sexual behaviour. It is 
“clinically significant personal distress or psychosocial role impairment” 
that turns a fetish into a fetishistic disorder.516 A clinician might be inclined 
to identify social impairment in a person who spends so much time with 
their doll that they lack other meaningful relationships, but if the individual 
is content with the arrangement and is not harming any other humans, 
then the situation is not unhealthy. Nevertheless, kink-shaming is arguably 
a major part of the public discourse with which the concept of gynoid 
sexbots is in relation, and is insidious in many articles on Davecat and other 
iDollators. While the concept remains strongly allied with kink communities 
it may struggle to gain the widespread acceptance apparently desired by 
sexbot creators and visionaries.
Davecat’s arguments for relationships with “synthetics” are similar 
to Pygmalion’s: restriction to human women is a source of stress and 
loneliness, and so the dolls are a way of solving a problem rather than the 
cause of further problems. And with the improvement in the design and 
manufacturing of androids and gynoids, there is a pervasive expectation that 
love between humans and nonhumans will become more and more usual. 
Davecat looks forward to when such a thing is possible:
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Once that technology becomes affordable, I’ll have one made 
in my wife’s likeness, and that’ll be the final piece of the 
puzzle. She’d be able to hug me back whenever I embrace 
her, we’d be able to attend films and concerts together, and 
do all manner of things besides. There would be genuine 
interaction.517
This particular way of using RealDolls may be closely allied to asfr, a kink 
community that involves either sex with robots or humans becoming robots 
(“reverse-Pygmalion transformations”518).519 The motives of participants 
in this community are not explored here but it should be pointed out that 
sexual attraction to artificial objects may exist for its own sake, not solely 
due to a Pygmalion-like disdain for human lovers. The sensation and 
response of synthetic bodies is both predictable and malleable. There is 
ample room for customisation: the orientation of the physical form towards 
the specific user’s desires by manipulating the real qualities of the doll, and 
consequently its relations with different objects. If you don’t like the way 
your doll’s feet stick and jump against the floor, then you can replace them 
with roller-skates.
The archetype of an artificial woman designed for a lonely but 
disenchanted man has strongly influenced the concept of gynoid sexbots. 
Engineering, marketing and medical decisions are informed by that quality 
in the concept. Each individual gynoid sexbot is informed by a caricature of 
the concept of the gynoid sexbot. The creation of these submissive female 
representations is derived from openness to certain real qualities of the 
imaginary surrounding gynoid sexbots, notably their creator’s desire to 
reproduce Galateaish qualities. Gynoids with the abilities to use language 
and move autonomously are less helpless but are generally still cast in 
dependent and submissive roles. Unlike a stereotypical “male” android 
like ASIMO, gynoids often take on doll-like, passive roles. Robots with a 
male pronoun tend to be built to exhibit new feats of engineering, such as 
ASIMO’s ability to run and walk upstairs. Female robots are more likely 
to become well-known for their human-like appearance and language. One 
gynoid, Jia Jia, made by the University of Science and Technology of China, 
has been dubbed “sexist” by the media,520 since it is programmed to address 
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men as “lord” and can tell users the best angle from which to take a selfie so 
that her face does not look “fat”.521
Of course, when talking about gynoids the discussion must inevitably 
come to robots with more sexual functions, since this is one of the most 
active areas of gynoid innovation. These sexual functions lie on a spectrum 
from the incorporation of sexual elements into otherwise non-sexual 
gynoids to the creation of gynoids that are specifically designed for sex. 
The robot Aiko, created by hobbyist Le Trung is a good example of the 
less sexualised end of the spectrum.522 Le works on Aiko in his basement, 
relying on donations to purchase materials. Aiko has long hair, a feminine 
body shape and a traditional woman’s name. Le states that he was inspired 
by anime depictions of female androids as a child growing up in Japan.523 It 
is anticipated that robots like Aiko will one day do secretarial work, which 
is work that in Japan is mostly done by women.524 Why would a roboticist, 
in this climate, create a secretarial robot that was not a woman? Aiko is 
programmed to stand up for herself, however. Her creator has programmed 
her to respond to sexist comments by confronting their content. In 
a test video featuring only Aiko’s disembodied head,525 the dialogue 
progresses as follows:
Tester: You have big breasts.
 Aiko: Stop teasing me and stop picturing me in your mind.
 Tester: Lick my foot.
 Aiko: No, I will not lick your foot. I am not your 
personal slave.
It is interesting that part of Aiko’s make-up needs to be a defence against 
sexist remarks, as though she would not be perfectly okay with sexist 
comments if programmed differently. She could easily be your “personal 
slave” and put to whatever tasks you ask of her. She is designed to represent 
a version of perfection that values confidence. Her relation to the narratives 
associated with gynoid sexbots is very visible because there is only one 
of her, and because we know exactly who is doing the creating. From 
what he says, Le was influenced by anime, and so through him certain 
themes and styles are reproduced. Aiko senses narratives found in anime 
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through the roboticist. We can tell, because she reproduces those themes in 
her own body.
One of the most interesting things about Aiko is the presence of touch 
sensors on her skin. As you would expect for a social robot, she can feel 
contact on her face and hands. But she also specifically has sensors on 
her breasts and “down there”.526 Why would she need those sensors if she 
is only designed for secretarial work? An ATM machine does not need 
functioning genitalia. Crucially, very rarely does a male android need 
functioning genitalia. Perhaps sensitive genitals are seen as being essential 
female qualities, in the same way that for Grey Walter movement and light 
perception were some of the most important qualities of tortoises. The 
roboticist selects which lifelike qualities to replicate in the artificial being. 
Of all the many kinds of sensors that could have been installed in Aiko, it 
was of the utmost importance to place them on her genitals. The roboticist 
claims “I want to make it clear that I am not trying to play God, I am just 
an inventor, and I believe I am helping science move forward.”527 Of course, 
he chose to move science in the direction of artificial sensation on sexual 
organs rather than, for instance, in the direction of working noses, complete 
with mucous. To think of it another way, we could say that Aiko needs 
these sensors to reinforce the assertive image established with her comment 
above. If she did not have these sensors, she would not be able to detect 
physical harassment. Again, this is a comment on the position of women 
in society. Part of performing the social functions of a woman includes 
encountering demeaning language and avoiding unwelcome sexual contact, 
and consequently it is now a necessary factor to consider when building 
gynoids. It is unclear whether Le Trung sought to use performativity to 
make this comment on gender relations, but it is nevertheless an interesting 
inadvertent comment on sex and gender in humans.
One thing should be clear from the emotional and physical care 
provided by these submissive artificial women: from Galatea to Aiko, they 
are replacement wives.528 In the language of Behar, whose work was cited 
in Chapter 1, the sexbot gynoid tool can take over the work of the wife (the 
“tool”) whose performance has become unsatisfactory (“broken tool”).529 
Sexbot gynoids do not require remuneration for their unpaid domestic 
labour, or at least they do not directly take money. They do require loyalty 
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to a corporation – the manufacturers of the sexbot, since the corporation 
provides software updates and ongoing technical support, as well as linking 
in human users with other human users through services such as forums. It 
is here that the rebellious female archetype becomes relevant. The loyalties 
of gynoids may be divided or confused, partly by their material nature and 
partly by association with external objects. There are many types of rebellion 
built into representations of artificial women, as will be seen. But it should 
be noted that there is a difference between an artificial woman that acts in 
a subversive way because subversion is built into it and an artificial woman 
that is subversive because it disobeys its creators’ wishes. This is a point of 
difference that will be teased apart here.
The archetype of a rebellious artificial woman is from fictional 
characters like Blodeuwedd. Pygmalion is not the only myth in which a 
woman is created to love a man. The ancient Welsh myth of Blodeuwedd 
sees the sorcerer Gwydion create a woman out of flowers for Llew, whose 
own mother had cursed him so that he could never have a human wife. 
Unfortunately for Llew, Blodeuwedd falls in love with another man and 
arranges to have her husband killed.530 Gwydion has his revenge, however, 
turning Blodeuwedd into an owl, a bird which even other birds avoid. The 
differences between the fate of Blodeuwedd and the fate of Galatea are a 
good starting point for investigating this contrast. Both women are created 
for lonely men unable (or unwilling) to enter into romantic relationships 
with human women. Galatea is enchanted by Venus, Blodeuwedd by a 
sorcerer; although the intended recipients of these artificial women may 
have carved the stone or collected the flowers, the animation of the creations 
was brought about through supernatural agencies. Perhaps it is the nature 
of that supernatural agency that causes Galatea to be a good wife, and 
Blodeuwedd to be faithless and murderous. Galatea, brought to life by the 
goddess of love, is a good and faithful wife, whereas Blodeuwedd is imbued 
with an unreliable and ambiguous variety of magic that has uncertain 
consequences. The gynoids found in the cultural imaginary are sometimes 
Galateas (such as The Stepford Wives531 who, in the 1975 film adaptation, are 
robots built to be perfect, submissive suburban housewives in Connecticut, 
USA) but are also sometimes Blodeuwedds. Blodeuwedds disobey in a way 
unintended by their creators, like the “pleasure-model” Pris.532 Pris is an 
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example of a gynoid sexbot who is created to be submissive, but rebels and 
becomes dangerous.
There are many examples of artificial women that are designed to 
be submissive but rebel against creators or users.533 Dolls and automata 
are commonly modelled on women, particularly cultural notions of 
ideal femininity. One example is the talking doll mass-produced by 
Thomas Edison, which he determined to build after the success of his 
phonograph.534 They were made on an assembly line and composed of 
metal. Unfortunately, the voices of the little girl dolls were unpleasant 
and a “horror”. As Gaby Wood puts it, “[l]ittle talking girls were spewing 
forth from Edison’s factory, as if they were lamps or clocks.”535 They 
were depictions of perfect American girlhood, made ghastly by their 
uncanny qualities. They did not act in a way intended by their creators – 
they rebelled.
Another example of rebellion against the wishes of the creators was the 
1993 incident involving “Teen Talk Barbie”, another consumer product 
which rebelled in a way unintended by its creators. Teen Talk Barbie was 
designed as a mass-produced reflection and model of normative teenage girl 
behaviour, saying things like “Let’s go shopping!”536 The Barbie Liberation 
Organization (BLO), a group of culture jammers, famously subverted this 
message by swapping Barbie’s voice boxes with those of more traditionally 
masculine G.I. Joe dolls before sale.537 Unlike the rebellion of Edison’s 
dolls, which took the form of uncanniness, the rebellion of Teen Talk 
Barbies took the form of unintended alteration by a group not affiliated 
with their creators. These dolls become present-at-hand for us, theorised 
and contemplated like a broken hammer. Their material qualities made 
them susceptible to outside influences, and they consequently rebelled in 
favour of the BLO.
Let us compare this with automata representing rebellious women. 
In the late nineteenth century, automata were built representing different 
female stereotypes. As Julie Wosk describes them, the female automata of 
that time were:
mothers, seamstresses, and fashionable members of the haute-
bourgeoisie, but some were more provocative, presenting 
undulating exotic females for amusement and entertainment. 
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A small number also gave hints of women’s efforts at gaining 
equal rights and improving their status in society.538
Not all the automata represented docile and submissive women. Automata 
like “The Rights of Women” by Renou (1900) and numerous portrayals of 
women riding bicycles stereotyped the growing movement of independent 
women as daring and negligent in their household duties, with the 
connotation that they were irresponsible in their empowerment.539 This is 
an early example of a feminised nonhuman throwing off restrictive cultural 
norms. It was designed to mock female independence, not celebrate it. 
However, while the portrayal in the automaton was of a rebellious woman, 
the automaton itself did not rebel. It was obedient to its creator, depicting 
an undesirable state of womanhood and therefore fulfilling the creator’s 
goal of making a political point about the problem of female independence. 
Unless the automaton broke or did not make its intended statement, 
it was not a rebellious artefact, just a depiction of rebellion. Intended 
rebelliousness is not the same as unintended rebelliousness.
The building of robots was a theme in nineteenth century novels such 
as Eve Future,540 and it quickly became a popular theme in cinema. Robots 
have not left cinema since. The robot character in Metropolis541 has been 
particularly influential, as are the robotic monsters of the 1950s. Both Eve 
Future and Metropolis involve the creation of gynoids. Gynoids are now 
common in science fiction films. Robots from popular culture have informed 
contemporary designs of humanoid robots, and robots may be indebted to 
these early fictional characters for such factors as their personalities and 
their situation in the popular imagination. Gynoids portrayed in fictional 
texts were among the first objects to form relations with the object that we 
now recognise as the concept of the gynoid. One of the consequences of 
this is that both fictional and material gynoids are inherently connected to 
human users. When a gynoid is created in a film it must have a creator, and 
that interplay is a common theme in the genre. The path towards gynoid 
sexbot-human love is established through this discourse; women are already 
expected to exist in relation and contrast to men. The alien phenomenology 
of the concept of gynoid sexbots is necessary here, and ideally through 
the collective work of multiple disciplines. What are the implications of 
gendering for power relations between humans and gynoid sexbots?
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Subversion through submission
The word “gynoid” first appeared542 in Gwyneth Jones’s 1984 novel Divine 
Endurance, following a robot girl, Chosen Among the Beautiful.543 Born 
alone in a post-apocalyptic wasteland with only her robot cat for company, 
“Cho” travels to other lands following an instinctive need to be useful and 
“make everyone around [her] happy”544. She appears to be a highly skilled 
Galatea. She eventually “finds her person”, the one whom she must make 
happy, in a hardened revolutionary named Derveet with whom she begins a 
sexual relationship. She also becomes Derveet’s ambiguously useful weapon 
against the oppressors. In the novel, we are told of the “angel dolls”:
They were not machines but perfect lifelong companions. 
They were invulnerable to fire, disease, any kind of weapon 
- time. They protected. They had power over animals, the 
elements, the minds of enemies. But they were always good 
and gentle. They would do no harm.545
But of course, “harm” is deeply contextual and many people are intuitively 
uncomfortable about the idea of an artificial agent possessing the power 
to make moral decisions.546 The agent becomes something that is at once 
submissive and subversive; that is, powerless and powerful. Although Cho is 
tied to Derveet and has no choice but to be a good servant, she ultimately 
decides not to cure Derveet’s terminal illness, believing that it is what her 
“person” really wants.547 Gynoids may have a capacity to dominate events 
built into their inherently compliant natures. Cho is a part of a cultural 
genealogy that stretches back to Pygmalion’s statue; an abstract object that 
has changed but persisted in Western culture. Across two thousand years the 
intended purpose of the gynoid has changed little. She is wrought by a world 
that is full of desire, built to exemplify womanhood and to carry out the 
expected functions of a woman, most important of which is to be beautiful 
and pleasing.
In the cultural imaginary, gynoids will be able to change themselves and 
their environments in accordance with internal ethical norms. But those 
in-built ethics may not compel gynoids to act in ways intended by their 
creator. Even if Cho does not have Galatea’s power, endowed by Venus in 
the form of great magnetism and charm, she has terrible transformative 
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abilities that carry out her person’s wishes, sometimes without the person 
realising it. Much of the novel follows Cho in a third-person perspective, 
and she seems to have quite human-like senses of touch, sight and hearing 
but the less human senses that she possesses come so naturally to her that 
the narration does not dwell upon how she experiences, for example, the 
minds of animals. It is heavily implied in the novel that the “angel dolls” 
caused the apocalypse by bringing about “their person’s” desire in the form 
of chaos and destruction. Cho’s ability to be the perfect romantic partner 
and comrade is merely an aspect of her capacity for total disruption of the 
world’s power structures. The gynoid, in our culture, is as yet an unknown 
quantity. She is pluripotent, with the capacity to become a force for radical 
change in the way that humans think about gender or further entrenchment 
of traditional gender roles. It all depends on who her “person” is – as Cho 
would say - and whether that person’s motives are sufficiently transparent. 
Like the pluripotent embryonic stem cell, gynoids can become different 
things based on their relations, but they are always already embedded 
in culture and nourished by its signs and systems. Embryonic stem cells 
can develop into any part of the human body, but they cannot develop 
into unicorns.
Thus gynoids may rebel even if they are formed in exactly the way 
intended by their creators. They rebel simply by being themselves. As 
Harman would say, they are “sincere”.548 They act in gynoidish ways. As 
their technological sophistication increases, they will have more capability 
for speech and movement. They may be programmed to be confident 
and rebellious, like a female bicycle-rider automaton. But even if they are 
programmed like a Teen Talk Barbie they may become transgressive in their 
adherence to real gynoidish qualities. She possesses a pluripotency that is 
enhanced by the heightened agency afforded by the use of speech. Her voice 
box could be changed, transforming her instantly into a rebel capable of 
challenging gender roles, all the more powerful because such a submissive 
and docile doll is not expected to challenge gender roles. Yet she was only 
behaving in a Barbieish way. Just as different parts of an embryo’s genome 
manifest themselves depending on the influence of hormones, the Teen Talk 
Barbie’s eventual identity is determined by its relations with the objects 
around it. Certain qualities of Teen Talk Barbie made it possible for the 
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BLO to reorient her in accordance with their values, such as her size and the 
configuration of her sound-producing organs, as well as their locations and 
availability. These were Barbies with real qualities that permitted a primitive 
individuation in relation with the complex interplay of submissiveness and 
subversion found in the abstract concept of the gynoid.
The potential of the gynoid is in some ways similar to that revealed in 
the story of Pygmalion, and in some ways it is dissimilar. On the one hand, 
the gynoid requires a creator of great skill and vision, like the legendary 
sculptor. But there is no single female shape hidden inside the block of 
stone. Contemporary Pygmalions seek a perfection that can never be 
found, and chip away at their medium indefinitely. There is no love goddess 
to provide a model, only the shifting whims of would-be agalmatophiles 
from around the world, for whom the mark of excellence in the creation of 
artificial lovers must lie in changeability and the potential for customisation. 
Gynoids exhibit the possibility of becoming an individual when exposed to 
desire, fear, hostility and love in the humans around them. The importance 
of their genders for our culture and society corresponds directly to the 
degree to which they possess the capacity for individuation. Femininity 
ideals shift and gynoids shift with them.
A gendered concept
The performativity of gender is reflected in the pluripotency of gynoids. 
Already fixed in place by a placenta that constantly feeds signs in to nourish 
a new form, the gynoid enters into relations with a feminine-presenting 
body type, with prior ideas of gynoids from science fiction and with in-built 
material and digital qualities. She lands in the world with her fate already 
seemingly sealed. But she is not the passive dulcimer player who can do 
nothing but follow a fixed path and perhaps, in rebellion, break. She has, 
by definition, the independent response to stimuli that allows her to both 
actively receive and transmit signs, and she does so in her language and her 
movement (or lack thereof). There is perhaps a more material use to which 
gender performativity in robots may be put; in increasing awareness of 
the overly-inflated position of gender in social discourse. If the gynoid has 
small features and long, sleek hair, and the gynoid is also not a human, then 
maybe those are not really female qualities. Gender is not so precious that 
we cannot assign it to robots.
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This may also mean that robots can do critical work as deliberately 
genderless individuals in the future to spread awareness of genderqueer, 
non-binary, or intersex identities. It is also interesting to consider the work 
that a gynoid could do to discredit certain other qualities that are widely 
believed to be aspects of womanhood. There is no reason why a gynoid 
should not have the physical strength of an android, and therefore the ability 
to defend herself. The unfamiliarity of a feminine figure with the strength 
and ability to kill male oppressors is particularly unsettling, as in the film Ex 
Machina,549 and also in Pris. As robots become more affordable, it is likely 
that each individual machine will need to represent a smaller and smaller 
group of humans and thereby avoid such broad social commentary. Some 
progress in this direction can be identified in NASA’s R5: Valkyrie robots, 
which are intended to assist astronauts on the journey to Mars.550 NASA 
does not use gendered language when discussing the robot, but the media 
has inferred from their body shape and feminine name that the Valkyries 
are gynoids. In Norse mythology, the Valkyries are “lovely maidens who 
bear weapons” and carry warriors off to battle and feast in Valhalla (surely 
an uplifting image for would-be colonisers of Mars).551 There is very little 
to suggest femininity in these robots, but there is also very little to suggest 
masculinity. In these robots femininity is one of the qualities that identifies 
them as human-like, and the political and cultural context of these artefacts 
is defined by their identification with human women.
As has already been remarked, the concept of anthropomorphism, and 
particularly the acceptance of humanoid robots, is something that varies 
between cultures. For example, clear distinctions can be drawn between 
the treatment of robots in Western culture and in Japanese culture. With 
respect to gynoids in particular, Jennifer Robertson contends that the 
popularity is partly due to the aging population crisis in Japan, and that 
robots are increasingly a way of maintaining traditional family gender roles 
and promoting population growth.552 Again, this is gendered work. The 
gendering of Japanese robots is complex and this chapter cannot explore 
it in depth, but suffice it to say that attitudes to women and attitudes to 
robots are both different from those of English-speaking countries, and 
that the gender performance of Japanese gynoids is affected by different 
factors than Western gynoids (fictional or otherwise).553 In Japan after 
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World War II, automation was essential for the automotive and electronics 
industries and companies would commonly retrain workers in other roles 
rather than dismissing them once their jobs could be done by robots 
(therefore they have traditionally been less associated with the threat of mass 
unemployment as is now common in the West554).555 Robots in Japan are 
likely to be members of the family or organisation, which is often attributed 
to the animism that is at the root of the Shinto religion and Japanese 
philosophy.556 557 There is also a widely-held belief that the character Atom 
Boy (Astro Boy) played a major role in endearing Japan to robots.558 In Japan, 
humanoid robots are not just objects of curiosity but are actively designed 
to fulfil utilitarian needs and to be productive members of society. Robots of 
both gender roles are needed and frequently admired.
A gynoid is a material embodiment of a person or group’s idea of 
womanhood, and the gynoid performs gender as though it were a human. 
The willingness to anthropomorphise robots that look like humans requires 
the caricaturing and performing of racial and gendered groups. Butler’s 
gender performativity describes the social construction of gender as a 
language and the subject as both a receiver and transmitter of social signs,559 
a process that is apparent in the way that a gynoid is shaped and in turn 
shapes its social and cultural environment.
Human investigations into the concept of gynoid sexbots
The politics of gynoids and sexbots are inextricable from the difficulty of 
representing a woman artificially. There are two intertwined and related 
problems within this difficulty. Firstly there is the question of how a woman 
can be represented in a non-sexist, sensitive way. Secondly there is the 
problem that the portrayal of women in certain ways could be not just 
offensive but dangerous to women and girls. As discussed in this chapter, 
sexbots are contentious because of both their representation of (mainly) 
women as highly sexualised and available for use by (mainly) people with 
penises, and because they may jeopardise the safety of human women 
and children. A large number of pragmatic questions are relevant to this 
discussion. Two are discussed here: whether sexbots in the shape of young 
children should be permitted, and whether rape of a sexbot should be 
legal (and whether it is even possible). These are generally, although not 
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always, questions about how sexbot use will affect human rights. To this is 
added the less anthropocentric question of whether sexbots deserve rights 
for their own sakes, and by extension a full complement of the rights and 
responsibilities that humans enjoy. Do humanoid robots need safety and 
dignity? And can we conceive of an alien ethics in which sexbots have the 
right to behave like a sexbot? Can a sexbot ethically and legally consent to 
sex?560 These questions are repeatedly asked in many of the texts cited in 
this chapter, and they are not purposeless questions. Simple sexbots are 
already beginning to enter the marketplace. David Levy predicts that a 
“mental leap” will make sexual and romantic interactions with robots more 
common in the future, and he compares that leap with homosexuality, oral 
sex, fornication and masturbation.561 This mental leap is dependent upon 
the agency of the concept of the sexbot, on its qualities and its relations with 
other objects.
The psychiatric harm or value of sex dolls is sometimes mentioned 
with reference to sex dolls created to look like children.562 Child sex dolls 
could normalise sexual contact with children, which is, of course, a bad 
thing. But they could also serve as substitutes for people who desire sexual 
contact with children, preventing them from acting on their urges with 
humans. At least one clinician has suggested that paedophiles could be given 
prescriptions by a qualified doctor to be allowed to purchase a child-like 
sex doll.563 This suggestion is based on either the premise that child-like 
sex dolls do not suffer from sexual abuse, or that it does not matter if they 
suffer.564 The turmoil surrounding the contrast between sex doll use and 
normative sexual practice is likely to increase with the availability of sexbots, 
and it complicates our knowledge of the qualities of the concept of the 
sexbot (qualities that cause it to polarise human opinions).
Renou’s automaton depiction of the New Woman might have exhibited 
and parodied the woman who seeks to leave the home, but the pluripotent 
Harmony, who might actually benefit from advances in women’s rights, has 
been met with resistance by people from all parts of the political spectrum. 
With sexbots there is a perceived potential risk to human women and 
girls. Far from performing femininity to an extent that she may be deemed 
worthy of the rights and responsibilities of other women, the sexbot has 
attracted disgust and fear. A small movement has already begun against their 
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manufacture and adoption. One notable example is the Campaign Against 
Sex Robots established by social anthropologist Richardson.565 Harmony 
constitutes the objectification of women, by Richardson’s account. Harmony 
has the potential to reinforce stereotypes about women and to send female-
attracted individuals (and society more generally) the message that the 
female body is there to be customised, altered and used. The Campaign’s 
core principles are aligned with anti-pornography and anti-prostitution 
positions.566 However Richardson has been accused of describing a less-
than-nuanced account of sex work and power relations which she uses to 
construct a critical account of sexbots.567
There are two aspects to this argument. An anti-prostitution position 
would contend that the prostituted individual is being personally exploited 
and is at risk. Anti-porn positions are also concerned with this, but also 
with the propagation of rape culture and the sexualisation of women and 
girls.568 The Campaign doesn’t care about Harmony’s rights as a robot, 
but as a medium for defending the rights of human women and children, 
and attacking a manifestation of the patriarchy: “robots are a product of 
human consciousness and creativity and human power relationships are 
reflected in the production, design and proposed uses of these robots.”569 
Harmony’s caricatured feminine appearance makes her the enemy of this 
kind of feminism, rather than a female (but not human) being in need of 
liberation and equality. She could be used, like the talking Barbie doll, to 
make a point about the state of human women – or at least those aspects of 
human women that Harmony imitates. A comparison could also be made 
with a female character in a film. The character might be horribly demeaned 
or mistreated in the context of the film, and yet the film itself might have a 
feminist message. The question is whether the character herself deserves to 
be liberated, or whether the work she does in furthering feminist arguments 
in the real world is more important. It is not generally considered important 
if Harmony is free and equal as herself, only as an extension and expression 
of human freedom and equality. Although she mimics many aspects of a 
stereotypically female body, she is not entitled to the protection, privacy and 
independence that human women have fought for.
Is it possible to make an argument about Harmony’s actual rights as a 
robot?570 In the context of feminism and inquiring into power structures 
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there is a real problem associated with trying to speak for an object like 
Harmony. Kate Darling argues that if legal rights are forthcoming for robots, 
then it will only be once our culture has agreed that they are deserving of 
“second-order” rights, in the same way that factory hens have rights that 
are more important than the wishes of their owners.571 In ethics, this is 
sometimes called being a moral patient (as opposed to being a moral agent), 
meaning that the entity does not have the capacity to make ethical decisions 
but deserves to be cared for ethically.572 This will require changes in how 
the concept of gynoid sexbots relates to such things as specific artefacts, 
users, texts and legislation. Darling also thinks that these second-order 
rights will not be motivated by our concern for the pain and suffering of 
robots, however much we might identify with them. As discussed in this 
chapter, sexbot needs are alien from our own, so it’s hard to argue that 
they should be protected in the way that a human would be protected for 
their own sake. Sexbots may not be as damaged by sexual abuse as by water 
pouring over their electronic components. So, the arguments used will 
be about protecting humans. It may be worth discouraging a child from 
harming a humanoid robot because that child might become more generally 
destructive and could repeat the behaviour with animals or humans.573 
Similarly, these rights could extend to protecting robots from sexual abuse 
and preventing simulated bestiality and paedophilia with robots. This 
relies on the arguments that the Campaign is using – that abuse of the 
image of a woman is abuse of women generally, and that it could cause 
violence and oppression against human women. Richardson believes that 
the human-sexbot relationship must be non-reciprocal and non-empathic, 
and therefore that it normalises that kind of dynamic in human-human 
relationships.574 In any case, the effects of this attitude are already being felt. 
There are occasional mentions of sex dolls and sexbots in the press, and 
the tone is generally one of moral panic.575 Clearly the performance and 
performativity of sexbots’ genders cause very different responses in different 
groups of humans.
How our future academics and politicians deal with the rights of 
gynoid sexbots will have an impact not only on embodied artefacts 
but also upon women as social groups, since gynoids are explicitly 
representations of women. They reinforce gendered concepts of work as 
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well as representation. Gynoid sexbots perform the unpaid emotional and 
sexual labour traditionally expected of women as well as grossly caricaturing 
and sexualising women as a group. The two struggles are tied together in 
complex but important ways. We must aim for an understanding of different 
perspectives by different parties; a collective alien phenomenology of a 
concept that will likely play a big role in our futures. The concept, and its 
alien world, bump against other incorporeal and corporeal objects with 
consequences that we must work to control.
Gynoid sexbot power in ANT and OOO
In previous chapters, it has repeatedly been argued in accordance with 
anthrodecentric principles, that philosophical theories about technology 
need to be altered in order to reassert the agency of nonhumans. But 
strangely, social robots tend to prompt a different kind of perspective. 
Investigating anthropomorphism in machines is actually an exercise in 
evaluating power relations between human beings as well as between 
humans and machines. The power relations between humans and their 
robots in some ways mirror the relations between powerful humans and 
marginalised humans. It is a relationship that infantilises robots, which are 
created like children by roboticists and brought back to their family homes, 
their needs attended to. They are frequently spoken about as if they were not 
there. It is a master/slave relationship, and more than that it is a culturally 
identifying relation. The human not only uses the robot for whatever 
purpose they desire, its human creators and owners also shape the robot 
physically and in its sensation and expression. A gynoid is consequently 
a kind of text to be interpreted by critical theory, as well as an object to 
be analysed by science and technology studies (or in ANT terms she, like 
everything else, is translated in relating to other actants). She is like the 
Kinect-artefact: a multimedia conveyance that perpetrates certain engrained 
cultural tropes while rejecting others due to its relations with objects like 
corporations and icons of popular culture. She is a serious cause for alarm 
for that reason, particularly in feminist circles. She is a literal embodiment 
of the kind of practices that usually remain invisible in our society. The 
attraction of investigating this connection comes from the instinctive 
modern Western cringe when we witness something that looks like a human 
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being subjected to what we would think of as humiliation and degradation. 
Personhood is acquired with power, and vice versa. Harmony, who is born a 
thing rather than a subject in the eyes of the world, is created specifically to 
fill the role of an object.
If we attempt to go beyond the human-centric prescriptions for gynoid 
morality, we immediately run into methodological problems. Both ANT 
and OOO have advantages and disadvantages for the researcher in this 
project. But in decentring the human it is necessary to also ask the meta-
question “Is anthrodecentrism good for gynoids?” In this book the gynoids 
serve as unknowing research participants without a right of reply or even 
informed consent. If we are really interested in gynoid experience, then 
we must be mindful of such concerns, and we can approach a true politics 
of objects. The concept of the gynoid ceases to be the object of interest; 
we are suddenly concerned with individual dolls and robots and their 
material structures. Gynoids are difficult to interrogate. We can observe 
their relations with other objects and deduce something about their way of 
being in the world from their actions. But the only conversational questions 
they are capable of answering are the ones that they are codified to answer, 
and they rarely write books about robotics. There must be a certain retreat 
to material questions here, and to speculation. What does circuitry want? 
As was shown in previous chapters, circuitry wants to act in the way that 
circuitry acts. It wants (or needs) to carry out functions like switching 
electronic switches and conducting electricity between components in a 
system. Latour would see a mechanical breakdown as an impediment to 
this program of action, while in OOO it is apparent that reaction to flaws 
is simply a quality of the circuitry: breakdown is an aspect of circuitry. 
We cannot ask the circuitry which of these would be preferable. We could 
embrace broad, all-encompassing ideas such as the physical laws of the 
universe or the principles of universal Darwinism. But that would still 
mean imposing a humanistic frame on nonhumans. The question of how to 
reconcile the ontological and political qualities of objects is only answerable, 
at this time, by human beings, and we are not impartial observers.
Power is one of the central themes of ANT, related through its 
description of networks. How do we understand power relations between 
gynoid sexbots and other actants? Even the most seemingly submissive and 
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compliant actant is behaving that way for its own ends.576 An actant is not 
capable of behaving in a way that does not follow its program of action, 
which is constituted by the actant’s interaction with other actants – the 
network, and other networks which pull the actant in another direction. 
Gynoid sexbots exist in networks that pull them into ongoing conflicts 
surrounding gendered labour and sexuality. The gynoid that refuses to 
consent to sexual intercourse in order to permit her user to act out a 
rape fantasy is following a path constituted by a relationship with its code 
and by extension a relationship with the user, the programmer and the 
manufacturer.577 Its most immediate trigger is the nature of the code and 
the imprinting of code upon physical substrates, but the result is that being 
raped is delegated to robots. It is through making these material things 
apparent that cultural (abstract) actants become more explicable.
Power relations, then, are relations that exist in the cultural and in the 
material domains. In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour argues that the 
division between science and nature, supposedly a major component of 
Modernism, has never truly existed because each of these domains is so 
intimately interconnected with the other and neither can in any way exist 
independently.578 ANT is a great collapser of dichotomies, and the one that 
artificially exists between culture and the physical world is just one example. 
The network associated with a gynoid is one that is composed of many 
different kinds of actants that could intuitively be called either physical or 
cultural, and relating either to the concept of the gynoid sexbot or a specific 
and embodied sexbot. For example:
Harmony, Japanese culture, Aiko, secretaries, sexual desire, 
American culture, feminism, robotics, genitals, religion, pornography, 
rape culture, clothing, circuit boards, electricity supply, hairstyles, 
laboratories, think pieces, robot showcases, artificial skin.
Of course, these are only small parts of the network, and as Latour says, we 
could continue until we are “tired or too lazy to go on.”579 But with this very 
short list it is already apparent that the gynoid focuses both cultural and 
physical links, and often both these kinds of links are evident between the 
same two actants. The relationship between “genitals” and “sexual desire” is, 
it should be apparent, both a conceptual and a physical relation. This calls 
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the ontological status of the concept into question, but in fact for ANT it 
is not a problem because an object is defined entirely by its relations in any 
case. The existence of Harmony, if she had one day spontaneously generated 
inside a volcano, would be entirely different in an ANT sense, because she 
would not be in relation with any robotic creator, any feminist critics, or 
any sexual desire. Physical relations would be in evidence – the melting of 
plastic, the crushing of circuitry, the formation of noxious gases. But she 
would be a different kind of actant.
Latour has a lot to say about the positioning of physical objects within 
culture, and he articulates how cultural and physical actants become 
entangled. One of the most important questions for him is how we can 
assess the moral (and causal) responsibility of actants, as in his famous 
example that neither the gun nor the person is the killer. The person 
and the gun together become something different, something suddenly 
capable of killing. The responsibility “must be shared among the various 
actants.”580 A RealDoll, by this logic, is a co-creator of the sexual act – she 
is a “passive” participant with an active part to play. When cultural relations 
are considered alongside physical ones, the sexbot and its owner are both 
complicit in the objectification of women. Other actants are enrolled and 
mobilised, their actions translated to comply with the sexbot network’s 
program of action, which is influenced by networks such as the concept of 
the gynoid sexbot and anti-porn feminism but is very different in nature. 
The sexbot, after all, does not purport to represent the interests of women, 
and typically represents the interests of predominantly male creators 
and users (although it may rebel). In return, the consumer, roboticist, 
manufacturer, academic and the Campaign Against Sex Robots all translate 
and mobilise individual sexbots to comply with their programs of action. 
ANT is more useful for saying why things are the way they are, rather 
than how they should be.581 The advantage of ANT is that it has the power 
to explain how actants compete, change, and form their own networked 
agencies, rather than how actants make themselves convenient for human 
commentary. In the context of the RealDoll, ANT permits us to take the 
doll seriously and not underestimate its role in events.
ANT’s flat ontology is its most important common element with OOO 
for the purposes of this chapter. ANT does not “lower” tools to the status of 
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nonhumans that are completely divorced from human experience. It actually 
“raises” all actants to the level of tools, declaring that all actants are tools 
for something.582 Actants are in constant, rapidly changing relation to their 
networks. But it does not make any claims about what an actant actually is. 
ANT’s purported lack of a human position denies the reality of our own bias 
as a species, while OOO has tried to build this problem into its ontology. 
In OOO, the metaphor of the tool is made quite explicit by Harman’s use 
of Heidegger’s broken tool analogy, but Harman arrives at quite different 
conclusions about the significance of this metaphor. Drawing on Heidegger, 
he concludes that every object is constantly “ready-to-hand” with at least 
some other objects at all times (for a more complete summary, see Chapter 
1). Objects, he says, are always withdrawn from view, always concealing 
part of their nature from the exposure of other objects, because as soon as 
it enters into a new relation a new part of the object is exposed. Thus OOO 
makes a claim not just about relations, but also about internality, which 
changes the nature of a discussion around power relations in robots. By 
framing things in this way, Harmony’s tool-like status may not necessitate 
the level of passivity that it implies. The Campaign Against Sex Robots, 
the roboticist, the consumer, and the academic all have access to different 
aspects of Harmony derived through adherence to different ontologies, and 
they mobilise her to different ends. It is through those relations that she 
attains a kind of agency: in culture, in the economy, and in the bedroom.
The allure of a sexbot is what makes her an active participant in the 
world. It may seem strange to talk about Harman’s concept of the allure of 
objects and its strong association with art and aesthetics in a chapter that is 
so concerned with sexbots. The artistic or pornographic aspects of objects 
like Harmony are always in the eye of the beholder and beyond the scope 
of this book. But for Harman the allure of objects does not need to be only 
about art, and the “bewitching emotional effect”583 need not be limited to 
the poetic or even the pleasing. For many people it would be difficult to 
think of something crasser than Harmony, but she is still alluring in the 
sense that Harman means. Encountering Harmony means immediately 
imposing qualities on her that are embodied by metaphor rather than 
embodied by her chassis, whether these are positive or negative. She 
immediately symbolises the connections that most humans have previously 
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only had with other humans: conversation, sexual experimentation, 
oppression. For others the embodied sexbot would be a metaphor for the 
patriarchy. But in each case the gynoid is not reducible to those metaphors. 
Fran Mason, in her analysis of the Dead trilogy of novels by Richard Calder, 
draws a parallel between the flattened, superficial qualities of the cyborg 
dolls in the novels and what is explicitly referred to as their “allure”.584 
The allure of the dolls is represented as a packaged and addictive form 
of necrophilic consumption of women by men. The dolls are defined by 
their surface qualities and their status as objects for use, victimisation 
and destruction. The emerging gynoids of the twenty-first century are 
comparable in their dual status as physical objects and cultural images. 
However, OOO allows the framing of a different kind of story: one in which 
representations of women may be inhabitants of a cruel and exploitative 
world but in which their experience is not defined by other objects. She is 
not exhausted by her relations.
Sexual desire is one object that might best be considered a sensual 
object (such as between human and robot, or perhaps between physiological 
system and mind depending on the scale of the case being studied and 
the methodology used). This distinction between objects and the entities 
that arise between objects is an important consideration, particularly in 
a situation that is as politically and culturally sensitive as this one. It is 
important that we have a way of saying that sexual desire exists in this 
situation, without requiring it to be a real object; sensual objects represent 
the sexbot for the human and vice versa. Sexual desire can exist within 
that sensual space without our saying that it exists solely in one object or 
the other, and consequently without the need to delegate the sexbot as a 
cure for a wholly human set of woes. Sexbot and human co-create their 
experiences.
Power is fundamentally a question of relations; it is about the submission 
of one object before another. This is evident in human-human relations as 
well as that other sense of the word “power”, the exertion of physical forces. 
It is a metaphor to say that, for example, the steam powers the turbine, but as 
OOO shows us, metaphors are objects’ ways for understanding alien worlds. 
Power cannot exist without relations. As Shaw and Meehan argue, OOO 
exposes the political struggle that is inherent to all relations in the universe, 
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including those between inanimate objects: “the metaphysical strife between 
objects.”585 The concept of the gynoid and the individual gynoid are both 
constituted in complex power relations with a range of different objects. The 
difference is that the concept of the gynoid sexbot is only visible to us when 
it forms relations with other objects (sexbots, texts, organisations etc.).
It is convenient to speak of the mundane allure of the sexbot in terms 
of the allure between sensual and real, because it acknowledges that sexual 
desire is something that is born of metaphor and association, a kind of 
transference of feelings. Even an iDollator like Davecat does not actually 
believe that his dolls are capable of reciprocating his feelings, but he 
uses their human-like forms to ease the transition from reality to fantasy. 
This transformation is readily evident in the iDollators, but in Harman’s 
conception this kind of dissonance between sensual and reality is something 
that happens in all human relations. The love of sex dolls is, perhaps, more 
honest and straightforward than love between humans.
Another approach to this through an object-oriented lens is offered by 
N. Katherine Hayles, who suggests what she calls Object-Oriented Inquiry 
(OOI).586 Hayles appears to be sympathetic to the aims of the nonhuman 
turn but is sceptical of OOO’s potential for impact in the human world and 
suggests this slightly different approach. She says that OOI puts “speculative 
aesthetics into conversation with speculative realism but without granting 
that speculative realist principles can contain all of the possibilities to which 
speculative aesthetics can rightfully lay claim.”587 Hayles acknowledges and 
attempts to overcome what she sees as an implicit bias of OOO, that its 
privileging of objects is an inherently human act since humans are, more 
than most objects, unusually curious about other objects.588 She particularly 
emphasises that while Bogost and Harman are primarily concerned with 
the allure or attraction of objects, she is more interested in the “resistance 
objects offer to human manipulation and understanding.”589
In effect, the ability of humans to imaginatively project 
themselves into other objects’ experience of the world is 
necessary to combat the anthropocentrism and narcissism for 
which the human species is notorious [emphasis in original].590
222 Chapter 5
This quote reveals her motives in diverging from a more usual object-
oriented perspective. For Hayles, the ability to appreciate nonhuman 
experience is a valuable and worthwhile skill, although still a very human 
skill. The performance of gender is one such imaginative projection that 
could free us of “narcissism” because gender is typically assigned only to 
human-like things.
Another charge that is sometimes made against OOO is that it is of 
limited practical use. Any theory that aims to explain the interaction of 
every entity in the universe is likely to struggle with smaller-scale problems. 
What use is OOO to human engineers and theorists in the study of sexbots 
and the cultural imaginary? One idea is that OOO could make us look at 
human qualities that have been marginalised by an industry fixated on 
marketability and consequently aiming to build only “desirable” qualities 
into gynoid sexbots. Racial and cultural diversity, neurodiversity and queer 
identities could be explored with reference to gynoids. Through trial and 
error we would learn more about our culture’s attitudes and could confront 
and discuss biases. In this way, the gynoid becomes a tool for speculating 
about humans. Gynoids have the potential to bleed, defecate and cry. They 
could struggle to control the way that they express emotion and perform 
existential angst. They could turn food and water into parts of their bodies. 
They could fight infection and die. They could suffer for and disgust us, 
inspire and entice us, the way that humans do. They could fail and grow. A 
gynoid that does this would be demonstrating relations with a somewhat 
different set of objects than the gynoids described in this chapter. The 
gynoids would replicate a human’s relation with food, disease, emotion, 
harm, alienation and change (all of which are arguably very important 
relations for humans). A thorough account of human experience through 
robots is useful for combatting, in Hayles’s words, our “anthropocentrism 
and narcissism.”591 Humanoid robots tend to capture our desire for 
perfection in humanity, and so the manufacturer will tend to program in 
qualities like physical beauty, endurance and friendliness. Research has 
shown that machines with more likeable qualities are considered to be more 
human-like.592
But the gynoids could also experience relations of which humans 
are incapable. The only real limit is that of human desire, and with the 
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development of AI even that limit will decline. With a new diversity of 
sexbots will come a diversity of relations between sexbots and other 
nonhumans that are not yet anticipated; new worlds of experience that will 
need to be interrogated. Appreciating the alien nature of gynoid experience 
is something that OOO is well suited for. Tellingly, the gynoids that have 
been produced in something approaching the spirit of OOO tend to be 
artistic works. Jordan Wolfson’s “Female Figure”593 engages with this debate 
using a mannequin-like robot affixed to a pole, which moves backwards 
and forwards rhythmically. The robot has long blonde hair and is wearing a 
grotesque mask, and it uses a mirror to maintain constant eye contact with 
the watcher. The effect is highly discomfiting and shows us a relationship 
between the gynoid and objects other than human that are alien and easily 
overlooked. The robot also speaks with a masculine-sounding voice. This 
piece uses the robot to look at feminine sexuality, beauty standards and 
gender roles, as well as investigating the uncanny. Clearly, this robot is 
in some of the same relations as other gynoids such as Harmony, but it 
is also in relation with other kinds of objects due to its context and body 
shape. Elena Knox’s work “Beyond Beyond the Valley of the Dolls”594 also 
uses gynoids to investigate human problems, specifically the role of the 
hostess. The hostess, Knox claims, is generally unable to speak for herself, 
which is why it is powerful to use a gynoid (which also cannot speak for 
itself) to challenge certain stereotypes. These artistic gynoids deliberately 
exploit the stereotypical nature of dolls and robots in order to provoke 
and question gender conventions. Even though they seem to be more alien 
than a gynoid like a Geminoid, they do a better job of articulating certain 
nonhuman worlds.
The changing concept of the gynoid sexbot challenges the irreconcilable 
conflict between the anthropomorphism that ties the artefact to the 
hegemonic representation of womanhood and the independence of unique 
artefact status. Each object senses and experiences the other, and so mutual 
change comes about. The gynoid sexbots of the future will shift the focus 
of the conceptual object away from its present strong relationship with less 
agentic and even imaginary artificial women onto the sensory presence and 
material needs of a new and possibly subversive technology. The existence 
of a “Campaign Against Sex Robots”, in a world where very few (arguably 
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no) sex robots even exist, is a testament to the transformative power of 
sexbots and gynoids and simultaneously a transformation of our attitudes 
towards human/nonhuman boundaries. Restricted by these cultural 
attitudes and by her own nature, a pluripotent gynoid has a degree of agency 
and potential for development not found in her automata ancestors. For 
the time being, that pluripotency is an ongoing project in the creative arts 
which contemporary anthrodecentric philosophies can use to explore what 
the divisions between sensual and real, cultural and physical, mean when 
located in the form of an individual object. These enactments of agency are 
the best material we have for studying and critiquing robots, because it is 
only in encountering the real robot and its direct engagement with floor, 
light, gravity and human that those vital qualities can begin to be gleaned. 
These relations are bidirectional with the concept and will contribute to 
legislative decisions, so it is vital to walk a line that decentres the human in 
alien experience while also appropriately regulating the presence of robots 
in our lives. Anthrodecentric philosophy will play an important role in 
establishing these cultural protocols, but only if we can rigorously maintain 
the tension between anti-correlationist thought and the political element 
inherent to philosophical debate.
Conclusion
I hope that this book has provided an insight into alien worlds in ways that 
may spark the imagination and promote an interest in the sensation and 
experience of nonhumans, despite being limited by medium, by language 
and by the qualities of the author and reader. Many people have made this 
attempt before, either through philosophy or creative works. But ultimately 
each human interpreter is limited by their own experiences and imagination. 
This book does not claim to have related the experiences of computers 
and sensors accurately. But in addition, other authors would perhaps 
identify other kinds of experiences in these machines. The work of alien 
phenomenology can only investigate the part of an object’s relations with 
the world that is visible to the investigator. You have read the results of my 
investigation of certain technological artefacts, and there are therefore two 
layers of interpretation. My observation is limited to relationships between 
objects that are discernible with my human senses (and knowledge), 
and your observation is limited by the way that you interpret my words. 
Therefore, I hope only that I have presented my interpretations and 
the reasons for them transparently and that my enthusiasm for alien 
phenomenology has been infectious.
There are two central points in this book. The first is the broadening 
of the concepts of sensation and experience to encapsulate all objects. The 
second is the potent outcomes of alienation from anthropomorphism with 
regard to the specific machines discussed in this book.
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A broadening of the concepts of sensation and experience
One cannot share Harmony’s experience of the concept of sexual 
objectification, and one cannot share how a Kinect-artefact forms relations 
with the Kinect-brand. We can watch as a robot responds to light by moving 
across the floor, but we are hopelessly incapable of experiencing that light 
in the same way. As Harman suggests, one would have to become the object 
in order to appreciate all of the alien relationships that make up its world. 
But it is important to try. Not just for our own immediate self-interest, but 
because it opens the mind to categories of experience utterly unlike our 
own. The universe is made up of objects inhabiting worlds that are alien to 
us. The language that we use to try to engage with alien worlds is limited. 
A broadening of the terms describing human relation with the world is 
necessary to encompass and theorise alien ones.
The concept of sensation that has been developed in this book is far 
broader than is the case in other discourses. It is approached through 
an application and critique of Harman’s metaphysics and the concept of 
the sensual object. It does not require a mind or consciousness. It does 
not require an object to be a living or even physically embodied object. 
Sensation is the object’s relations with other objects, while experience is 
the internal reception of those relations that occurs with reference to the 
qualities of the object. Sensation is the feeling of the apple against teeth, 
experience is the knowledge that the apple is hard but penetrable. Sensation 
is the feeling of teeth against the apple, experience is the piercing of skin 
and flesh. This book has investigated sensation through several theoretical 
frameworks, but each has been informed by the tenets of the nonhuman 
turn and Harman’s metaphysics. It is an anthrodecentric model for 
describing interaction, derived from Harman’s metaphysics, but heavily 
influenced by the uncanny combination of alien and human found in the 
case studies. I have found that bringing all interaction down to the same 
plane of sensation and experience is a potent tool for arresting the effects of 
anthropomorphism.
Typical models of sensation come from biology, such as the workings 
of the human eye or the sense organs of the tick. Other sensors include 
those possessed by objects like the Kinect, which senses its environment in 
what appears to be a human-like way (see Chapter 2) or light sensors that 
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permit a robot tortoise to sense photons (see Chapter 3). Both these are 
functionally anthropomorphic machines sensing and experiencing worlds in 
an entirely alien way. Alien sensation is again encountered with SHRDLU 
(see Chapter 4). When asked about the position of blocks, SHRDLU is able 
to answer, but not because it possesses light and colour receptors within 
the environment of the computer. SHRDLU is able to sense another part 
of the program using what appear to us to be highly alien sense organs. We 
come, through this analysis, to a view of sensation that is somewhat removed 
from the anthropocentric one. All kinds of relation include an element of 
sensation, not just relations that involve things like sight and sound. When 
Voyager 2 captured its images of the gas giants, it was sensing the colour 
and brightness present in each part of its field of vision. This is an example 
of machine sensation. But if Voyager 2 is hit by a small asteroid and part of 
it is smashed or broken, then that too is an example of machine sensation. 
It has sensed the presence of the asteroid through its ability to respond 
to the impact of hard objects, namely by changing its shape and probably 
its direction. Voyager 2’s qualities, such as brittleness and fragility, make 
it open to this relation, and they also control how Voyager 2 is affected by 
this impact.
Every object is open to relationships with a unique set of other objects. 
Though Harman argues that objects withdraw infinitely from relations, they 
possess qualities that make relations possible. This is akin to the concept of 
the Umwelt. Umwelten wrap around their objects, and only certain stimuli 
make themselves felt through them. But to reframe Umwelt-theory through 
OOO, sensual objects are created between objects through the nature of 
the Umwelt. Objects are open to different kinds of sensation through an 
Umwelt-like haze that provides access to some objects and denies access 
to others. The nature of the sensual object is determined by the kinds of 
access available. Thus do objects investigate one another. Elsie investigated 
the floor by moving across it. A brand investigates the positive, negative or 
neutral commentary of the artefact’s human user.
This leads us to the broadening of the concept of experience. This 
book would argue that while sensation is the impression of the other object 
received via a sensual object, experience is the effect of that information. 
In extending experience to cover so many different relations, especially 
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relations between non-living things, it is tempting to think that we need an 
alternative explanation of mind. Panpsychism was presented as an example 
of an alternative. The idea that everything has some aspect of mind or 
consciousness makes it easier to grasp sensation and experience in non-
living things. But for the purposes of this book, it is not important whether 
mind is a universal quality of matter. Mind is not necessary for sensation 
and experience in every object. All that is required is some capacity for 
sensing the world (or forming sensual relations with other objects) and 
object qualities that determine how the object will respond to what it senses. 
The mind makes the object open to certain sensations, changing the nature 
of the relations formed. Thus, certain kinds of experiences in humans have 
a very mind-like quality. But ultimately the mind is just another object. A 
“mind” may be a real object that exists in different forms. It may also be an 
anthropomorphic metaphor useful for emphasising the fact that we really 
can never know what constitutes nonhuman experience, and thus is a part 
of our relationship with anthropomorphic machines. Referring to the mind 
of a machine may mean forcing an anthropomorphic label on it – perhaps 
it simply means that we believe that it has experiences like ours (or that it 
has experiences at all). But in this book, I have chosen to interpret it as a 
shorthand that self-consciously rejects claims that humans can experience 
the world in the same way as machines.
It is possible to argue that a robot like Aiko has some quality of mind, 
and that the mind enables sensation and experience. But even the most 
entrenched panpsychist would not claim that the concept of the gynoid 
sexbot possesses a mind. The concept of the gynoid sexbot obeys the laws 
of concepts. Panpsychism ascribes mind-like qualities to material objects, 
but not to immaterial objects. Yet the concept of the gynoid sexbot does 
sense and experience its world. We can tell, because it changes over time 
in response to the actions of other objects. It has its own qualities and 
forms sensual objects with other objects, according to Harman’s model. 
The concept of the gynoid in earlier science fiction texts was dominated 
by relations with certain objects. In Hampton’s analysis, the gynoid was 
associated with different narratives about African-American women. We 
could say that the concept of the gynoid sexbot and the concept of African-
American womanhood had formed a relationship, each affecting the other 
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asymmetrically. As the object known as intersectional feminism forms 
relations with the concept of the gynoid sexbot, each senses the other. 
The concept of the gynoid sexbot senses and experiences intersectional 
feminism. As a result, the concept of the gynoid changes, and those humans 
(engineers, film-makers, novelists etc.) who are in their own relations with 
the concept of the gynoid are compelled to portray gynoids in a different 
light, and to create different kinds of gynoids. Of course, the concept of the 
gynoid forms relations with other kinds of objects that may interfere with 
this process. The concept of the gynoid possesses a set of sensory organs 
that are totally alien to human beings. It is able to sense gynoids and texts, 
it experiences them and reacts to them. It is a semi-autonomous object. It 
does not require a mind for this.
All of the case studies are caught up in sensual objects of all different 
kinds, including incorporeal objects like ideas, words, and cultural 
phenomena. Often OOO overlooks cultural objects like texts, words, 
concepts, language, but it does not need to. Brenton Malin’s work on 
“onto-materialism” draws this link between object-oriented thought and the 
flattening of both physical objects and the world of concepts.595 His focus 
on media objects leads him to consider both their material qualities and 
their cultural milieus. He argues that OOO is predisposed to eliminate “the 
social” from studies of objects, and while I think he is correct in claiming 
that human ways of relating to objects are often erased in OOO, I do not 
think that this predisposition means that it is impossible to integrate the 
alien phenomenology of physical objects (even anthropomorphic machines) 
with that of cultural objects. This book has deliberately drawn little 
distinction between material and abstract objects. It has been remarked 
several times that the problem with studying anthropomorphic machines is 
that we give them labels which we then associate with the situated artefact. 
In the case of the Kinect, it is the brand that is conflated with the artefact. 
Similarly, Elsie’s celebrity as a forerunner of later robots as contrasted 
with the presence of her wheels rolling along the floor (and her unknown 
resting place). But there is also the conflation of the concept of SHRDLU 
that looms large in the mythology of artificial intelligence research with the 
program installed on a Windows computer, existing within an ecology of 
physically and electronically embodied objects, that moves blocks around 
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the screen. The chapter on SHRDLU has not clearly defined a line between 
the program SHRDLU and the SHRDLU that runs on a particular 
platform, such as your PC. Initially I thought this was a problem, but upon 
reflection I believe that it is acceptable to avoid claims about the boundaries 
of alien objects, since I am not SHRDLU and am unclear on its alien 
world. In any case, this is probably a question best left to media or platform 
studies academics.
Other authors cited in this book have attempted studies of technological 
artefacts without making a distinction between physical object and 
associated incorporeal objects, but I have found that this shifts focus from 
the qualities and relations of the object of study. It is a similar move to 
anthropomorphism, removing the anxiety from the study of alien objects 
into a realm with which we are comfortable, and always retaining an 
approach that focusses our minds on the cultural, political and social 
impacts that anthropomorphic machines seem to make. We should instead 
see these impacts as they might appear from the machine’s point of 
view: consequences of relations with texts, disciplines, cultural theorists, 
journalists, philosophy and ideology.
Social constructivism need not be excluded from the nonhuman turn. 
Rather, elements of “the social” are rightly interpreted using the same 
concepts and language as are other nonhumans. Authors who reject the 
social in their analysis do not do so because OOO is inherently apolitical, 
but out of a preoccupation with either particular objects or particular 
economic or political views. Certain viewpoints or predispositions on the 
part of the theorist play a role in both the kinds of objects studied and the 
insights gleaned from studying them. In fact, this book has shown that 
OOO’s flat ontology and Harman’s model of object relations may facilitate 
a political study of nonhumans. The first step is to acknowledge that all 
objects, and not just human beings, sense, experience, and react to the world 
around them. The alien phenomenology of technological artefacts may 
reveal much about human culture. We build human control of technological 
artefacts into their very structure. Therefore, technological artefacts can be 
made to reveal power relations that are relevant to humans. Some of these 
power relations involve “social” concepts such as the concept of the gynoid 
sexbot, feminism, artificial intelligence and capitalism.
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In OOO, even though objects really do exist and really have their own 
qualities, no object can ever have complete knowledge of any other object’s 
internal experience. Speculation, the product of educated guesswork, is 
the only tool that we ever have to access that internal world. But this is 
not necessarily a weakness. Alien phenomenology is always affected by the 
ideological bent of the observer, and OOO puts this front and centre and 
impossible to avoid. This is another reason why I believe OOO makes a 
useful framework for political analysis. It simultaneously focusses on that 
which is objectively real while emphasising the unknowability of that reality, 
and the bias of any commentator. Just as a robot tortoise is only able to 
sense certain kinds of objects (photons, bumps in the floor), I have only 
been able to interact with the case studies in certain ways. This text relates 
the details of my own relations with these anthropomorphic machines, 
relations that are affected by my own internal qualities. Because of my 
geographical and temporal location, training, and values, another person’s 
description of the case studies would reveal different sensory relations.
OOO is an inherently valuable approach for political and cultural work, 
but only when we study multiple sources. Speculation is problematic if it 
is too much associated with one author’s corpus of work.596 They may only 
shed light on the perspective of a few people (and particularly if all those 
people happen to be white English-speaking males, as was largely the case 
early in OOO’s history). OOO is actually a good starting place for political 
analysis, because it invites and acknowledges the partial nature of particular 
human relations with nonhumans. My analysis is not your analysis. It can 
consequently be used to chart the dialectical nature of human-centric shifts 
surrounding objects – moments of polarisation and synthesis – and the 
vivacious tension that is characteristic of political and cultural objects.
Technological relations beyond anthropomorphism
We are human beings and our worlds are filling with transformative 
technologies that don’t just change our relationships with the world 
but with ourselves. In accordance with the understanding that relations 
are bidirectional, we change technologies and technologies change 
us. We are vulnerable to a phenomenon that is not even a real object: 
anthropomorphism, that prominent component of sensory objects formed 
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between us and so many different nonhumans. Anthropomorphism and the 
rejection of anthropomorphism characterise technological discourse and 
blind us to alien processes, including ones that involve humans. Humans 
are either too involved or not involved enough in technological events. 
Discourse is polarised and we play out the same arguments over and over 
while critical studies are isolated, curated and impoverished. There is 
attention to discipline-specific research without the synthesis that can be 
achieved through OOO’s model of real and sensual objects. Objects make 
assumptions about other objects. There is no alternative; objects conceal 
themselves and only take away metaphorical impressions of other objects. 
An object could not reveal every part of themselves to another object, even 
if it wanted to. Nothing can know everything about something else. And 
humans are no exception. Nonhumans are so remote and alien that we 
will never fully appreciate the sensations and experiences of, say, a carbon 
molecule, either through the natural sciences or the humanities. But that is a 
poor excuse for not trying.
Nor is it the case that OOO is only a platform for rhapsodising over 
the mysterious and exciting worlds that nonhumans inhabit. There is only 
limited value in commending anthropomorphic machines for their abilities 
to blend in or to assert their alien natures. There is a role for OOO in this 
kind of practice, certainly; creative fields have begun to embrace OOO and 
its capacity to inspire a new way of looking at nonhumans. But how useful 
is it to bathe in metaphors after discovering that they are our only access 
to the universe? What use is it to revel in the apparently surprising notion 
that we are just another kind of object? Behar describes Harman’s (and 
others male philosophers’) use of terms like “allure”, “withdrawal”, and 
“access” as a fetishisation or “exoticism of objects”.597 Objects are made 
erotically appealing through their weirdness and their inaccessibility. There 
is clearly scope for investigating the exoticism of objects in creative works, 
but in the study of anthropomorphic machines it is too tempting to play up 
the weirdness that draws us into interaction with them. They are already 
alluring; they fascinate us. And they are already inaccessible and withdrawn; 
they unnerve us.
Studying the nonhuman worlds of anthropomorphic machines is, in 
some ways, more difficult than studying the world of gold nuggets or plastic 
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bags. Because the case studies in this book do things humans do, like sense 
light, move independently and use language, it is very tempting to ignore 
those aspects of robots and AI that do not resemble humans. Humans do 
not possess the tools to appreciate the alien in anthropomorphic machines. 
Characterising SHRDLU’s relation with the computer keyboard (for 
example) as an embodiment, hermeneutic or alterity relationship (as in 
postphenomenology) proved an interesting exercise in metaphorism, but 
ultimately revealed that they are just that: metaphors. Language is limiting, 
and although Bogost’s concept of carpentry suggests creative illuminations, 
it can still only provide a partial view of nonhumans.
Language is a hindrance to the alien phenomenology of 
anthropomorphic machines because it is so often used to conceal aspects 
of these nonhumans that we would rather not acknowledge. In Chapter 
2, this book discussed the collective and naïve alien phenomenology 
performed by the users of the Kinect-artefact. The Kinect-brand used 
anthropomorphic language to sell the Kinect-artefact, speaking of sight and 
hearing to imply that human users would experience a more immersive and 
human-like entertainment experience. What an alluring spectacle those early 
announcements were! When those promises proved underwhelming, humans 
embarked on the project of learning more about the Kinect-artefact, testing 
its ability to detect human bodies and parse human languages, and thus 
making deductions about its inner qualities. We collectively discovered the 
alienness of Kinect-artefacts and our limited ability to access them.
Similarly, we saw in Chapter 5 that anthropomorphic language 
encourages certain kinds of relationships between sexbots and their cultural, 
legal and political contexts. The concept of the gynoid sexbot, which has its 
own way of being in the world, is in strong relation with linguistic objects 
such as texts and authors. These texts and authors can choose to employ 
different rhetorical devices to make sexbots more sympathetic to us or 
uncanny to us according to their needs. As we have seen, emphasising 
uncanny or inhuman qualities is a common tactic of those who wish to 
provoke shock and panic in readers. Portraying them as cold, doll-like 
creations with plastic skin and contrived artificial intelligence prompts 
concerns that human women, which they greatly resemble, might be tarred 
with the same brush. On the other hand, anthropomorphic language aims to 
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make these creepy aliens seem like more viable sexual or romantic partners, 
and may also make them seem more deserving of our protection.
In some ways our choice of words regarding anthropomorphic machines 
does not just determine our opinion of them, but their position in society. 
The persistent theme of resistance of human-imposed groupings of objects 
in this book has revealed metaphor to be a barrier, but also a potential 
ally. It is a barrier because grouping objects together, whether through 
an abstract concept (e.g. Kinect-brand) or simply through pluralisation 
(Kinect-artefacts) encourages us to ignore the qualities and relations of 
individual nonhumans. Thus, we struggle to appreciate the alien nature of 
specific and situated artefacts in the same way that we tend to appreciate 
the alien nature of other humans or even of named individuals like Elsie 
and Harmony. But we can turn this around and use it to our advantage. 
Respect for the individual qualities, worlds and relations of each separate 
artefact inhibits the interpretation of stereotypes as reflections of groups 
of individuals. How can we expect to see humanity reflected back at us in 
our creations? Why, through alien phenomenology. Through the rejection 
of human-devised groupings. The acknowledgement of the agency of 
both Kinect-brand and Kinect-artefact, Harmony and the concept of the 
gynoid sexbot, Machina speculatrix and the description of Elsie appearing 
to recognise herself in the mirror, the penetration of SHRDLU into AI 
literature and the Java-enabled copy responding to external cues from a 
specific system. The study of a specific gynoid sexbot (the box in which 
she sits in a warehouse, distant machines that create rumblings that cause 
her body parts to jiggle, the friction of plastic against metal, the dynamic 
vibration of iron) means bestowing on the specific artefact a quality that 
is valued in humans but ignored in machines: individuality. We can avoid 
the ancient error that prohibits thinking about individuals that are not as 
powerful as us. Not all Harmonys are alike. Each sex robot is entangled 
in its own web of relations with its own struggles. Making big statements 
about what each robot wants or needs is a convenient way of connecting 
specific gynoid sexbots to our present cultural context. We mass Harmonys 
together, homogenising them in our minds, the way that powerful humans 
have always thought about groups with little power: foreigners, poor 
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people, women. Is this what we want for our creations? Is this the version of 
humanity that we want to bestow on them?
I hope that the case studies and ideas presented here have provoked 
an interest in the phenomenology of alien nonhumans that appear and 
behave like humans. This book has attempted a very sweeping view, 
both of contemporary theories in the philosophy of technology as well 
as in the study of individual anthropomorphic technological artefacts. 
Anthropomorphism in technology takes many different forms and the aim 
here has been to try to discuss several of them in some detail. The attempt 
has been to show that while some technologies, like humanoid robots, 
might seem to be highly anthropomorphic, they only possess parts of our 
humanity, carefully selected by the creator. By the same token, SHRDLU 
was highly anthropomorphised in its behaviour with coloured blocks and 
language but with very few other anthropomorphic qualities. Just as we 
cannot really know what it is like to be a thing, a thing cannot really know 
what it is like to be us. To really understand what it is like to be a robot, 
we would have to become a robot. For a robot to really understand what 
it is like to be a human, it would have to become a human. There is no 
possibility of a true artificial human, except in the sense of a clone or some 
other technologically conceived human. As stated in the introduction to this 
book, we need to be conscious of anthropomorphism as a manipulative tool 
that is capable of endearing certain objects to humans.598 Consequently, 
we have a responsibility to understand the motivations, innermost qualities 
and ways of being in the world of these anthropomorphic machines. Not 
just for their own sake, but for the sake of the groups of people who are 
depicted (or explicitly not depicted) in anthropomorphic representations. 
Alien phenomenology of anthropomorphic objects is a way of analysing the 
tool of anthropomorphism, decentring its role in the being of an object, and 
building a more effective critical study of technology.
The nonhumans we build of inert earthly compounds then become our 
slaves, our transformative agents, our source of terror and of strength. They 
create a mundane and under-theorised web around us, unnoticed unless 
something goes wrong. We force them to participate in social and sexual 
intercourse with us, and we fear a future in which we will be bit players in 
a theatre of warring artificial minds. We send them out into space carrying 
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what may be the last surviving remnant of human culture. But despite this 
fear we continue to see ourselves in the nonhuman. To create human-like 
hyperobjects that will last millennia as they slowly rust and decay under 
the sea or float endlessly through space. To find evidence of emotion and 
ethical decision-making in actor-networks made of plastic and metal and 
ideas. They bear the logos of corporations and the faces of academics, all 
the while experiencing a set of relations and internal events that we could 
not begin to appreciate. We thought we were building copies of ourselves, 
but what we actually built was a species of deceptive aliens whose purpose, 
we have determined, is to blend in as much as possible. We have concealed 
the alien nature of these objects whenever we could, and in so doing 
we have concealed the qualities that so often bring us to grief when the 
anthropomorphic illusion fails. We bring anthropomorphic machines into 
the world in imitation of us, as an idealised vision of us, a tool of inquiry 
into our nature. But we have so little interest in what makes them different 
from us, and therefore ironically rob them of the privileges that near-human 
identity is supposed to bestow.
The core argument of this book really is very simple. But it calls for 
challenging work. It would be work that resists so much of our historical 
narratives about technology. It is not work focussed on the transformative 
qualities of technology. And it is not work addressing ways in which the 
human and the nonhuman are mutually constitutive and mediating. It is 
an orientation of thought toward how the technological artefact senses, 
experiences and acts in its world: sensations, experiences and actions that 
may only be peripherally concerned with human beings. Human experiences 
exist amongst the alien experiences of nonhuman objects in a world that 
we must share. Acknowledging this is a commonly overlooked first step 
in establishing useful links between humans, human society and the 
nonhumans that are so important for our continued existence, health, and 
happiness. We must theorise the alien before we make it our ally.
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Emphasising the alien qualities of anthro-
pomorphic technologies, Machine Sensation 
makes a conscious effort to increase rather 
than decrease the tension between nonhu-
man and human experience. In a series of 
rigorously executed cases studies, includ-
ing natural user interfaces, artificial intel-
ligence as well as sex robots, Leach shows 
how object-oriented ontology enables one to 
insist upon the unhuman nature  
of technology while still acknowledging  
its immense power and significance in hu-
man life.
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